The West Must Carefully Consider True Meaning of Putin’s Red Lines

Executive Summary:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin has again threatened Western countries with nuclear retaliation, claiming that Ukraine’s use of Western weapons means direct participation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries in his war against Ukraine.
• Western states should respond to this the same way they have to the previous threats: take note and proceed with their plans anyways, acknowledging that Putin is afraid of drastic and unpopular steps.
• The Kremlin does not know how to respond to Western countries crossing its redlines and therefore relies on intimidating rhetoric. In some cases this use of language is still fulfilling its role, as it has occasionally succeeded in hindering the West from assisting Ukraine. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin, in an interview with Russian media following the Forum on United Cultures, once again threatened Western countries. In his speech, Putin emphasized that allowing the use of Western, primarily US-made, weapons in strikes on Russian territory would mean direct participation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries in the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine (Kremlin.ru; Lenta.ru, September 12). This statement caused great controversy in the Western political environment, but it is worth taking a more sober look at the situation. 

This is not the first time Putin has threatened war with NATO countries. Poorly veiled threats of using nuclear weapons were made on the first day of the so-called “special military operation” when Putin declared that if anyone tried to interfere in the conflict, the response would be unimaginably harsh, using all available measures (see EDM, March 7, 2022). Moreover, Putin instructed his defense minister to put Russia’s strategic nuclear forces on special alert. This caused much controversy in the expert community, as such a regime is not prescribed in the relevant nuclear strategy documents. Putin’s signal was clearly intended to stop Western countries from helping Ukraine, but it did not work (RBC, February 27, 2022). Since then, various Russian officials have repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons, raising the topic with varying degrees of persuasiveness and eloquence. A hawkish example is former Russian president and current Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, who repeatedly warns of a possible nuclear response in all forms of media available to him (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, July 23, 2023; RBC, February 7; T.me/medveev_telegram, June 28, September 14).

In early 2024, Putin’s mouthpiece, Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov, admitted that the war in Ukraine is, in truth, a war against the West, in effect going over his boss’s head (see EDM, April 1; Argumenty i Fakty, March 22). The very thesis that the war in Ukraine is essentially a war against the West has been the essence of Russian propaganda since 2014. Russian government-controlled media has demonstrated this trend repeatedly. The Kremlin’s argument is that the 2014 Maidan Uprising/Revolution of Dignity which overthrew former Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych was inspired by the United States, who led the rebels directly from its embassy in Kyiv (Parlamentskaya Gazeta, February 19, 2015; see EDM, February 25, 2022). After that, according to Russian propaganda, Ukraine essentially came under the control of Washington. It is from this understanding of the world that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s “regime” has since been denounced as a puppet state (Argumenty i Fakty, May 18). That is why Putin does not seek to negotiate with the Ukrainian leadership but insists on negotiating with the United States, which, he is convinced, is the primary beneficiary of this war.

This is not a new rhetoric in Russian propaganda and politics, but a repetition of old, long-standing theses used in the Russian media for at least a decade. How the West responds to these is essential. Western states would benefit from responding the same way they have to the previous threats: take them into account but proceed from the fact that Putin himself is afraid of drastic and unpopular steps, whether in the political or military sphere. Even his old friend, former defense minister and current Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu, was dismissed only when it was no longer possible to turn a blind eye to corruption and theft in the army (see EDM, May 16). The Kremlin carefully attempted to impede the spread of knowledge of such corruption among the Russian people without revealing that something was wrong (Meduza, May 12). The catastrophic situation in the armed forces was known years ago, in fact, revealed by work done by Alexei Navalny and other Russian journalists (Gazeta.ru, December 3, 2025; The Moscow Times, May 19, 2017). 

The government changed little after the recent presidential election in Russia in March 2024 (see EDM, March 25). All key positions remained with the same people, suggesting that Putin is becoming less and less politically flexible as he ages. The same is true in the military sphere. Some circumstantial evidence suggests that the September 2022 mobilization was only undertaken with great difficulty. As a result, Putin is likely delaying the decision to begin a new wave of mobilization, knowing that it could cause complications in Russia (see EDM, July 27, September 18, 2023, April 30; RBC, June 7).

Mobilization is highly unpopular in the country, which goes counter to Western propagandists who claim that support for the war against Ukraine is ubiquitous across society, with all Russians large or small, fiercely supporting it (see EDM, December 21, 2023, February 29, April 1, September 10; RTVi, August 31). Mobilization is a fundamentally unpopular measure and, according to key opinion polls, it would dramatically reduce Putin’s support This could be seen in 2022, as the September mobilization significantly lowered Putin’s approval rating, according to polling done by the most independent sociological research organization in Russia, the Levada Center (SibReal, September 29, 2022; see EDM, November 17, EDM, 2022). Beyond this, many could be said to have “voted with their feet,” as the mobilization drive triggered a mass exodus of individuals who opposed the war or who did not want to fight in it. Putin has many reasons, then, to avoid taking any drastic steps toward mobilization. 

Another reason that Putin looks to avoid overt mobilization is that he realizes that the war is not going according to plan. There are no prospects for a quick victory, and Putin’s only hope is that the West will get tired of the war before the Russians do and decide to stop helping Ukraine. At the same time, Russian propaganda maintains the illusion of control over the situation, claiming that “everything is going according to plan” and “everything is under control.” Alternatively, the Kremlin and its media outlets simply ignore unpleasant news, such as the Ukrainian operation in Kursk oblast (see EDM, August 14, 15). Any drastic steps would send a very troubling message that something is going wrong, that the President is losing control. Therefore, any decisive developments—be they mobilization, abrupt personnel changes, declarations of war against Western countries, or military strikes against Western bases, for example, in Poland or the Baltics—seem highly undesirable to Putin today. This is to say nothing of the use of nuclear weapons, even tactical ones, against Ukraine’s armed forces. The consequences of these steps are difficult to predict, though the negative ones are more obvious.

Putin and his entourage, which value stability above all else, are not prepared to take such steps without extraordinary circumstances. That is why Putin’s threats to consider NATO countries as participants in the war should be perceived in the same way as his previous threats about the Kremlin’s “red lines” in Ukraine. Western countries have repeatedly crossed said lines, but Russia has not responded adequately. 

The Kremlin does not know how to respond and relies on intimidating rhetoric. Unfortunately, this rhetoric is, to some extent, fulfilling its role, hindering the West from assisting Ukraine (see EDM, June 4). Such hesitation, fed by open fear of Putin’s threats, not only undermines Western resolve and NATO’s image worldwide but also makes it harder for Ukrainians to keep Russian troops at bay. Ukrainian manpower is not infinite, and without Western support, it could run out before Russia tires.