Azerbaijan Seeks End to EU Mission in Armenia as Pashinyan Offers Border Compromise

Executive Summary:

• Russia’s Federal Security Service border guards left Armenia’s border checkpoint with Iran on December 30. Even though Russian guards will remain elsewhere on the entire stretch of the Armenia-Iran border, it represents further diversification away from Moscow.
• The European Union Mission Armenia (EUMA) is set to complete its initial two-year deployment next month. The European Union and Yerevan hope to extend the observation mission deployed in early 2023, but Baku demands that it be withdrawn.
• In response, Armenia has offered to withdraw EUMA from the demarcated parts of the shared border with Azerbaijan. Baku has not responded, though it continues to warn that extending EUMA could disrupt the fledgling demarcation process.

On December 30, 2024, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards left Armenia’s Agarak border checkpoint with Iran at the end of December 2024 (Azatutyun; Facebook.com/nikol.pashinyan, December 30, 2024). This follows the FSB border guard’s withdrawal from Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport at the end of July 2024 (see EDM, August 15, 2024). The move had been anticipated by several pro-government activists in Armenia who had already called for their removal to cut off Russian access to the country’s Border Electronic Management Information System. This applies, however, only to the checkpoint and not the entire length of the Armenia-Iran border. Instead, FSB border guards will now be joined by an unknown number of Armenian National Security Service (NSS) border guards to jointly perform duties. Until now, the FSB guards have been solely responsible for guarding Armenia’s borders with Iran and Türkiye, as stipulated in a 1992 agreement between Yerevan and Moscow. Their withdrawal from the checkpoint represents a symbolic reduction in Armenia’s reliance on Russia for its security needs and a gradual diversification away from Moscow in general.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan can tout the development as a successful move in  exerting gradual control of its sovereign territory in a pre-election year, but another development relating to a different border could prove more difficult and perhaps even more sensitive (see EDM, November 27, 2024). Following clashes on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in September 2022, the European Union deployed a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) civilian observation mission to reduce tensions between the sides. That decision stemmed from the October 6, 2022 meeting between Pashinyan and his Azerbaijani counterpart, President Ilham Aliyev, alongside the presidents of the European Council and France, Charles Michel and Emmanuel Macron, at the first-ever European Political Community (EPC) summit in Prague (European Union, January 23, 2023). The temporary mission was able to deploy quickly because it was made up of 40 monitors already in neighboring Georgia as part of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) on the Administrative Boundary Lines with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The European Union Monitoring Capacity was only to be deployed for two months and reluctantly accepted by Azerbaijan, who refused to allow it to operate on its side of the shared border. Upon completing its mission in December 2022, Yerevan requested one similar to EUMM in Georgia. Much to the annoyance of Azerbaijan, Iran, and Russia, the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) was deployed and started operating on February 20, 2023 (IWPR, February 23, 2023; see EDM, March 11, 2024). Its two-year term ends next month.

While Armenia has signaled hopes that EUMA’s initial mandate will be extended for another two years in the same way that EUMM has been, Azerbaijan has similarly made it clear that it wants the mission removed as a condition for establishing normalized relations with Armenia (Jam News, November 20, 2024). Speaking in Antalya last year, then European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, Toivo Klaar, opined that there would be no need for EUMA only once a peace agreement had been reached.

Azerbaijan, similar to Iran and Russia, sees EUMA as an unnecessary example extra-regional interference in the region (Azernews, September 29, 2024; APA, December 24, 2024). For Armenia, however, EUMA is viewed as a tripwire to alert the European Union if new escalations occur on the border or lead to a new war. EUMA was also intended to build confidence between the sides in anticipation of a peace agreement, including among border communities. It was also meant to support the agreed-upon border demarcation process in Brussels almost three years ago (European Council, April 22, 2022).

Since then, Baku increasingly views EUMA as part of a small but developing relationship between Yerevan and the European Union on cooperation in the security sphere, including 10 million euros ($10.3 million) of assistance to the Armenian armed forces under the European Peace Facility (European Council, July 22, 2024). France has also been criticized now that it is selling weapons to Armenia, although India remains the largest supplier following the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine (see EDM, September 12, 2024).

Responding to renewed demands from Baku that EUMA be withdrawn from the Armenian side of the shared border, Pashinyan said in November that he has instead offered to withdraw it only from those parts of the border that have been demarcated (ArmInfo, November 23, 2024). It is implied, however, that this would include other parts once they are demarcated in the future.

Last June, Pashinyan also suggested that a bilateral mechanism to address border violations could be implemented (EU Neighbours East, June 24, 2024). Klaar, however, immediately suggested that given EUMM’s experience in Georgia, the European Union could assist here, too. Baku appears to have ignored the idea, instead adamant that there should be no “internationalization” of the border, including the presence of any foreign forces.

At a U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearing in September, it was suggested that EUMA should remain even after a peace deal is signed and that the U.S. should send personnel to join the mission as Washington D.C.’s “eyes and ears” on the ground (YouTube/Helsinki Commission, September 10, 2024). Canada has already sent a small number of staff (Arka, July 20, 2023). Even the Armenian opposition has raised concerns that Türkiye could join EUMA given Ankara’s growing involvement with the CSDP (News.am, February 19, 2024). EUMA dismissed the claim by saying that no neighboring countries ever participate where CSDP missions are deployed (YouTube.com/Public Radio of Armenia, December 25, 2024)

Nonetheless, with the European Union taking on a more geopolitically-oriented stance since 2022, there are concerns that CSDP missions could also project harder security intentions in the future. In January 2023, for example, EU Civilian Operations Commander Stefano Tomat detailed the bloc’s vision for CSDP missions and closer cooperation with EU military missions to serve the bloc’s foreign policy objectives (EEAS, January 17, 2023). Some Armenian analysts had already called for EUMA to be deployed inside Azerbaijan, something Baku is unlikely to agree to (APRI, April 11, 2023). EU-facilitated talks effectively ended in October 2023 when a statement issued at the EPC in Granada called for international monitoring on the right of return for Karabakh Armenians displaced in September 2023 (European Council; see EDM, October 5, 2023).

Similar risks are also evident in extending EUMA’s mandate, with Azerbaijan already warning that doing so threatens the demarcation process (Caliber, December 18, 2024). Since Baku boycotted the Granada EPC, it believes the peace process should only occur bilaterally. Despite the risks, Pashinyan is eager to see EUMA remain. Having already faced an attempt to force his resignation last year over the return of four Azerbaijani villages as part of the actual process of border demarcation, EUMA could prove a useful tool in addressing perceived security fears among local communities (see EDM, April 8, 2024). For that, however, the process would have to continue with Baku’s criticisms and concerns likely acknowledged, allayed, or even addressed. Even now there are incidents, such as in November and earlier this month. By his own admission, Head of Mission Markus Ritter has said EUMA usually visits the location of reported incidents only after they occur. Nonetheless, EUMA did note that when they did earlier this month the situation was calm (OC Media, January 9).

The demand for EUMA to withdraw is also just one of many conditions from Baku for an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement, including on the constitution (Commonspace, December 17, 24, 2024). Failure to agree on all demands might lead to continued deadlock throughout 2025. For now, Yerevan has not publicly stated whether it has officially requested EUMA extend its mission next month even though the European Union has offered to do so (Azatutyun, January 10).