Autonomous Battlefield: PLA Lessons from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Executive Summary:

• Chinese military experts are incorporating lessons from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the use and importance of drones and autonomous systems, which is reshaping the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategic planning and operational doctrine.
• In simulated Taiwan Strait scenarios, the PLA has demonstrated heavy reliance on drones to carry out phased operations culminating in precision-guided airdrops to support an amphibious invasion. These exercises suggest the PLA intends to mobilize multi-theater, domain-specialized operations in the event of a future Taiwan contingency.
• Tactical innovations, notably the use of cost-effective first-person view drones capable of precise anti-armor operations, drone swarm tactics, and multi-domain integration, are highlighted by Chinese analysts, as is the integration of artificial intelligence-driven systems.
• Chinese strategists emphasize the need to develop stealthier drones, robust anti-jamming capabilities (such as fiber-optic guidance), and autonomous ground logistics systems, aimed at enhancing battlefield sustainability and reducing vulnerabilities in future combat scenarios.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has vividly demonstrated the pivotal role autonomous and drone-based systems play in modern warfare. Chinese military experts have gained invaluable insights as the conflict has evolved over the last three years, reshaping their understanding of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of autonomous systems that likely will play an important role in a potential conflict over Taiwan.

In late March, state media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) reported the rapid evolution of anti-drone technologies, with aerospace expert Wang Ya’nan (王亚男) emphasizing the urgent need for more cost-effective and efficient countermeasures (CNR, March 23). Traditional methods, he noted, are prohibitively expensive—often hundreds of times the cost of the drones that they are meant to defeat—and still fall short in detection accuracy and coverage. Meanwhile, reports have surfaced of some PRC factories openly displaying Ukrainian flags, signaling acknowledgement for and partnerships with Ukraine’s drone manufacturers instead of Russia’s (X/@wartranslated, March 16). This speaks to the complex ways in which policymakers and key observers within the PRC perceive and are interpreting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

This research draws from a curated collection of sources that reflect a diverse cross-section of Chinese military thought. It includes publications and analyses from direct PLA-affiliated research units, technical writings by analysts embedded in the PRC’s broader defense apparatus and academic institutions, and influential commentary from recognized voices on Chinese online platforms. Together, these materials provide a rich matrix for assessing how different layers within the PRC’s military and strategic community have interpreted Russia’s war against Ukraine, particularly the operational role of drones and autonomous systems.

Chinese Perspectives on Tactical Innovations in Drone Warfare from Ukraine

Chinese experts view Russia’s war against Ukraine as marking an evolution in the use of drones and autonomous systems. At the start of the conflict in 2022, Chinese experts from the Army Engineering University of the PLA observed that Russian forces had relied on small and medium unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance, battlefield intelligence, and limited precision strikes, as well as traditional anti-drone measures emphasizing radar detection and electronic jamming. [1] This approach shifted after the introduction of Iranian-made Shahed-136 suicide drones and first-person view (FPV) drones, and the expansion of UAV production within Russia. Russia has frequently been deploying suicide drones ever since, as experts from the People’s Liberation Army’s Air Force Early Warning Academy (中国人民解放军空军预警学院) noted in 2024. [2] This enhanced Russian offensive and surveillance capabilities, especially those targeting armored vehicles and infrastructure (Global Times, January 4). [3] On the Ukrainian side, NATO-supplied drones, such as the Turkish Bayraktar TB-2, were deployed extensively in the early phase of the conflict to execute precision strikes. Although initially having limited domestic manufacturing capacity, Kyiv, too, has since scaled production through initiatives like the “Army of Drones” project, which has provided drones for reconnaissance and precise tactical strikes against Russian forces (Ukrainian World Congress, accessed March 25). [4]

One of the most significant tactical developments identified by Chinese analysts is the use of FPV drones for precision anti-tank and anti-personnel operations. FPV drones’ speed and agility allow them to bypass conventional defense systems, while their ability to deliver small yet potent payloads makes them highly effective for precision attacks. Their successes on the battlefield have led to a shift toward agile and low-cost weaponry capable of disrupting armored warfare strategies that rely on heavy conventional munitions. [5]

Analysts have also highlighted drones’ impact on kill chains, shortening the time from target identification to engagement, enabling real-time target acquisition, intelligence relay, and immediate precision strikes at unprecedented speeds. [6]

The versatility of drones has allowed for their integration into broader tactical frameworks across multiple operational domains. For example, one researcher discusses Ukraine’s deployment of Magura V5 maritime drones armed with air-defense missile systems to engage Russian helicopters in 2024 (Global Times, January 4). Experts from PLA Unit 68398 argued that Ukraine’s success in this direction, particularly through NATO-supported information networks, has illustrated how real-time data from drones can improve the precision and lethality of conventional forces. [7]

These successes have led to a need to develop robust anti-drone and counter-swarm defense systems. Russian and Ukrainian experiences suggest that layered defense strategies should be used, combining both electronic warfare techniques and direct interception methods. Experts from the Engineering University of the People’s Armed Police Force have further contended that such a strategy could include radar detection, electronic jamming, high-energy laser, and high-power microwave technologies. Artificial intelligence (AI)-driven countermeasures might also be used against drone swarms to quickly identify, prioritize, and neutralize multiple simultaneous threats. [8]

The tactical sophistication of Russian UAV operators has evolved over the course of the conflict, a detail that has not been lost on observers in the PLA. Recent combat footage illustrates a high degree of coordination, notably in scenarios where UAV teams sequentially penetrate defensive countermeasures such as cage armor installed on Ukrainian tanks. PRC state media recently noted an incident in Zaporizhzhia where Russian drone operators successfully employed two quadcopter drones. One breached the tank’s protective mesh with an initial grenade strike, before a second drone delivered a follow-up attack directly into the exposed area, effectively neutralizing the vehicle (Xinhua, January 6). Analysts have also followed Russia’s increasing use of fiber-optic guided FPV drones, exemplified by the destruction of a U.S.-made M1A1 Abrams tank in Kursk oblast (PLA Daily, November 15, 2024; Xinhua, January 6). These drones showcase superior resistance to electronic warfare, circumventing traditional radio-frequency jamming methods commonly employed by Ukrainian forces. These advances in UAV tactics and technologies, including coordinated multi-drone operations and improved anti-jamming capabilities, are likely reshaping battlefield doctrines for the PLA.

Lessons and Expectations Focus on AI and Integration

In their published research, Chinese military experts foresee several specific trends emerging as drone warfare evolves and have made recommendations for the PLA on that basis.

The main doctrinal development appears to be an emphasis on integrating drones—especially AI-driven drones—and autonomous systems into joint operational frameworks. Integrated autonomous systems will coordinate between sea, air, and ground platforms, allowing for countering threats across various operational environments (Global Times, January 4). AI-driven systems are also capable of countering sophisticated drone swarms and cross-domain autonomous threats, while offensive drones have dramatically shortened decision-making timelines and precision targeting capabilities. Some experts believe that this integration will center AI systems as core capabilities rather than as supplementary tools. [9] However, other experts’ views differ on these conclusions, arguing instead that AI should serve primarily as a supplementary tool—assisting coordination and drone identification in anti-drone warfare (CNR, March 23). These debates apparently are ongoing, and it is not clear what ultimate direction PLA strategy will take.

Table 1: Evolution of PLA Experts’ Observations on Drone Warfare During the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

(Source: Authors’ compilation based on Chinese research papers referenced below)

The vulnerability of drones in the current conflict has been an issue for both sides (see EDM, November 11, 2022, September 10, October 8, 16, 2024). If such systems could operate undetected or at least mitigate enemy countermeasures, they would be more effective and sustainable, reducing the costs associated with their replacement. As a result, top military engineers from the Shanghai Electro-Mechanical Engineering Institute have argued that future Chinese drone systems should incorporate advanced stealth capabilities and electronic countermeasures to evade sophisticated air defenses. [10] Autonomous ground logistics systems provide another means of reducing vulnerabilities and improving battlefield logistics. This is because they can operate continuously under harsh or contested conditions without fatigue, using data-driven systems to optimize resupply scheduling and route planning. Strategists likely will focus on developing these to better sustain operations in complex environments and managing contested supply lines. [11]

Beijing’s progress in developing unmanned aerial systems were on full display at the 15th China International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition in November 2024 (otherwise known as the Zhuhai Airshow). The Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC; 航空工业/中航工业), one of the PRC’s top defense manufacturers, unveiled its latest large reconnaissance and strike drone, the “Jiutian” (九天) (PLA Daily, November 15, 2024; China Brief, December 20, 2024). Its modular design is unusual, and in particular its “heterogeneous hive mission bay” (异构蜂巢任务箱) mounted beneath the fuselage, which allows for rapid payload changes. Publicly available information shows that the drone features eight external hardpoints and a heavy-duty mission compartment that can be reconfigured quickly to fulfill a wide range of tasks, including air transport and airdrop, electronic warfare and information support, and precision strike operations. Reports claim that the Jiutian drone incorporates an innovative swarm algorithm, which allowed it to launch a formation of 200 micro-drones that successfully maintained 95 percent formation integrity under heavy electromagnetic interference during live battlefield tests in Syria. This level of battlefield resilience could render traditional missile defense systems like the Patriot effectively obsolete. The Jutian is scheduled for operational deployment in June 2025 (Baijiahao, March 26).

Simulations for a cross-Strait conflict have deployed the Jiutian drone. These allegedly showed the Jiutian deploying drone swarms that first neutralized enemy radar before firing off a wave of anti-ship missile saturation strikes and finally dispatching precision-guided munitions airdropped in support of amphibious landings. Other simulations have demonstrated the PLA’s growing emphasis on unmanned warfare, too. A recent CCTV broadcast featured rare footage of PLA troops conducting manual wargaming exercises simulating urban combat in Taoyuan, Taiwan. In the simulation, the military campaign, led by the PLA Central Theater Command, included integrated teams of drones and unmanned ground systems. The signs are clear: the PLA has been investing and will continue to invest in drones and may deploy them for multi-theater operations in a potential Taiwan conflict (Tencent News, September 15, 2024).

Conclusion

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has served as a real-world proving ground for drone, anti-drone, and autonomous warfare. For this reason, it has been studied closely by Chinese military experts. Insights from FPV drones, suicide UAVs, and swarm tactics have shaped PLA thinking, emphasizing the need for agile, low-cost, and intelligent systems capable of operating in contested environments. These lessons are already influencing PLA doctrine and procurement, with a growing push to integrate AI into decision-making processes and precision targeting. At the same time, layered anti-drone defenses and autonomous logistics are being prioritized to support sustained operations.

New PLA capabilities and initiatives, such as the Jiutian drone, exemplify the PLA’s shift toward flexible, AI-driven combat platforms. These indicate that the Chinese military is actively translating lessons from Europe into its own next-generation warfare capabilities.

Notes

[1] 凌海峰 [Ling Haifeng], 李锐 [Li Rui], 白林远 [Bai Linyuan], and 郭文娟 [Guo Wenjuan], 俄罗斯反无人机装备的现状及启示 [Current Developments and Implications of Russian Anti-UAV Equipment], 国防科技 [National Defense Technology] 44, no. 3 (June 2023): 81–87; 马攀伟 [Ma Panwei], 潘奎 [Pan Kui], 潘景峰 [Pan Jingfeng], 高洪波 [Gao Hongbo], 沈晓兵 [Shen Xiaobing], and 卞文坤 [Bian Wenkun], 从俄乌冲突看自杀式无人机的作战运用与发展 [Combat Operation and Development of Suicide Drone from the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict], 舰船电子对抗 [Shipboard Electronic Countermeasure] 47, no. 2 (April 2024): 1–3, 9.

[2] Ma et al., 2024.

[3] 张耀为 [Zhang Yaoyi] and 李宁 [Li Ning], 俄乌无人机攻防对抗对反无人机装备发展的启示 [The Enlightenment for the Development of Anti-UAV Equipment from the Offensive and Defensive Operations of UAVs Between Russia and Ukraine], 空天防务 [Air & Space Defense] 7, no. 3 (2024): 34–39; 王越 [Wang Yue], FPV自杀式竞速无人机作为反坦克武器 [FPV Suicide Racing Drones as Anti-Tank Weapons], 坦克装甲车辆 [Tank and Armored Vehicle], no. 5 (2024).

[4] Zhang and Li, 2024.

[5] Wang, 2024.

[6] 李兴华 [Li Xinghua], 于永生 [Yu Yongsheng], 孟真 [Meng Zhen], 郑文鹏 [Zheng Wenpeng], 夏祥童 [Xia Xiangtong], 郝成硕 [Hao Chengshuo], and 韩嘉睿 [Han Jiarui]. 从杀伤链看无人智能装备在俄乌冲突中的运用 [Analysis of the Application of Unmanned Intelligent Equipment in the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict from the Perspective of the Kill Chain], 指挥控制与仿真 [Command Control & Simulation] 46, no. 5 (2024): 6–12. https://www.zhkzyfz.cn/CN/10.3969/j.issn.1673-3819.2024.05.002.

[7] 冯志方 [Feng Zhifang], 李东涛 [Li Dongtao], 朱鹏博 [Zhu Pengbo], and 杨宏荣 [Yang Hongrong]. 俄乌冲突中无人机作战运用研究 [Research on UAV Combat Operation in Russia-Ukraine Conflict], 第四届自主无人系统国际会议论文集 [Proceedings of 4th 2024 International Conference on Autonomous Unmanned Systems (4th ICAUS 2024)], 2024.

[8] 吴润泽 [Wu Runze], 王侃 [Wang Kan], and 史亮 [Shi Liang], 国外反无人机蜂群装备建设现状与作战趋势展望 [Current Situation and Operation Trend Prospect of Anti-UAV Swarm Equipment Construction Abroad], 舰载电子对抗 [Shipboard Electronic Countermeasure] 47, no. 6 (December 2024); 张文昌 [Zhang, Wenchang], 无人机运用与思考 [Thoughts on the Use of UAVs in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict], 国防科技工业 [Defence Science and Technology Industry], 2023.

[9] Li et al., 2024; Feng et al., 2024; 王凯旋 [Wang Kaixuan], 袁媛 [Yuan Yuan], 郝振凯 [Hao Zhenkai], and 赵廷棣 [Zhao Tingdi], 海空跨域无人装备体系结构建模与作战任务风险分析 [Modeling of Sea-air Trans-area Unmanned Equipment Architecture and Operational Mission Risk Analysis], 北京航空大学 [Beihang University], Beijing, 2024; Wu et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024.

[10] Zhang and Li, 2024.

[11] 方钢 [Fang Gang], 雍歧卫 [Yong Qiwei], 赵彦涛 [Zhao Yantao], 段纪淼 [Duan Jimiao], 曾国栋 [Zeng Guodong], and 郭杨 [Guo Yang]. “地面无人装备在后勤保障中的应用模式研究” [Research on the Application Mode of Ground Unmanned Equipment in Logistics Support], 舰船电子工程 [Ship Electronic Engineering] 43, no. 3 (2023): 7–10.