Central Asian Countries Suffer Massive Brain Drain, Putting Their Futures at Risk

Executive Summary:

• The five Central Asian countries have suffered a new brain drain since gaining independence in 1991, with a large share of their advanced students and best scholars moving to the West rather than to Russia, as had been the case in Soviet times.
• This new brain drain has alarmed both the governments of the region, which consider it a threat to their futures, and Moscow, which views it as a way other countries are attempting to wean Central Asia away from Russia and weaken its influence.
• The Central Asian countries are doing more to retain or attract back their best minds from abroad, but Russia is now attempting to exploit that drive by calling for a joint Russian-Central Asian foundation to monitor and support this brain drain reversal. 

Since gaining independence in 1991, the five Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—have suffered a new brain drain problem. A large share of their best scholars and advanced students are moving not to Russian centers, as had been the case in Soviet times, but to universities and research centers in the West and the countries of the Pacific Rim (Commonwealth of Independent States, March 7, 2023; Bugin.info, April 16). This new flow has been eclipsed in numbers and attention by the movement of the vastly larger numbers of worker migrants from Central Asia to Russia and other countries, on whose remittances home the Central Asian countries currently rely (Checkpoint, June 30, 2022; Bugin.info, April 15). The impact of the outflow of students, scientists, and other scholars, however, is increasingly worrying the region’s governments. These countries are already suffering losses because of the departure of students, scientists, and other scholars, and fear that without such people, their countries’ development will be hobbled. Such fears have only been intensified by World Bank reports and by Russian commentaries suggesting that this brain drain is a Western plot to wean the Central Asian countries away from Moscow (The World Bank, October 31, 2024; RITM Eurasia, April 4; Bugin.info, April 14).

All five countries are committed to addressing this problem. All invest far less in education and research, however, than the average of the world’s countries, most by more than an order of magnitude. Money shortages have limited their ability to hold, let alone attract back, researchers, as Kazakh scholar Gulnash Askhat and others point out (The Diplomat, August 14, 2024; Zakon.kz, April 14). Now, some in Moscow are seeking to take advantage of this situation by calling for the formation of a joint Russian-Central Asian foundation to support this effort, promising both money and restrictions on the length of time Central Asians can spend in Russia (Bugin.info, April 16). Whether Moscow can create such a structure is very much an open question given its past actions and increasingly xenophobic attitudes toward Central Asians (see EDM, May 9, October 22, November 21, 2024). Still, this new proposal by itself will exacerbate geopolitical competition in the region.

As many as 100,000 Central Asian students are now enrolled in foreign universities, up by more than 60 percent since 2000, with only about a third of them saying they plan to return to their countries after graduation (Bugin.info, April 15). Their refusal to go back only adds to the problems caused by the departures of hundreds of Central Asian scientists, scholars, and researchers to the West and the Pacific Rim. The exact figures of those departures are unknown as the region’s governments remain reluctant to advertise them, as some officials in these regimes even continue to deny that this brain drain is a problem (Asia-Plus, July 29, 2022). The numbers are now large enough, however, that both international organizations such as the World Bank and most leaders in the region have christened this a “brain drain” and are expressing fears that unless it is limited or better reversed, they face an uncertain and increasingly difficult future (bne Intellinews, March 16). A clear indication of just how large this problem is comes from Tajikistan, where the government says the brain drain from its territory has already cost Dushanbe more than $80 billion, an amount it says will only continue to grow if nothing is done (Asia-Plus, June 6, 2023).

As large as those looming losses as a result of brain drain may be, the immediate costs of turning things around quickly are almost certainly beyond the capacity of all the Central Asian countries, except perhaps Kazakhstan (Zakon.kz, April 14). Kazakhstan is different because its government has the resources relative to population to address this problem and has done so earlier than the other Central Asian states (see EDM, July 8, 2024). Consequently, the Central Asian countries will need large amounts of foreign assistance to limit the problem. The United Kingdom has made a major contribution by promoting higher education reforms in the region, as have some other Western countries (RITM Eurasia, April 4). If such inflows of cash continue, Central Asia may be able to reduce the impact of brain drain by ensuring that those who now study or work abroad will want and be able to return home. As always is the case in the post-Soviet space, however, Moscow views such foreign involvement not as a contribution to solving a very real problem but rather as a threat to itself. Moscow counters such threats both by attacking the motives of those making these contributions and by setting up institutions intended to ensure that the former Soviet republics will look to Moscow rather than anywhere else.

Some Russian commentators are now proposing a Russian-Central Asian foundation that would provide funds for Central Asians to go to Russian universities and research institutions. These programs promise that Central Asians’ stays in Russia would be limited. The commentators also propose that Central Asian governments help them expand their universities and research centers so that Russian-trained specialists can then return home. They hope that this will contribute both to the development of their own countries and to the promotion of good relations between Moscow and the Central Asian governments (Caravan, September 4, 2021; Bugin.info, April 16).

Moscow faces an uphill battle in pushing this idea for at least three reasons. First, Russia itself lacks the funds to make a Russian-Central Asian foundation possible, given budgetary stringencies created by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine. Backers of this project concede as much when they say they would need money from elsewhere. Second, Russia’s reputation in Central Asia has been in decline both because of xenophobia among Russians and because of the large number of Russians who have fled to the region to avoid having to go to fight in Ukraine. Third, Moscow’s promise to send Central Asian experts home after a specified time is unlikely to be believed, given that Moscow itself has tried to promote the migration of experts from Central Asia to the Russian Federation and that it does not have an outstanding record of keeping its word especially with regard to its treatment of Central Asian worker migrants (Radio Azattyq, March 14, 2014).

The fate of the more than five million migrant workers from Central Asia in the Russian Federation will undoubtedly continue to attract more attention than the far smaller number of educated specialists from Central Asia there and elsewhere. The latter, however, will have an impact far more than their numbers both on the future of the Central Asian countries and on the geopolitics of the region. As a result, the resolution of the brain drain problem in Central Asia merits more attention lest Central Asia suffer not only economic problems in the future but also fall back under Russian influence.