PRC Partnership Diplomacy in the New Era

Executive Summary:

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has an extensive taxonomy of diplomatic relations, with at least 42 unique combinations of adjectives for different partnerships. The PRC has never delineated the ranking of these partnerships explicitly, though there is enough available information to determine a loose hierarchy.
• The adjective that carries the most weight is “all-weather (全天侯)” or, in the case of Kazakhstan, “permanent (永久).” The elevation of 30 African nations to an “all-weather community of common destiny” in September indicates the importance the PRC sees in its relations with the continent.
• The PRC continues to avoid traditional alliances, favoring flexible partnerships instead. This approach allows Beijing to foster international cooperation without political entanglements.
• The terms “community of common destiny” and “new era” have grown in importance in recent years and reflect alignment on specific strategic challenges, especially against the United States. The PRC deploys the combination of phrases carefully to individual countries to maximize their strategic value.

In an unprecedented mass promotion, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has elevated 30 African countries in its diplomatic hierarchy (MFA, September 6). The shift was made last week in Beijing at the 9th triennial Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which 51 African leaders attended. Every nation on the continent now has at least a “strategic partnership” with the PRC, except for Eswatini, which recognizes Taiwan. In his speech at the forum, PRC President Xi Jinping also announced that the national leaders had all agreed to “elevate China-Africa relations [as a whole] to an ‘all-weather China-Africa community of common destiny for the new era’ (将中非关系提升为新时代全天候中非命运共同体).”

“Partnership diplomacy” plays a central role in PRC foreign policy. Through its partnership network, Beijing seeks to shore up global support by swelling its ranks of various types of partners. There are no direct economic or institutional implications to becoming a “strategic partner” of the PRC, nor are there necessarily material benefits to advancing to the level of “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Such promotions can be significant in other ways, however. For partner countries, being officially designated a close partner can provide opportunity for real cooperation.

The PRC Prefers Partners, Not Allies

The PRC does not do alliances in the traditional sense, preferring to conduct relations through a variety of partnerships. Beijing began articulating its policy of “partnership, not alliance (结伴不结盟)” before the end of the Cold War, but partnership diplomacy gathered speed in the 1990s. In 1993, the PRC established its first strategic partnership with Brazil (State Council, July 26; MFA, accessed September 16). [1] Beijing saw partnership diplomacy as key to maintaining a flexible, independent foreign policy, providing room to concentrate on development (Gov.cn, December 23, 2014). By eschewing alliances, the PRC could reap the benefits of friendly economic cooperation with everyone while avoiding entanglements. This non-confrontational approach has been incorporated into the PRC’s narrative of its “peaceful rise (和平掘起).” A 2011 white paper published by the State Council Information Office on “peaceful development,” for example, reiterated a promise to not “form an alliance with any other country” (Gov.cn, September 6, 2011).

As strategic competition with the United States has come into sharper focus, partnership diplomacy has begun to constitute a vector of the PRC’s asymmetric response to the United States’ value-based alliance system. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rhetoric explicitly frames the PRC’s approach as a contrast to that of the United States (MFA, March 13). While the United States maintains a “cold war mentality (冷战思维),” sowing division to maintain hegemony, Beijing promotes cooperative, non-exclusive partnerships based on the principles of non-interference and mutual respect.

This narrative is a core part of the PRC’s value proposition to the Global South. Beijing seeks a values-agnostic “democratization of the international order (国际关系民主化)” and proposes the creation of a harmonious “global community of common destiny (人类命运共同体)” (CPC News, January 14, 2022; Gov.cn, September 26, 2023). [2] These CCP concepts increasingly have been inserted into partnership statements in recent years. This helps build support for Beijing’s global leadership and its vision for a new international order. Partnerships such as that established with South Africa at FOCAC denote relations with countries that Beijing considers firmly onside in its fight against US hegemony (MFA, September 3).

‘Strategic’ and ‘Comprehensive’ Partners

The PRC’s diplomatic hierarchy is extensive, but it does not cover every country, and there are several states whose relations fall outside the ordered rubric. A 1961 mutual defense treaty with North Korea suggests that Beijing does have one ally. The treaty has never been invoked, however, and it is unclear whether the PRC would abide by it. The United States, meanwhile, is uniquely important to the PRC, yet exists outside of the partnership system. Countries like Cuba are also oddities—leaders from both countries have pledged to support a “China-Cuba community of common destiny” but have not actually established any formal level of partnership, perhaps on Havana’s insistence (Xinhua, July 9; see China Brief, July 26).

Flexibility within the partnership system is unsurprising. The different levels have never been clearly delineated in official publications, but context, along with some explanation from PRC officials and academics, is enough to determine a loose hierarchy. Certain adjectives appear to carry consistent meanings, for instance (IISS, October 20, 2023). One of the biggest distinctions is between partnerships that are described as “strategic (战略)” and those that are not. Another important adjective is “comprehensive (全面).” Some partnerships are “comprehensive,” yet not “strategic,” but generally partnerships progress from “strategic” to “comprehensive strategic.” Another common descriptor is “cooperative (合作).” This is sometimes adjoined to both strategic and non-strategic partnerships. All are straightforward in meaning. “Strategic” implies long-term, close cooperation on issues of global importance, while “comprehensive partnerships” encompass all dimensions of cooperation.

There are currently 42 unique combinations of adjectives for different partnerships. This indicates that the descriptors for PRC partnerships with many individual countries are tailor-made. For instance, the United Kingdom is the only country to have a “Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century” with the PRC. [3] The adjective that carries the most weight in the hierarchy is “all-weather (全天侯)” or, in the case of Kazakhstan, “permanent (永久).” These both imply very close relations that are expected to remain stable in the long term. Until 2019, only the PRC’s relationship with Pakistan was officially described as “all-weather” partnership. In 2019, Kazakhstan was also dubbed “permanent,” with the “all-weather” moniker likely avoided to preserve the unique nature of Sino-Pakistan relations. Since then, Beijing has increased its circle of very close friends and has normalized use of the term “all-weather.” Additions include Belarus in 2022, Venezuela and Ethiopia in 2023, Uzbekistan and Hungary in 2024, and now Africa as a whole.

‘Community of Common Destiny’ and the ‘New Era’

Two phrases that have emerged more frequently in recent diplomatic statements are “community of common destiny” (hereafter “CCD”) and “[…for the] new era.” At FOCAC, alongside the continent-level PRC-Africa CCD, Beijing established at least four bilateral CCDs with Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, Senegal, and Zimbabwe (FMPRC, September 4 [1] [2]; September 6; MFA, September 4). Not all of these were partnerships “for the new era,” however.

Both phrases are established rhetoric under Xi Jinping. The “new era,” included in the CCP constitution in 2017, is an assessment that the world has entered a period in which the global balance of power is shifting in the PRC’s favor (China Brief, November 10, 2017). CCD is also a central concept in Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, the PRC’s current foreign policy doctrine. It predates Xi, but has been promoted under his watch and refers to a utopian vision of PRC-led harmony and interconnectedness—a “global village” in which “all human beings are one big family” (The Diplomat, October 25, 2017; Belt and Road Forum, September 2023). While light on detail, the concept is defined in opposition to the status quo of unequal international relations presided over by the United States. CCD is pitched at the global, multilateral, and bilateral levels.

Beijing Ramps Up CCD Partnerships

In 2016, the PRC and Laos signed a joint statement, affirming that they “are a CCD with strategic significance (是具有战略意义的命运共同体)” (MFA, May 4, 2016). This was followed in 2019 with a CCD “Action Plan,” referred to as the PRC’s first bilateral document on building a CCD (though a similar action plan was signed two days prior with Cambodia) (QS Theory, May 1, 2019). The term “community of common destiny with strategic significance” is used to refer to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, which have also established CCDs with the PRC. Pakistan was also an early CCD partner, agreeing to “build a closer China-Pakistan community of common destiny in the new era” in November 2018 (Gov.cn, November 4, 2018).

Beijing stepped up expansion of the CCD concept in 2022. In 2022–2023, the PRC issued joint statements with 11 countries, the language used by the PRC in joint statements with 11 countries to describe ‘building’ a bilateral CCD closely resembled that used in endorsements of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative (MFA, May 9). From January to September 2024, the PRC established 7 new CCDs, including its first with a European country: Serbia. In total, the PRC has established bilateral CCDs with at least 22 countries. Additional countries have paid lip-service to the CCD concept but have not yet announced joint statements affirming this position. For instance, Xi Jinping has formally proposed the PRC-Vanuatu and PRC-Egypt CCDs, but joint statements are still forthcoming (Bastille Post, July 12). Establishing a CCD with the PRC remains a more exclusive privilege than signing up to OBOR, which is consciously inclusive and open to endorsement from anyone. Joint statements on CCDs effectively function as an endorsement of the PRC’s global vision, and do not necessarily entail material benefits in themselves for partner countries. This makes them less clearly beneficial to agree to than signing on to OBOR.

An official commitment to a CCD is not by itself a distinct level of partnership but an additional marker of the nature of a partnership. It symbolizes that the partner country is ideologically aligned with Beijing’s global vision, but also that Beijing is invested in positive, long-term relations. As with the various partnership levels, differences in precise language suggest a gradation. For example, a 2024 joint statement with Timor-Leste, not a particularly important country for the PRC, says that the countries agree to “work towards building a China–Timor-Leste community of common destiny” (MFA, July 29). At FOCAC this year, the PRC and Eritrea also agreed to “strive to build a high-level China-Eritrea and China-Africa community of common destiny” (MFA, September 3). In both cases, the language suggests that these countries are not quite at the level of actually “building” a “community of common destiny” with the PRC.

Russia Leads ‘New Era’ Partnerships

Beijing has also recently begun establishing partnerships with the descriptor “[…for the] new era.” There is some overlap between countries that have established CCDs with the PRC and those that have “new era” partnerships, but fewer countries have the “new era” formulation in their partnership title than those with CCDs. These include Belarus, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, the Solomon Islands, Uzbekistan, Hungary, and, most recently, South Africa.

Russia was the first country to establish a “new era” partnership with the PRC in June 2019. This is indicative of the term’s significance (Xinhua, June 5, 2019). Whereas a CCD indicates deep, long-term alignment, and an intertwining of futures across a range of areas, the “new era” nomenclature is more issue specific. It is a narrower sign of alignment with the PRC’s strategic vision and challenge to the status quo. The upgrade of Sino-Russian relations to a partnership befitting a “new era” is connected to another CCP slogan, “great changes unseen in a century (百年未有之大变局)” (see China Brief, November 21, 2023). As with the “new era” phrase, this refers to the decline of US hegemony and the arrival of a multipolar world order (People’s Daily Online, June 6, 2019). This ideological alignment is the foundation of the Sino-Russian relationship and can be traced from the 1997 Joint-Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order all the way to the current “new era” partnership (UN Digital Library, accessed September 16). By declaring a partnership fit for a “new era,” Beijing recognizes a country’s alignment with its wider strategic view of international relations.

Hungary and Serbia Illustrate Partnerships’ Differences

Establishing a CCD indicates support for the PRC’s global vision, but more broadly and perhaps less boldly than signing on to the “new era.” It also suggests a closer economic and cultural link that is absent from the “new era” designation. The difference is subtle. Hungary established an “All-Weather Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the New Era,” with the PRC in May 2024, but has not established a CCD. Serbia, on the other hand, only has a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” with the PRC, but in May 2024 became the first European country to establish a CCD with the PRC.

Making this distinction allows Beijing to treat each of its closest friends in Europe as unique partners but it also reflects a real difference between the Sino-Serbian and Sino-Hungarian relationships. Serbia has stronger links to the PRC than Hungary. The PRC has made several important greenfield investments in Serbia over the past decade and the Export-Import Bank of China has extended billions of dollars in loans for Serbian projects. The country is also engaged with the PRC in tourism and educational exchanges. There is even an emotional tenor to the relationship—a Chinese cultural center recently opened in Belgrade on the site of the PRC embassy that was destroyed during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 (Global Times, May 9). Hungary on the other hand has fewer important economic links with the PRC but is a more important actor on the international stage. As a member of both the European Union and NATO, it is a key partner to cultivate in the “new era.”

Conclusion

The PRC has a complicated taxonomy for its diplomatic relations with other countries. Two phrases have become important descriptors in recent years, adding nuance to the various levels of “strategic” and “comprehensive” partnerships. These are the concepts of a “community of common destiny” and the “new era.” Both are deployed in partnership diplomacy to advance PRC narratives through endorsements from other countries. While CCD signals support for PRC ambitions more broadly, “new era” partners are those who seem more closely aligned with Beijing’s desire to fight against US hegemony. As the country’s domestic economic troubles and tensions with the West persist, Beijing is increasing its efforts to seek partners in the Global South. Monitoring the evolution of the PRC’s partnerships will indicate where its influence is gaining traction, and in which domains that traction is taking hold.

Notes

[1] As Wang Yi goes on to say in the speech cited, Brazil was not only the PRC’s first strategic partner, but also its first comprehensive strategic partner in Latin American and the first Latin American country to surpass the $100 billion mark in bilateral trade with the PRC.

[2] The “community of shared future” is Beijing’s updated, preferred English translation for “命运共同体.” The original official translation was “community of common destiny.” Outside of direct quotation of English-language sources, China Brief prefers to stick with the latter, which more closely reflects the Chinese term.

[3] This was established during the so-called “golden-era” of Sino-British relations presided over by former UK Chancellor George Osborne.

[4] The exact phrasing in the 2019 joint statement is “changes in the world situation (世界形势变化).”