Beijing Eyes NSR Through Russia to Advance Arctic Goals

Executive Summary:

• The maiden Arctic voyage of the Istanbul Bridge from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the U.K. via Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR) halved transit time to 20 days, signaling potentially growing PRC–Russian cooperation in Arctic trade corridors.
• Despite the advantages of lower transit costs and time, the NSR faces major constraints, including seasonal navigability, lack of infrastructure, and sanctions that limit its current viability and competitiveness against traditional maritime routes such as the Suez Canal.
• The PRC’s use of the NSR reflects long-term strategic aims rather than short-term economic gain, as Beijing leverages Russia’s isolation to expand its Arctic presence—potentially setting the stage for future technological and geopolitical competition.

On September 24, the container ship Istanbul Bridge departed from the Port of Ningbo-Zhoushan in Zhejiang province, People’s Republic of China (PRC), sailing to a U.K. port in Felixstowe, inaugurating the first cross-Arctic container voyage from Asia to Europe. On its way to Europe, the containership traveled via the Russia-controlled Northern Sea Route (NSR), halving the average travel time from the PRC to Europe from 40 to 20 days (Arctic.ru, September 23). Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation Rosatom claimed that the NSR not only offers the shortest and cheapest route, but it is also the most ecologically sustainable route of its kind (Strana-rosatom.ru, September 28). Despite Rosatom’s enthusiasm, however, a combination of economic and geopolitical factors could impose certain limitations on the project and prevent it from becoming a game-changer in international economic and trade relations.

The main advantage of the NSR-offered alternative is its shorter travel time and associated reduction in transportation costs compared to the traditional route through the Suez Canal. This will positively impact the transit times for goods produced by companies operating in high-tech and retail industries, as well as logistical operators relying on multimodal transportation—such as a combination of waterways and railroads (China Logist, September 26). These advantages were highlighted by PRC top-level business management. For instance, the Chairman of the Board of Zhejiang Seaport Logistics Group Co. Ltd., Sun Xuejun, underscored the importance of this maritime transportation route, which he called “an important result of the Ice Silk Road.” Zhou Xiaoping, the deputy director of the Daxie branch of Ningbo Customs, noted that the route will be used to transport not only goods classified as “daily necessities” but all types of goods that form so-called “new trio” including, among others, high value-added goods and industrial/specialized goods, such as energy storage modules and traction batteries (Russian.china.org.cn, September 23).

Russian economic, trade, and business experts urge caution when it comes to the new route. For instance, Igor Yushkov, an expert from the Financial University under the Russian government, identified numerous constraints. First, the route remains fully navigable—provided that necessary icebreakers are provided—only from July to November, which for now makes the NSR “not a very attractive transportation artery.” Second, the economic sanctions against Russia have prompted the PRC to ship many of its goods via Türkiye, Mongolia, and Central Asia to avoid risk-prone routes that pass through Russia. Third, shorter operating periods and the lack of supporting infrastructure—such as icebreakers, seaports, and land-based transportation—make operations along the NSR during the low season more expensive than alternative existing routes. Furthermore, producers of finished goods will have to compensate for the costs associated with the NSR by increasing the selling price of their goods, which may make them less competitive (Vgudok, August 29, 2024).

Maria Nikitina, founder of a Russian consulting and research project focused on transport and logistics optimization, attributed growing PRC interest in the NSR to Russia’s increasing weakness and isolation. She argued, “It is an open secret why China has joined the NSR. Without the [Special Military Operation] and Russia’s ongoing confrontation with key Arctic players, China’s chances of taking part in the NSR as an equal partner would have been quite minimal” (Vgudok, August 29, 2024). Other Russian experts, when commenting on the PRC’s move in the Arctic, arrive at a similar conclusion. The PRC is playing the long game. Its interests are strategic in nature, and Beijing can afford short-term sacrifices to achieve long-term objectives. For example, as of now, the NSR remains an extremely “seasonal niche,” with transportation potential being curtailed by numerous factors, including climate and navigability, ecological risks, high total costs, and sanctions-related considerations. In the future, however, with the possible removal of sanctions and changes in other variables, the NSR could become an “addition to the Suez and Panama canals.” Experts advise against assumptions that the PRC will entirely switch to the Russia-offered alternative. Instead, the NSR could emerge as an addition to—not a replacement of—already existing maritime transportation waterways (Briefly-news.com, accessed October 18).

In an interview with the People’s Daily, Wu Gang, a leading expert at the China State Shipbuilding Corporation, noted that, when discussing the technological aspect of the PRC’s Arctic policies, the development of nuclear icebreakers would play a key role in advancements in the region. This could potentially evolve into a source of friction between Russia and the PRC in the Arctic. Given that Russia is the only country in possession of these types of modern ships, one PRC official stated that the PRC will need to “focus on the building heavy [nuclear] icebreakers” (RIA Novosti, March 17). This statement, while neutral on its own, acquires a totally different meaning when compared with Russia’s perception of the development of the Arctic. Specifically, the Russian side insists that it is fully capable of providing all necessary technological support needed for operations in the Arctic, and foreign assistance is not warranted.

The PRC’s plan to focus on production of icebreakers could be viewed in Moscow as a sign of Beijing’s interest in acquiring more autonomy in the Arctic, potentially at Russia’s expense. These ideas were implicitly aired by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who stated that Russia alone is fully capable of developing its Arctic territory, including providing convoys and escorts to various types of cargo ships, and accomplishing all its plans (RIA Novosti, February 19). As of now, the PRC has a very limited presence in the Arctic region. Given its ambitious plans and Russia’s rapidly growing dependence on the PRC—which is likely to increase further should Russia’s war against Ukraine drag on—it is not a given that Russia would be able to keep the PRC out of the Arctic region or, when jointly cooperating, would be able to effectively control all its actions.

The voyage of the Istanbul Bridge is an indication of the growing potential of the Arctic region as an alternative maritime trade route whose full capacity is likely to become visible only in the future. This voyage also demonstrates the PRC’s growing interest in the Arctic, which has increased exponentially in response to Russia’s adventurism and visible decline. Even though the PRC is not an Arctic state, it sees access to the Arctic as strategically imperative, leading it to try to increase its presence in the region (see EDM, February 18, October 3). Despite appearing calm now, frictions between Russia and the PRC in the Arctic may become more visible in the future.