Nicholas J. Myers is an analyst of the Russian and Belarusian militaries. He has been studying Russian policy and statecraft for over 10 years and focusing specifically on the Russian and Belarusian militaries for the past 4. He has written a number of reports on the operational capabilities of the Russian military and overseen a wide variety of wargames of potential conflicts in the European Intermarium and Asia-Pacific regions. He received his undergraduate degree from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in 2011. He runs the website WarVsPeace.org.
Executive Summary Russia’s last friend on its border with Europe, Belarus acquired new significance for Russian strategy after the emergence of an anti-Russian regime in Kyiv in 2014. However, Moscow
Despite the reported impact of COVID-19 on Russia’s military-industrial complex (Vedomosti, April 10), deliveries of new equipment continue (see EDM, March 25, April 1), including of modernized radios (Mil.ru, April
Amid speculation of mounting tensions in Russian-Belarusian relations (see EDM, September 9, 16), the two allies’ militaries conducted their quadrennial Union Shield (Shchit Soyuza) exercise last week (September 13–19). Along
After the week-long Vostok 2018 large-scale Russian strategic maneuvers ended on September 17 and the initial hot takes went to press, the Russian blog Naspravdi rebutted Western observations, declaring, “[I]f
Despite the relatively slow pace of Russian military modernization (see EDM, November 8, 2016), the country’s Ministry of Defense announced in May that more than 50 percent of the equipment
Last month, at the Halifax Security Forum, Polish Defense Minister Antoni Macierewicz, known for his strong anti-Russia stance, restated his claim that Russia and Belarus’ joint strategic exercise Zapad 2017