Brain-Computer Interface Systems, Qiyuan Lab, and the PRC’s AI Push

Executive Summary:

• Beijing views brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) as “key and core” technologies, leading to substantial state investment for both civilian and military purposes.
• Qiyuan Lab, an artificial intelligence (AI) laboratory in Beijing led by a People’s Liberation Army Major General and machine learning expert, has ramped up hiring for BCI research-related roles since 2023. Current Qiyuan employees mostly do not appear to indicate their employment status on recruitment sites, suggesting that some of their work may be sensitive.
• Laboratories such as Zhejiang, Purple Mountain, and Pengcheng share similar objectives—recruiting top-tier talent for AI and BCI endeavors under programs such as the “Overseas Outstanding Youth Fund Project” and guided by the 2017 New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan.

State media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) frequently report on breakthroughs in brain-computer interfaces (BCIs, 脑机接口), a set of technologies that link the human nervous system with computers, allowing direct communication between the two. On March 20, a number of reports covered the successful implant of a “Beinao-1” (北脑一号) chip that can help patients with aphasia communicate (Xinhua, March 20; S&T Daily). The same day, the Beijing Municipal Science & Technology Commission, which has supported the chip’s development, declared that it will accelerate clinical trials for the chip, as well as its production, as part of its main priority this year of “unswervingly support research on key and core technology” (关键核心技术) (Beijing Government Releases, March 21). This phrasing is identical to that found in the central government’s Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan and Long-Range Objectives through the Year 2035 (‘十四五’规划和2035年远景目标纲要). A table in the document placed brain science and brain-inspired research fourth in a list of seven areas of cutting-edge science and technology to tackle (Xinhua, March 13, 2021).

The “Beinao-1” chip was developed by the Chinese Institute for Brain Research, Beijing (北京脑科学与类脑研究所) in collaboration with Beijing Xinzhida Neurotechnology (北京芯智达神经技术; aka NeuCyber NeuroTech). The latter, set up by the Beijing municipal government, has been propagandized as the firm creating “China’s version of Neuralink,” in reference to the company owned by tech entrepreneur Elon Musk, which is seen as a world leader on BCI technology (Global Times, May 22, 2024; Qichacha, accessed March 26). This is just one example among many of the developments emerging from work that takes place in a network of large, government-funded laboratories dedicated to strategic research. Zhejiang Lab (之江实验室), which may be connected to the artificial intelligence (AI) large language model (LLM) startup DeepSeek, embodies this advanced, state-funded research model (China Brief, February 14; China Policy Leads, February 25). Another example, Qiyuan Lab (启元实验室), appears to be the PRC laboratory most focused on BCI. It is based in Zhongguancun, an area of Beijing often dubbed the PRC’s “Silicon Valley” (中国硅谷), which also hosts the creators of the “Beinao-1” chip (People’s Daily Online, February 25; Qiyuan, accessed March 4).

Qiyuan Lab’s BCI Specialist Hiring Spree

AI, another “key and core technology,” is increasingly integrated with BCIs. The New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (新一代人工智能发展规划) issued by the State Council in 2017 set the goal for the PRC to become the world-leading AI industry power with a “first-mover advantage” (先发优势) by 2030 (State Council, July 20, 2017; China Brief, December 22, 2017). Qiyuan Lab, an advanced AI research laboratory, has ramped up BCI hiring since 2023, posting numerous ads on Liepin (猎聘网), a recruitment site. Its recruitment page describes itself as a “laboratory focused on scientific research in the field of intelligent technology” (实验室聚焦智能科技领域科研攻关) and employing 1,000–2,000 people primarily engaged in AI and other advanced technological research (Liepin, accessed March 4). In a posting advertising joint training positions for doctoral students at the Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT)—a “Seven Sons of National Defense” university—Qiyuan describes its collaboration with multiple elite PRC universities as a relationship of “strategic cooperation” (战略合作), supported by a network of over 50 doctoral supervisors from Tsinghua and other “partner” institutions (China Brief, February 14; HIT, March 4).

As this indicates, the laboratory has a prominent role in the PRC’s defense technology ecosystem, reflected in its mission statement, “reflecting the national will, serving the national strategy, undertaking the national mission, and representing the national level” (体现国家意志、服务国家战略、承担国家使命、代表国家水平). This connection is further highlighted by its leadership by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Major General (少将) Liao Xiangke (廖湘科), a machine learning expert who also oversees the Tianhe (天河) series of supercomputers at the National University of Defense Technology (国防科技大学; NUDT). In a keynote at the Beijing Digital Talent Development Conference (北京数字人才发展大会) in November 2024, Liao identified LLMs as Qiyuan’s primary focus (People’s Daily Online, November 20, 2024).

Qiyuan’s focus on bio-hardware integration first became evident in early 2023 with the establishment of its bio-intelligence platform department (类生智能平台部) (WeChat Official Account of North China Electric Power University Career Center, January 12, 2023). As with its AI research, traceable through job listings for supercomputer hardware and software specialists, Qiyuan’s involvement in bio-hardware research appears in numerous related job postings. Between June 2022 and February 2025, Qiyuan sought neuroimaging specialists, PhD graduates in biology and computer science with neuroscience backgrounds, and master’s degree holders in biological experiment engineering and data processing. By early March 2025, it was recruiting interns in biological experimentation, BCI, and neuroimaging algorithms, as well as a supervisor for an animal testing facility. Research goals for Qiyuan in 2025 include bionic robotics, biomedical engineering, and mechanical engineering, among others (HIT, March 4).

Although these job postings are easily accessible via open-source research, Qiyuan’s current employees maintain strict operational security. Only a few former, low-level, and non-technical staff (mostly interns and human resources (HR) professionals) publicly disclose their past or present employment at Qiyuan Lab on the Chinese-language professional networking site MaiMai (脉脉).

Network of Labs Recruit Strategically, Targeting the West

Zhejiang Lab and Qiyuan are just two research institutions among an extensive network dedicated to “promoting the core national interest” (推进核心国家利益). Alongside them, laboratories like Pengcheng Laboratory (鹏城实验室), Pazhou (Huangpu) Laboratory (琶洲实验室[黄埔]), and Purple Mountain Laboratory (紫金山实验室) appear designed to recruit, develop, and retain “high-level talent” (高层次人才) in STEM fields critical to national strategic goals. Publicly available recruitment information suggests that Purple Mountain centers on hardware (satellites, autonomous vehicle navigation, and drones), Pazhou focuses on AI/LLMs hardware and software, and Pengcheng pursues a broader range of sensitive research. As of February 25, Pengcheng listed 129 open positions for specialists in software engineering, data mining, robotics, AI, information security, and other fields (Liepin, accessed March 4 [1], [2]; Liepin/Pengcheng Laboratory, accessed March 4).

On job-board sites, Qiyuan and other labs are often categorized as “government/public” employers (政府/公共事业), with managerial and HR roles explicitly requiring or preferring Chinese Communist Party membership (“中共党员优先”), indicating government involvement. They are also linked to programs such as the “Overseas Outstanding Youth Fund Project” (海外优秀青年基金项目) that aim to attract “high-level talent”—often ethnic Chinese with advanced technical training from foreign universities. Some labs even host dedicated recruitment events for this purpose (Purple Mountain Labs, January 16, 2024; Zhejiang Lab, February 6, 2024; Pengcheng Lab, February 7, 2024). The similar wording and timing of these event announcements suggest coordination by a central organizing entity.

Figure 1. Qiyuan Recruitment Advertisements

(Source: Liepin)

These overseas recruitment drives provide high salaries, recruitment bonuses, and other special perks for “high-level talents” and “outstanding young scientists” (优秀青年科学). A Zhejiang posting showcases the benefits offered to overseas recruits, including furnished housing, resettlement allowances over renminbi (RMB) 100,000 ($14,000), and annual round trip flights for visiting overseas relatives (Zhejiang Lab, February 6, 2024). With relatively high salaries—RMB 1.5 million ($207,000) advertised in 2024—these positions are highly appealing to graduates from prestigious Western institutions. Pengcheng offers even higher compensation for “High-End Class A Scholars” (高端学者[A类]), providing RMB 3 million ($410,000) in research funding and a one-time RMB 1 million ($140,000) relocation bonus for those willing to return to live and work in the PRC.

Details on Qiyuan’s recruitment bonuses for foreign-educated elite scholars are less available than at similar institutions such as Zhejiang, Pengcheng, and Purple Mountain. Qiyuan did, however, collaborate with the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security in December 2024 for an event aimed at “outstanding young talents from home and abroad” with the theme of “Struggle in the Present, Open Up the Future” (搏在当下，启智未来) (Sohu, November 11, 2024). This event sought to attract post-doctoral STEM students to “contribute to the country’s high-level scientific and technological self-reliance” (为实现国家高水平科技自立自强贡献力量), mirroring the messaging of more public recruitment drives by other labs. Similar initiatives at Purple Mountain and Pengcheng list, as a first requirement, that applicants residing overseas must “abide by the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and relevant laws and regulations” (遵守中华人民共和国宪法及相关法律法规) (Purple Mountain Labs, January 16, 2024; Wechat Official Account of Pengcheng , February 7, 2024). These drives also often stipulate minimum residency commitments, such as a requirement to remain in the PRC for at least three years.

PRC entities have also actively recruited non-Chinese BCI experts from the West. A prominent example is Charles Lieber, a former Harvard professor renowned for his work in nanotechnology and nano-bioelectronics, who was convicted in the United States on charges including the transfer of Department of Defense- and National institutes of Health-sponsored research to Wuhan University of Technology, as well as failing to disclose PRC payments while participating in the controversial “Thousand Talents” program (千人计划) (China Brief, August 5, 2010, April 12, 2023; U.S. Department of Justice, April 26, 2023). In a surprising turn, a U.S. court permitted Lieber permission to return to the PRC several times in 2024 to attend conferences and discuss potential collaborations (The Harvard Crimson, October 30, 2024).

Conclusion

The PRC’s extensive state-funded laboratory network is pivotal in developing cutting-edge technologies, including in AI research and BCIs. These fields have both civilian and military use, and ethical approaches to the applications of emerging technologies in the PRC have long diverged from Western standards (CSET, March 11, 2024). The recruitment of top-tier talent—domestically and internationally—is indicative of a concerted effort to achieve and maintain a technological lead. The rapid growth of these labs, which seem to share goals, recruiting drives, and possibly research, reinforces the visibility of this effort, as does their adherence to the 2017 New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan.

The PRC’s construction of an expanding network of labs likely has learned a lot from the United States’s own system of national and university labs. Notably, Qiyuan Lab, Tsinghua University’s High Technology Laboratory, and the Academy of Military Science Evaluation and Demonstration Research Center published a study in 2021 that compared U.S. research institutions such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Carnegie Mellon, University of California, Berkeley, and others with PRC “National Laboratories.” [1] By comparison, the West knows much less about the PRC’s laboratory system. Against this backdrop, differences between the two systems warrant closer examination.

Notes

[1] Ban Yanjun, Fang Chao, and You Hanlin “Inter-agency Resource Management Models of the National Laboratories: American Case Analysis and Enlightenment” [国家实验室的跨机构资源管理模式:美国案例分析及启示], Science and Technology Management Research [科技管理研究], 2021(24): 1-8.