Airstrikes, Artificial Intelligence, and Sabotage Drive Russian Psyops

Executive Summary:

• The Russian Federation continues its efforts aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society and undermining Kyiv’s defense capabilities through the use of social media and bots to spread disinformation.
• Russian propagandists effectively combine kinetic and non-kinetic means to increase the effects on the target audience, embellishing Russian military victories and the declining state of Ukrainian infrastructure.
• The focus on exploiting mobilization issues and energy blackouts as primary disinformation targets highlights the Kremlin’s intention to sow discord and weaken Ukraine from within.

On July 19, former member of parliament and philology professor Iryna Farion, a prominent defender of the Ukrainian language, was murdered in Lviv (The Kyiv Independent, July 19). ). The subsequent investigation stated that Farion’s murder seems to have coincided with the alleged planned murder of a current member of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament), Maksym Buzhansky, known for his ambiguous pro-Russian positions (ZN.ua, July 26). According to Maryana Reva, spokesperson for the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, among the motives for the murder of such high-profile persons may be Russian efforts to destabilize and subvert Ukrainian society (Ukrinform, July 25). The Russian Federation continues to wage information warfare against Ukraine and the world as part of its conventional war. The main goals of this hybrid influence remain undermining the capabilities of the Ukrainian Defense Forces to facilitate Russian military operations at the front and destabilize the country’s internal political and social situation. Currently, the Kremlin has focused its efforts on several areas. One important area of emphasis is to undermine Kyiv’s mobilization drive. This is done by highlighting violations and shortcomings in the mobilization process (real and fake) and creating a negative image of the military personnel already in the Ukrainian army. Russia’s attempts at destabilizing Ukraine through hybrid warfare and the use of digital propaganda highlight the evolving state of modern warfare.

In April, Ukrainian Defense Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense (GUR) warned of a Russian information and psychological operation (psyop) called “Evader,” aimed at increasing societal tension and encouraging Ukrainians to avoid mobilization (GUR, April 16). The intensification of this campaign coincided with the adoption of the mobilization law in Ukraine on April 11, around which there was already uncertainty and tension in society (see EDM, 10, 24; Ligazakon, April 12). One illustrative example of the campaign was the publication of a video dedicated to the unfair mobilization process in Ukraine. Later, it was discovered that Russian actors were involved in the video’s production, and the ad style resembled disinformation that had been previously filmed and disseminated in Russia (Meduza, April 1). Another example of these psyops is a video of a Russian soldier killing his comrade, which was presented by Russian media as an alleged shooting of a Ukrainian soldier by another Ukrainian (Spravdi, July 18).

The Russian propaganda machine also uses more modern methods for its psyops (see EDM, May 13). A journalist investigation by Ukrainian independent media group Toronto Television (Телебачення Торонто) identified a network of Russian military officers belonging to the press service of the so-called “LPR [Luhansk People’s Republic] army” that was creating deep-fake videos of the Ukrainian military. This network used face overlay technologies and artificial intelligence to create the fakes. Several emotional videos were created that highlighted supposed significant problems in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including one that depicted a fake soldier with Down syndrome and a soldier who allegedly threatened bus passengers with a grenade. Later, such videos were posted on behalf of Ukrainian soldiers on TikTok and Telegram and further disseminated via a specially created network of Telegram channels and Facebook communities (Telebachennya Toronto YouTube, July 7). Another Telegram channel’s administrator, who promoted videos to avoid mobilization and even sabotage against recruitment offices, was identified as a former citizen of Ukraine now living in the temporarily occupied city of Donetsk while carrying out Russian psyops (OSINT Bees, July 13)

The creation of active bots on various social networks has also been detected. These bots create a hostile information environment around the issue of mobilization and other relevant topics in favor of the Russian Federation through their stories and comments. The content is being disseminated not only to a Ukrainian audience but also to social media users abroad. Some of these bots use elements of artificial intelligence, such as ChatGPT, though mistakes in the production of this content by Russians have been recorded several times (X.com/reshetz, June 18; X.com/visegrad24, July 23). The existence of such channels and bots for each target country is recognized by Russian propagandists themselves, such as the editor-in-chief of Russian state-controlled RT, Margarita Simonyan, and confirmed by the relevant law enforcement agencies of various other countries, such as the United States (X.com/igorsushko, June 5; BBC, July 10).

Simultaneously, the Kremlin continues its long-term campaign to destabilize the socio-political situation in Ukraine. Particularly, Moscow uses non-kinetic effects to inflate battlefield successes through its infiltration of Ukrainian social media space and the embellishment of military operations. Thus, the effectiveness of military strikes is regularly exaggerated, as Russian propagandists create fake stories that enhance Russian progress along the frontlines. For example, after numerous Russian claims of the destruction of US-supplied Patriot air defense batteries, the Ukrainian Air Force Command refuted the Russian claims and published an explanation regarding the destruction of decoys of the air defense systems (Air Forces Command Telegram, July 6). In case of apparent damage to the civil infrastructure, such as the tragic strike on Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital, Russians always try to blame Ukrainian air defense despite all the independent verifications and evidence of Moscow’s guilt (Detector Media, July 18).

During the recent Kharkiv offensive, a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic means was used (see EDM, July 24). According to Halyna Kuts, a member of the Kharkiv regional council, at the beginning of the offensive, Russian bots actively disseminated false claims on the total evacuation from Kharkiv city to provoke panic (Apostrophe, May 16). Similarly, following strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, Russian media channels and bots pretending to be Ukrainians often exaggerated the destruction. In most cases, rumors are published about the impossibility of recovery, the total collapse of the national electrical grid, and, most importantly, disinformation about the difference in electricity supply in different regions to create tensions between people. Russian propagandists try to further inflame the situation with rumors about alleged exports to EU countries instead of supplying energy domestically (Intent, April 19; Ministry of Energy of Ukraine Telegram, July 2).

An identical pattern was spotted in the fall of 2022 when the Russian army first began to attack Ukrainian energy infrastructure. At the time, Russian bots were spreading calls for rebellion against the government over allegedly unfair blackouts across the country (Detector Media, November 20, 2022). According to Andriy Kovalenko, head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation housed within the National Security and Defense Council, mobilization and blackouts will remain the two main subjects for Russian disinformation and propaganda moving forward (Detector Media, July 25).

The strategic integration of airstrikes, artificial intelligence, and sabotage in Russia’s psyops campaign against Ukraine illustrates the evolving nature of modern warfare and the Kremlin’s persistent efforts to destabilize Ukraine. By combining kinetic and non-kinetic tactics, Russia aims to erode Ukrainian societal stability and undermine its defense capabilities. The focus on exploiting mobilization issues and energy blackouts as primary disinformation targets highlights the Kremlin’s intention to sow discord and weaken Ukraine from within. This multifaceted approach underscores the significant threat posed by hybrid warfare, necessitating heightened vigilance and countermeasures from Kyiv, its allies, and Ukrainian society to preserve stability and resilience against these destabilization efforts.