Aged Cossacks Bolster Russia’s War Effort in Ukraine

Executive Summary:

• Recent reports show that Russia is increasingly drawing upon the older generation to fill its ranks on the frontlines of Ukraine, a trend also present among Cossack volunteers on the battlefield. 
• Older Cossacks are not only involved in combat but are also heavily involved in “humanitarian” support for those on the frontline and recruiting others to join the war effort.
• Russia’s use of older citizens on the frontlines and the Cossack society’s encouragement of all who are able to serve their fatherland demonstrates how desperate Moscow is for personnel to fill its meatgrinder of a war.

Amid reports that Moscow is now filling the demands of its meatgrinder of a war in Ukraine with notably older men, such demographic shifts are also showing up among the Cossacks (CEPA, October 4; see EDM, October 17). A recent article in Kazachestvo, a portal commissioned by the Russian Presidential Council for Cossack Affairs, highlighted that “it is never too late to become a hero,” featuring 68-year-old Sergei Bogaerev, who received a medal for his “courageous” service at the front. Bogarev, whose nom de guerre is Chukotka, was a member of the BARS-11 volunteer unit. Chukotka, whose “Cossack soul does not sleep,” was determined to enlist despite others’ objections. He said, “No one believed that I would get to the front, and for several months, I went to various authorities—to the military registration and enlistment offices, but everywhere there was a refusal, saying ‘at this age you just do not fight.’” Although initially rebuffed from fighting, Bogarev did finally enlist and was wounded twice for his trouble (Kazachestvo.ru, October 14). He was born in 1956 in Smolensk and, after serving in the army, went to live in the Chukotka autonomous okrug for 44 years (hence his nickname). Upon retirement, he returned to live in a village in Krasnodar. When the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, he decided he did not want to be simply involved in auxiliary support. Ivan Bezugly, an Ataman in the Kuban Cossacks, helped Bogaerev reach the frontlines. On recuperation leave away from the combat zone, Bogarev hinted that he wishes to return (Note, this source is only available with a Russian VPN, Slavakubani.ru, September 9). Granted, the official recognition of one older and particularly committed Cossack is not by itself enough to demonstrate a trend among Cossack society. However, coupled with earlier reporting of a marked increase in the age of fatalities among those serving in the Russian army, the propagandization of Bogaerev’s story helps demonstrate the demographic shifts currently being seen in Russian soldiers (Ukrainska Pravda, September 23).

Older Cossacks have played an important role in providing logistical and “humanitarian” support to those fighting in the war. In an interview with the Ataman of a regional Cossack society and member of the Tula regional government, Aleksei Al’khovik makes just this point. Al’khovik, who is also head of the regional Russian Union of Afghanistan Veterans—an organization which, despite its name, includes soldiers who fought in Chechnya as well—is 64 years old. He said that “from the very first day of the special military operation, we have been fully involved in the provision of participants both on the frontline and here—with the wounded, with those serving under the contract—we work very closely with them” (Kazachestvo.ru, September 17; Edinaya Rossiya, accessed October 24). While Al’khovik’s participation on the frontlines was not discussed, it remains a possibility, particularly given his current involvement in auxiliary services for the war and his emphasis that “anyone can take part” in helping the war effort (Edinaya Rossiya, November 17, 2023).

The recruitment of older Cossacks for the frontlines in Ukraine has implications that extend to the Cossack reserve army currently being coordinated. An earlier rationale gave the maximum size of the army as 60,000 because “this is about 40 percent of the 146,000 members of the All-Russian Cossack Society who are fit for military service in terms of age and health” (Parlamentskaia Gazeta, October 9, 2023). Previous articles had shown that 60 was the upper age limit for Cossacks to be considered fit for service. If men above that age are now being directly used on the frontlines of the actual war, however, it seems reasonable that they might be able to bolster the ranks of a peacetime army as well within Russia itself. The implication is that the size of the reserve army might be greater than previously thought.

Those of late middle age already have officers’ positions in the reserve army. A response from the Ministry of Defense to the announcement of the aforementioned army’s creation stipulates that those holding the highest officer ranks may serve until age 70, senior officers to 60–65, middling officers to 55–60, and “those holding other military ranks” from 45 to 55 (Kazachestvo.ru, September 9). While it is frequently noted in such discussions that people are healthier and living longer these days, such an age structure surely stretches the credulity of such an observation. The fact that the regime has been forced to rely on older adults to fill the ranks of new military units speaks volumes about its inability to find younger men.

The recruitment of older Cossacks to military positions also tracks neatly with the recent reports on the use of North Korean soldiers in Ukraine that have come out since the beginning of October. Kyiv Post reported about North Korean casualties on October 4, and on October 8, South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong-Hyun said it was “very likely” that North Korea would regularly send troops to support Russia (Kyiv Post, October 4; Yonhap News Agency, October 8). By October 11, there were reports of thousands of soldiers from North Korea fighting alongside the Russians (Meduza, October 18). Russia’s use of North Korean soldiers appears to have begun right around the same time as reports noted the rising average age of casualties on the front, demonstrating how desperate Moscow is for cannon fodder. The broader demographic of those eligible for military service through the older generation, coupled with North Korea sending troops to bolster Russia’s personnel on the frontline, will presumably enable Moscow to continue its conventional war even longer without a second mobilization. If this trend of utilizing soldiers from partners such as North Korea continues and expands, perhaps Russian grandpas may be able to avoid military service and enjoy their retirement in peace.