Azerbaijan-Armenia Peace Deal Faces Hurdles

Executive Summary: 

• Armenia and Azerbaijan have finalized the text of a long-awaited “Agreement on Peace and Establishment of Interstate Relations.” The announcement came unexpectedly from Baku and was confirmed soon after by Yerevan.
• Yerevan seeks to sign the agreement quickly, while Baku says that Armenia must first remove a controversial preamble in its constitution that refers to what amounts to territorial claims on the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.
• The opposition in Armenia maintains that Azerbaijan will not sign the agreement if it believes that it can gain more concessions from Armenia. 

On March 13, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov told the media that the text of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan had been finalized (Azertac, March 13). The announcement came as a surprise on the sidelines of the Global Baku Forum, an annual gathering of heads of state and government themed this year as “Rethinking World Order: Turning Challenges Into Opportunities” (President of Azerbaijan, March 13). A day earlier, Baryramov’s Armenian counterpart, Ararat Mirzoyan, told journalists that an agreement was within reach but did not divulge any details (Azatutyun, March 12). Following Bayramov’s announcement, the Armenian Foreign Ministry confirmed the news and expressed its readiness to agree on a time and place for signing the agreement (Azatutyun, March 13). There has been no joint statement.

The United States, European Union, France, Germany, the People’s Republic of China, and Russia have all voiced support for the agreement (X/@ABaerbock; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 13; DW; TASS; Armenpress; U.S. Department of State, March 14). Even multilateral organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) welcomed the news (X/@NATOpress; Armenpress, March 14). 

The peace agreement comprises 17 points, two of which remained outstanding until last week. These two points concerned the withdrawal of legal cases filed between Armenia and Azerbaijan in international courts and a prohibition on deploying “third country forces” on their shared border (ARKA News Agency, March 13). The latter point is taken to specifically refer to the European Union Monitoring Mission in Armenia (EUMA), deployed only on the Armenian side of the border with Azerbaijan in February 2023. Despite criticism from Baku, EUMA’s deployment was extended last month for another two-year term (see EDM, March 14, 2024, January 25). 

This treaty is not without its complexities despite marking a potential turning point in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. The official text of the peace treaty is not yet publicly available. Armenian analysts are particularly concerned by what they describe as preconditions outside of the text itself. Baku considers these preconditions necessary before it can sign the document. Specifically, Azerbaijan’s consistent demands that Armenia amend its constitution continue to be assessed negatively domestically (Azatutyun, March 14, 15). Baku claims Armenia has included territorial claims on Azerbaijan in the constitution’s preamble, referring to “nationwide objectives enshrined” in the 1990 Declaration of Independence (President of the Republic of Armenia, December 12, 2015; see EDM, June 25, 2024).

Pashinyan has previously claimed that the declaration is separate from the constitution and that it is Azerbaijan’s constitution that references territorial claims on Armenia rather than vice versa (President of Azerbaijan, November 27, 1995; see EDM, January 11, 2024; Prime Minister of Armenia, November 13, 2024). The opposition widely believes that the preamble will be changed or removed among wide constitutional changes planned in the future. The Armenian government’s messaging, however, has also been muddled. After Bayramov’s statement, Armenian National Assembly Speaker Alen Simonyan suggested that both the Armenian and Azerbaijani constitutions could be presented to the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission for its opinion (Azatutyun, March 17). Recently appointed Armenian Justice Minister Srbuhi Galyan has implied that a new constitution should not threaten a potential peace deal (Azatutyun, March 18).

In February, Pashinyan addressed the nation to present his vision for a “Real Armenia” that required changing the constitution (The Prime Minister of Armenia, February 19). Despite not denying the removal of the constitution’s preamble, Pashinyan later stated in March that changes to the constitution will “inherently have regional significance” (Arka, March 13). A draft of the new document should be ready by the next parliamentary elections scheduled for mid-2026 (News.am, March 21). If Baku maintains that changing the constitution will be necessary to sign the agreed peace treaty, then this clearly creates problems. Some Baku-based analysts and former U.K. Ambassador to Azerbaijan James Sharp have suggested that a mechanism whereby an agreement does not come into force until constitution changes are enacted could be considered, but whether this is an option remains unknown (Caliber, June 11, 2024, Caspian Policy Center, March 15).

Azerbaijan and Russia have also called for the dissolution of the Minsk Group, the international body established by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that mediated the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (OSCE, March 23, 1995; ARKA News Agency, January 31). Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, most analysts believe it has no relevance today. Although Russia and the European Union have provided platforms for talks since 2021, they became fully bilateral in October 2023 (see EDM, April 21, 2022, February 24; JAM News, August 16, 2024; Topchubashov Center, December 29, 2024). France, Russia, and the United States technically remain the group’s three co-chairs (OSCE, accessed March 23). The demand to dissolve the group is largely acceptable to Armenia, but Yerevan prefers that the formal signing of a peace agreement occur first. Azerbaijan, however, considers that the continued existence of the OSCE Minsk Group following a signed peace agreement could put the issue of Karabakh back on the table (JAM News, August 16, 2024). 

The issue of unblocking regional transport and economic links, particularly regarding an overland route between Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia, further complicates progress on a peace agreement (see EDM, January 25, 2024). Earlier this year, Pashinyan said discussions continue outside the actual peace treaty (ArmenPress, January 31). Baku, however, has yet to respond.

Armenia’s relationship with Russia also remains a potential risk for securing a peace agreement with Azerbaijan. Pashinyan has already accepted an invitation to attend the annual Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 9, something he declined last year (RIA Novosti, March 14). Following Bayramov’s announcement on March 13, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk also signaled that Moscow is willing to resurrect the trilateral working group on unblocking regional communications routes established with Armenia and Azerbaijan following the November 2020 ceasefire statement (News.am, March 18). As global power dynamics shift, particularly regarding Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and potentially changing relationships between Russia and the United States, Moscow could again seek to exert influence.

Yerevan remains eager to normalize relations with Ankara if an Armenia-Azerbaijan agreement falls through (see EDM, May 6, 2024). That prospect, however, remains unlikely as Türkiye insists that Yerevan and Baku first resolve their differences before normalization of Armenia-Türkiye relations can be achieved (APA, March 13). Although the closed Armenia-Turkish border was temporarily opened for 10 days to send humanitarian assistance to Syria, Ankara maintains this is not a permanent step (Armenian Public Radio, March 21; News.am, March 24). Azerbaijan considers that all outstanding issues should be resolved before an agreement is signed (AIR Center, March 17, 19). Armenia believes the agreement should be signed before any more regional and global developments disrupt the process, especially if Russia were to re-establish its focus on South Caucasus (Responsible Statecraft, March 17). 

In the meantime, Azerbaijan claims that Armenia has violated the ceasefire agreement over several days, something that Yerevan denies (Azatutyun, March 18). Pashinyan posted on social media that he is now ready to sign the agreement and ordered the Ministry of Defense not to violate the truce (X/@NikolPashinyan, March 19). Mirzoyan has also suggested establishing a joint arms control mechanism, while Pashinyan has again proposed that Baku start consultations with Yerevan on signing the treaty (Azatutyun, March 20). The same day, Armenian National Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan repeated the proposal (Azatutyun, March 20). 

These challenges represent only the surface of the complexities that Armenia and Azerbaijan must overcome before signing a peace agreement. The coming weeks and months will reveal the degree to which both sides are committed to ensuring a lasting peace or if rhetoric and state narratives are the only progress achieved at this point. While the announcement of a finalized peace agreement offers a glimmer of hope, those hurdles remain. Unless Azerbaijan withdraws its longstanding demand that the Armenian constitution be changed, it is unlikely to be signed before mid-2026 or even 2027.