Russia’s Prospective Childfree Ban Becomes New Way to Control Society

Executive Summary: 

• The Russian State Duma announced that it conceptually supports a new law to ban “the childfree ideology,” that is, the conscious refusal to have children in Russia, in an effort to “preserve family values.”
• In practice, these measures are not capable of improving Russia’s declining population, but may become a new means to control citizens and open the way for unlimited abuse by officials.
• Repressive laws are created in Russia not only as instruments of reprisal against dissidents, but also to keep ordinary people in constant fear of the government and under the Kremlin’s control. 

At the end of September, Russia renewed its consideration of a law forbidding “the childfree ideology” (чайлдфри), referring to people’s averseness to having children. The bill, introduced in the State Duma two years ago, was set aside for modifications at the time. While discussions surrounding the bill occurred over the summer, on September 23, reports confirmed that the government “conceptually supports the proposed bill, forbidding propaganda in support of the childfree ideology” (TASS, June 27; RBC, September 23). According to these reports, “the bill is intended to preserve and strengthen traditional family values” and “foresees the establishment of protection against dissemination on the internet, media, films, and advertisements of information propagandizing the refusal to have children” (RIA Novosti, September 23). Russia is in a serious demographic crisis, as its death rate rapidly increases due to the war, contributing to Russia’s drastic population decline (see EDM, October 24, 2023). The Kremlin can only do so much to improve the birthrate. In order to do so, it turns to its preferred method: repression and control over its citizens.

Experts note that no ban could significantly increase the birthrate in Russia because modern lifestyles and the reproductive inclinations of people are well-established (Forbes.ru, January 30, 2023). In this regard, there are abundant objective reasons for people to refuse to have children in Russia, primarily poverty and war (Istories.media, September 24). According to the Russian research company “Russian Field,” 17 percent of childless Russians do not want children due to poverty and unemployment (RussianField.com, August 23). Contrary to the Kremlin’s concerns, according to data reported by the General Director of the (state-owned) Russian Public Opinion Research Center, Konstantin Abramov, only 6 percent of Russians think childlessness is an ideal option. This opinion, if stretched, will likely be considered a hostile “ideological” attitude (TASS, September 3). 

The authors and supporters of the bill term the childfree ideology “a dangerous instrument of information warfare” (Вashinform.ru, June 28). No organization propagandizing such views exists. Independent journalists fear that, in practice, this repression could affect anyone who publicly admits that they are not yet ready to have children (Istories.media, September 24). A similar situation arose previously following a ban on the non-existent “movement in support of non-traditional sexual relations,” which made it possible to recognize any representative of the LGBT community or people who sympathize with them as an “extremist” (Istories.media, November 17, 2023).

The new law is not so much intended to increase the birthrate in Russia as it is to create conditions for the legal persecution of anyone who has mentioned that, for one reason or another, they do not desire to have a child any time soon. This particularly wide reach is becoming characteristic of contemporary Russian repressive laws. These laws are intended to both combat dissidents and spread fear by increasing the number of people who risk being charged with a criminal or an administrative offense. In other words, the Kremlin’s ever-expanding regulations rely on fear of prosecution to control behavior, assuming that citizens in turn will do their best to avoid charges (see EDM, July 10, August 7, 14). For example, in September, an inhabitant of Tyumen oblast was charged with treason because he worked as a programmer in a foreign organization (Кommersant.ru, September 19). 

Such laws, combined with their extremely broad interpretation, are an excellent way to control people. Law enforcement agencies and the special services can blackmail a person by initiating a criminal case against them, demanding money or “services” (see EDM, June 27, July 29). If those who have consciously chosen the path of dissidence are resistant to such pressure, the Kremlin will feel provoked, leading ordinary people to become the target of yet another repressive law—and subsequently succumb more easily to blackmail.

Notably, having children does not guarantee the absence of repression from a law such as this. The Russian government has often held leverage over families by taking their children away. In 2017, independent journalists wrote that guardianship authorities most often take children not from socially disadvantaged parents who altogether lack the ability to take care of their children but from poor people, even in cases where living conditions are not dangerous for the child. There are also frequent cases when, after fires, the state has not provided sufficient compensation to the victims, and social services, instead of helping the affected families, have taken their children away (Novaya Gazeta, January 20, 2017).

Since the beginning of the full-scale war with Ukraine, taking children has become another way to put pressure on dissidents. The most high-profile case of this was when the state sent 13-year-old Masha Moskaleva to a juvenile detention center after she drew an anti-war picture in an art class at school. A case was opened against Masha’s father under the article on “discrediting the army,” and he was placed under house arrest. The girl was first sent to an orphanage and then handed over to her mother, who had previously refused to take the child for several years. In a letter to his daughter, Masha’s father told her to go with any relative that would be willing to take her instead of staying in state custody, as it would be safer, likely due to the nature of his “crime” (Svoboda.org, April 8, 2023).

Another means of keeping society under control is the immense debt many Russians have, which is only growing. In September, the Central Bank of Russia raised the interest rate to 19 percent, and other banks are following its example (see EDM, August 20). Despite this, individuals continue to borrow hundreds of billions of rubles a month—and companies, trillions. The Russian population’s income has recently been growing, so people are trying to get ahead of price increases by buying as much as possible (see EDM, August 1, 20). Experts warn, however, that income growth will slow next year, making repaying loans more difficult (Istories.media, September 25). One of the main motives for many contract soldiers who have signed up to be sent to the war against Ukraine was to be able to repay debts, creating a perverse incentive for the Russian government to keep its citizens in debt (YouTube.com, April 29).

Manipulating public opinion is the ultimate means of keeping ordinary people under control. Recently, Russian propagandists claim that the problem in Russian society is not the loss of everyday joys of life, such as enjoying entertainment, bars, or movie theaters—which they make a point to claim is continuing as usual, especially in the occupied territories of Ukraine—but that people who do not pay attention to the war are not involved in the “great historical test that is being carried out before their eyes” (Vzglyad, September 26). This includes the overwhelming majority of Russians, against most of whom the Kremlin could easily launch a targeted campaign of harassment. This technique was used, for example, against the participants of the “almost naked” party, whose organizers then not only recorded “repentant” videos, but also began traveling to Donbas, including occupied Mariupol (see EDM, January 17; Svoboda.org, May 3). The Kremlin’s consideration of a law banning “childfree ideology” reinforces the general sentiment of a lack of rights in Russia and will make people even more dependent on the state to avoid persecution and repression.