Belarus 2020–2025: Domestic Repression and Russian Influence

Executive Summary:   

• In the five years since Belarus’s 2020 protest movement, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime has become characterized by systematic, violent repression of dissent. The country, isolated from the West, became a military foothold for Russia and fell into political, economic, and informational dependence on the Kremlin.
• Western sanctions in response to Lukashenka’s human rights abuses and support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine failed to stop Minsk’s repressive tactics. Sanctions deepened Belarus’s dependence on Russia, strengthened authoritarianism, and harmed average citizens.
• The Belarusian opposition cannot influence the situation inside the country; it remains fragmented and financially dependent on Western donors. The distribution of Western aid to Belarusian pro-democracy groups inside the country and in exile is often opaque, ineffective, inefficient, and prone to corruption.
• The change of power in Belarus will likely occur either under Kremlin pressure or when Lukashenka passes away.

Five years ago, on August 9, 2020, Alyaksandr Lukashenka “won” a sixth term in a presidential election marred by widespread ballot fraud and voter intimidation (Meduza, August 18, 2020). Hundreds of thousands of Belarusians took to the streets following the election to protest electoral fraud and the authorities’ subsequent violent suppression of demonstrations (see EDM, November 2, 2020; Centre for East European and International Studies, March 25, 2021; see EDM, August 16, 2023). Independent election observers and democratic countries did not recognize the elections as free or fair due to myriad voting violations and a lack of transparency (U.S. Embassy in Belarus, August 10, 2020; European Union, October 21, 2020). Lukashenka, who has been in power since 1994 with the support of the Kremlin, has retained this position through systematic repression of political opposition and civil society (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 28, 2020). His authoritarian rule had not seen opposition and protest at such a level, however, until after the 2020 presidential election. The Lukashenka regime’s violent suppression of these protests consolidated his prolonged authoritarian rule, systematized restrictions on Belarusian rights and freedoms, institutionalized state violence, and cemented his repressive governance model. 

The 2020 protests in Belarus were a response to years of stagnation, corruption, impoverishment, and the absence of political turnover. The country experienced the largest wave of protest mobilization in its history, and riot police detained almost 7,000 protesters in the first four days of protests alone (Human Rights Watch, January 13, 2021). The authorities responded to protests with mass arrests, torture, banning independent media, dismantling civil society organizations, exiling businesses and opposition figures, and adopting laws that effectively criminalize political dissent (Vyasna, September 1, 2020; Belarusian Association of Journalists, November 19, 2020). 

According to Belarusian human rights groups, Lukashenka currently holds over 1,300 political prisoners, and more than 500,000 people have fled the country since 2020 (RFI, March 28; Dissidentby, accessed July 29). Public pressure, including public appeals by Nobel laureates to world leaders, has kept the plight of Belarusian political prisoners on the international agenda (see EDM, June 4, 2024; Bolkunets.org, February 17). Recent diplomatic efforts from the United States, which contributed to Minsk’s decision to release 14 political prisoners on June 21—including Siarhei Tsikhanouski, the husband of the leader of the Belarusian opposition in exile, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya—offer hope that the rest of the political prisoners will eventually be freed (Belsat, June 21; see EDM, July 28). 

Since 2020, the authoritarian regime has solidified in Belarus, under which the state systematically uses violence against its own population. State institutions—security services, courts, the military, and state-run media—function as instruments of organized repression aimed at suppressing dissent and maintaining power at any cost. Following his obvious manipulation of the 2020 presidential election, Lukashenka completely lost legitimacy as a democratically elected ruler in the eyes of most developed democracies. The European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries refused to recognize Lukashenka as a legitimately elected president (U.S. Embassy in Belarus, August 10, 2020; European Union, October 21, 2020). Since Belarus’s international isolation following its 2020 election, Minsk intensified its alignment with authoritarian states—such as Russia, the People’s Republic of China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, where regimes have been maintained, sometimes for decades, through sham elections and repression of any political or civil opposition (see EDM, October 21, July 15, 2024, April 24, June 13; Tehran Times, March 12).

The January 26, 2025 presidential election was a mere formality and failed to inspire trust domestically or internationally (U.S Embassy in Belarus, January 17; see EDM, January 22, 29). The official results claimed that Lukashenka secured 86.82 percent of the vote, winning the presidency for a seventh consecutive term. The election did not inspire significant opposition because of the widespread fear and emigration driven by the previous five years of systematic, violent repression (BELPOL, December 26, 2024; Meduza, January 21; BelTa, February 3). Other countries no longer view Lukashenka as a sovereign leader; he is seen as an extension of the Kremlin and an accomplice of Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in his provision of Belarusian territory for Russian military purposes and support of Putin’s aggressive foreign policy (see EDM, April 17).

Belarus has been politically, economically, informationally, and logistically isolated from Western networks since 2020. In response to Minsk’s 2020 repression and facilitation of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other democratic countries significantly reduced contact with the Belarusian regime (Carnegie Politika, June 25). The European Union closed border crossings, suspended passenger air and rail traffic, and imposed bans on vehicles with Belarusian license plates (Minsk Dialogue, July 11, 2023). EU and U.S. sanctions hit the general population and small businesses harder than the Belarusian authorities, who turned to Russia for support. 

Over the past five years, the sanctions imposed by the European Union and other Western powers have been fragmentary, belated, and often easy to circumvent for the Belarusian regime (see EDM, October 25, 2021, March 14, 2024). Meanwhile, citizens of Belarus face bank refusals, visa restrictions, and discrimination in employment and housing rentals abroad. Belarus has effectively become a “grey zone”—a buffer territory used to bypass sanctions and for illicit transit between Russia and Europe (see EDM, August 7, 2024)

Today, a new “Iron Curtain” is rapidly taking shape, separating Belarus from Europe. Russia is the primary beneficiary of this isolation (see EDM, March 20, 2024). Exploiting the weakening of Minsk’s international ties, the Kremlin has fully drawn Belarus into its orbit, strengthening its political, economic, military, and informational control (see EDM, August 7, 2024). The lack of real alternatives and Lukashenka’s economic reliance on the Kremlin has allowed Putin to turn Belarus into a client state—a relationship where Belarus is subordinate, cut off from the European space, and integrated into the Russian neo-imperial framework. The Republic of Belarus’s sovereignty is compromised, especially regarding foreign policy, with crucial decisions made in Moscow, not Minsk.

Militarization of Belarus as a Foothold for Russian Aggression

The growth of Russian leverage over Minsk since its rupture with the West following its suppression of the 2020 protests has allowed Moscow to use Belarus as a military foothold for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine (see EDM, February 3, 12, 13, March 13, June 11). Lukashenka’s reliance on Russia has essentially given Moscow control of the economic and defense spheres in Belarus.

Belarus has been Moscow’s main collaborator in its war against Ukraine. The Kremlin placed more than 30,000 Russian troops inside Belarus in January and February of 2022 ahead of the full-scale invasion (see EDM, February 3, 9, 2022). Militarization in Belarus is advancing rapidly, and the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on its territory poses a serious threat to the security of regional states, especially in the Baltic region (see EDM, May 9, 2024, April 17).

Moscow views Belarus as part of a “unified military space” through which it can exert pressure on the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), destabilize regional security, and re-establish its influence on countries in the former Soviet sphere (Standing Committee of the Union State, March 12, 2012; RIA Novosti, May 25, 2023; President of Russia, March 13; President of Belarus, May 16). Belarus’s proximity to the Kaliningrad semi-exclave, which Russia cannot directly access by land, would make it central to any conflict over the Suwałki Corridor—a strip of land along the Lithuania–Poland border that links western Europe to the Baltic states and could link Russia to Kaliningrad (see EDM, June 3). In this context, Belarus could become a crucial tool for further Russian aggression against Europe. 

Western Sanctions on Belarus

Sanctions imposed by the West have led to a significant deterioration in the situation of average Belarusian citizens inside the country and abroad, where many live in forced exile. The European Union began imposing sanctions against Belarus in 2020, aiming to punish the government for its violent repression of protests while minimizing harm to ordinary citizens. In practice, however, sanctions harmed average Belarusians while the regime and Lukashenka’s allies in business remained relatively unscathed through increased economic reliance on Russia (see EDM, September 11, 2020, May 7, August 7, 2024). International banks closed accounts of small and medium-sized businesses not connected to Lukashenka; accounts of activists and opposition members were blocked; difficulties arose in paying pensions and social benefits to Belarusian citizens living abroad; visa regimes tightened; many European countries closed their consular offices; and prices for visas and related services increased dramatically (DW, January 23, July 16, 2024; Devby, April 25). The broad measures that have been applied to Belarus have the unintended effect of cutting off cooperation in areas that the sanctions supposedly do not target.  For example, Western sanctions do not target the public health sphere, but medicine has not been reaching Belarus because Western companies have ceased working inside the country (DW, March 7, 2024). 

Instead of weakening the regime, Western sanctions deepened Belarus’s dependence on Russia, contributing to Minsk’s involvement in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including the stationing of Russian troops on Belarusian soil. Sanctions did not harm businesses linked to Lukashenka and his inner circle. Some even gained a boost after 2020 thanks to increased trade with Russia. Minsk began to selectively conceal the information of businesses and politicians to limit the appearance of Lukashenka’s allies on sanctions lists (Zerkalo, April 13). With Russia’s support, the Lukashenka regime was largely able to compensate for the negative impacts of sanctions, deepening its dependency on Moscow.

Opportunists began forming lists of Belarusian companies and individuals subject to sanctions, creating businesses to help wealthy individuals circumvent sanctions. There are cases where organizations sold residency permits in EU countries to relatives of businessmen connected to the Lukashenka regime (Belarusian Investigative Center, May 28, 2023). At the same time, some pro-democracy activists persecuted by the regime have been denied political refugee status in the European Union.

Opposition

The Belarusian political opposition in exile exerts little real influence on political processes inside Belarus and has been ineffective at resolving the problems faced by citizens in exile. The main weakness of the political opposition, independent media, and independent civil society organizations remains their dependence on external donors (Pikulik, Bedford, “Aid Paradox: Strengthening Belarusian Non-democracy through Democracy Promotion,” August 30, 2018). There is practically no funding from Belarusian society itself to support political and civic activism. The Belarusian opposition’s reliance on Western aid creates a system of incentives that revolve around the priorities of Western donors and the practical financial and bureaucratic demands of running a Belarusian pro-democracy organization. Donors allocate funds to address their own objectives, and Belarusian pro-democracy groups that receive aid often lack the means to influence internal political processes under Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime. Financial resources provided by the European Union and the United States to support the democratic community in Belarus have sometimes been distributed non-transparently, leading to wasteful and occasionally corrupt financial practices among grantees (Sota, July 2). Some analysts even argue that this practice has strengthened authoritarianism in Belarus (Delfi, September 17, 2018). The Belarusian opposition in exile appears to lack a cohesive strategy to end repression inside Belarus, and faces internal conflicts and corruption, exacerbating the perception that it is not a viable alternative to Lukashenka (see EDM, June 13, 2024). 

Since 2020, a number of European and international institutions have recognized Belarusian opposition leader in exile Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Coordination Council as the legitimate interim representative of Belarus’s democratic community (see EDM, November 2, 4, 2020; European Parliament, July 7, 2023). Lithuania even recognized the council as the sole democratic representative of Belarus (Government of Lithuania, September 12, 2020). Western entities’ recognition of opposition organizations in exile can have a counterintuitive effect. The choice can play into Belarusian and Russian propaganda narratives about Western meddling in internal Belarusian affairs, undermining trust in Western institutions and their commitment to democratic values (see EDM, May 5, 2021, February 3, June 11; YouTube/@ont_by, August 6). 

Political Transition Scenarios 

Over the past five years, Belarus has suffered significant losses, and the state, citizens, businesses, and society have been negatively affected. The country has regressed politically, economically, and culturally. Instead of progressive development, there is degradation, stagnation, and isolation. Lukashenka, while maintaining political power, has lost his place in history. Since the 2020 presidential election, the regime has existed in a state of fear, vindictiveness, and violence. This period of dictatorship and repression has shattered hopes for a free and independent Belarus.

The issue of political transition in Belarus is extremely complex and contentious. Under an authoritarian regime, predicting scenarios is difficult, as the regime will eliminate potential threats before a transition begins.

Scenario 1: Death or Death in Office of Alyaksandr Lukashenka

This scenario is the most likely way that a political transition will occur in Belarus. The constitution stipulates that in case of the president’s death, his powers pass to the chairman of the Council of the Republic until a new head of state is inaugurated (President of the Republic of Belarus, accessed July 29). In such a situation, the government can implement a state of emergency or martial law, likely with Russian intervention to maintain order. Lukashenka’s death and the regime’s immediate reaction to it could lead to protests, internal power struggles, and complex negotiations between different stakeholders.

Scenario 2: Lukashenka’s Departure Under External Pressure

Only the Kremlin has enough leverage over Lukashenka to make him leave office, and as long as Russia’s war against Ukraine continues, he will be useful to Russia in some form. A managed power transition would be possible wherein Lukashenka retains influence, for example, through the position of chairman of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly (see EDM, May 8, 2024). The Belarusian establishment and Russia would tightly control his successor. This scenario was considered for 2025, but Lukashenka, according to unofficial sources, broke a 2020 promise to the Kremlin by running again in the elections (Interfax, August 9, 2021; see EDM, July 16, 2024, March 19, March 19). Citizens would remain excluded from decision-making processes, and political competition would be absent.

Scenario 3: Military Coup or Intervention

Although it is possible, a military coup or intervention is unlikely. There are no internal forces capable of organizing an armed coup, and external actors (including NATO and Ukraine) would likely not militarily intervene in Belarus, as Russia would likely defend it. Despite significant influence, however, Russia is unlikely to resort to open military intervention in Belarus without a serious threat to its interests. 

Scenario 4: Revolution 

A mass popular uprising capable of overthrowing the regime is unlikely due to the level of systematic suppression of opposition, widespread repression, and robust control by security forces in Belarus. If escalation occurs, Russia is ready to militarily support the Lukashenka regime to suppress protests. The country effectively lives under a harsh police dictatorship, where any protest attempts are brutally crushed.

Scenario 5: Negotiations Involving Opponents

Negotiations between the Lukashenka regime and the political opposition remain unlikely, but are not impossible. The regime does not view the opposition as equal partners and tends to conduct direct dialogue with Western countries on potential reforms, bypassing legitimate opposition structures. Token negotiations may occur to ease sanctions or reach temporary compromises, but a substantial agreement is unlikely. Still, Western governments and the regime itself underestimate this scenario’s potential. Active involvement of European states, the United States, and international organizations in a negotiation process that includes the Belarusian opposition could help ease tensions and create conditions for a peaceful political transition.

An independent, democratic, and sovereign Belarus is a vital element of regional security. European countries could act not only as mediators but also as guarantors, ensuring compliance with agreements, thereby increasing trust among participants. Supporting genuine dialogue and creating a platform for negotiations involving all key political forces and international observers could be an effective tool for gradually weakening the authoritarian regime without the risk of violence. For this scenario to succeed, however, coordinated and resolute diplomacy as well as a willingness by Belarusian officials to make minimal concessions are necessary, which is currently not evident.