Do the Suwayda Clashes in Syria Signal Future Clashes Between the Kurds and the New Syrian Regime?

Executive Summary:

• The Syrian government’s attempted offensive on Suwayda appears to have been aimed at taking advantage of skirmishes between Bedouin tribal militias and Druze factions to dismantle local autonomy under the pretense of halting intercommunal violence.
• The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) views the Suwayda assault as a model the central regime may employ against its own autonomous region in northeast Syria. These concerns are exacerbated by the collapse of integration talks between the SDF and the Syrian Interim Government in July.
• Experts warn that unless Damascus abandons its agenda of centralization, Syria risks renewed conflict between the state and its autonomous regions. In particular, the Kurds are unlikely to reintegrate into the new Syrian army unless meaningful guarantees of their autonomy and security within the new state are provided.

On July 12, intense clashes broke out between Druze and Bedouin armed groups in Suwayda, Syria. This occurred after an informal Bedouin checkpoint kidnapped a Druze vegetable truck driver, resulting in a series of escalating kidnappings and killings between the two groups (Alhurra, July 16). Suwayda is a province in southwestern Syria that contains significant Druze, Christian, and Sunni Arab populations. The main players in the region adopted a position of neutrality during the Syrian Civil War, maintaining limited autonomy from Damascus while becoming a refuge for those fleeing the al-Assad regime, including individuals fleeing conscription (Etana, February 22, 2024). In April 2023, anti-regime protests erupted in Suwayda; by December, the Druze joined the fight against the al-Assad regime, opening up another front in the final days of the war from the south (Anadolu Ajansı, August 17, 2024; CNN, December 6, 2024). Among the leaders of Suwayda’s Druze is Hikmat al-Hijri—a former al-Assad supporter who came to endorse the new regime when Suwayda’s autonomy was put in danger. Now, the Druze fear that the new Syrian government will encroach on their autonomy. This is an especially poignant threat in light of the latter’s Islamism and failure to protect minorities, most notably the Alawites, more than 1000 of whom were killed in March.

The new government in Damascus, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known by his alias as an al-Qaeda affiliated leader, Abu Muḥammad al-Jawlāni), tried to exploit the tensions between Bedouin and Druze to try to take full control over Suwayda. If this were successful, it is likely the case that the new regime would have sought to remove the semi-autonomy of the Druze factions led by al-Hijri (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, July 17). However, Israeli intervention on July 16 halted Syria’s advances and pushed out Syrian government forces, who withdrew fully on July 17, after which a ceasefire was established with U.S. support (CNN, July 17; Euronews, July 17).

It should be noted that this is not the first clash between the Druze and Arab tribal fighters. Clashes also erupted between Druze and tribal factions in Suwayda in March after a video falsely portrayed a Druze man mocking the Islamic Prophet Mohammed, killing nearly 100 people. Those clashes only stopped after a ceasefire and Israeli airstrikes in May (Carnegie Middle East Center, May 14).

Heavy clashes have continued after Damascus-backed Arab tribal fighters attacked Druze groups following alleged abuses by the latter against Bedouin civilians in Suwayda’s countryside (Anadolu Ajansı, July 18). Furthermore, a large tribal mobilization from other provinces in Syria to join the fight in Suwayda ensued, including from Homs and Deir ez-Zor. These individuals sought to support the Bedouin tribes of Suwayda against Druze factions after reports emerged of displaced and murdered Bedouin (Middle East Eye, July 17; Hürriyet Daily News, July 18; Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, July 18). The clashes between Druze and Syrian government-backed tribal fighters in Suwayda’s countryside have continued since July 17, but reportedly cooled down over the next few days.

Arab Threats to SDF Territory

Some of the thousands of tribal fighters mobilized to fight in Suwayda also come from Arab areas under the control of the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), including Deir ez-Zor, a former Islamic State (IS) stronghold (X/@vvanwilgenburg, July 19). Activists from Raqqa (IS’s former capital) and Deir ez-Zour have pressured Damascus to capture these majority Arab areas from the SDF, with the idea that the new regime could try to spark tribal revolts in SDF-held areas (Al Monitor, July 15). This would resemble what the former al-Assad government did with Sheikh Ibrāhīm al-Hifl of the ‘Akaidāt tribe, who led a failed tribal revolt in 2023–2024 against the SDF under the so-called “Forces of the Arab Tribes and Clans” (Carnegie Middle East Center, December 10, 2024; Washington Institute, April 15). At the same time, Turkish-backed groups under the same name also attacked the SDF in areas like Tal Tamr in solidarity with tribes in Deir ez-Zor (Levant 24, September 3, 2023).

The SDF and the new government held a tense meeting with U.S., U.K., and French mediation on July 9 in an attempt to ameliorate the situation. At the meeting, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani—an Arab from Hasakah in northeastern Syria, currently under SDF control—reportedly made veiled threats to capture Deir ez-Zor from the SDF by force (Al Monitor, July 14). Hifl, meanwhile, has reportedly also sought favor with Damascus (X/@fadi0bed, January 18). Fighters of Sheikh Farhān al-Marsūmi, an individual thought to be close to Iran, were also spotted during the pro-Syrian government offensive against Suwayda (X/@vvanwilgenburg, July 15). Al-Marsūmi is also known to have ties to Hifl (Washington Institute, April 15, 2024). The meeting would ultimately prove unsuccessful.

These factors collectively suggest that Damascus may exploit tribal groups to incite tribal revolts. The situation would be fundamentally similar to the Bedouin uprisings against the Druze and provide a pretext for the Syrian government to deploy its armed forces in SDF-held areas, as it did in Suwayda. Before the fall of al-Assad, many Arabs in SDF-held Deir ez-Zor opposed the entry of Iranian and regime forces. Now the situation is different, with the al-Assad regime toppled, and Iranian militias no longer present. With al-Assad gone, many Arabs would prefer that the new regime asserts control over SDF-held areas, while others maintain neutrality.

The Tenuous Relationship Between the SDF and Syrian Interim Government

The current Suwayda events are being closely watched by the SDF, but the recent incident is not the only event that concerns the Kurdish militia. On March 10, the SDF and the al-Sharaa-led Syrian Interim Government signed a deal to integrate the SDF into the new Syrian state. This was taken as a capitulation by the SDF to Damascus’s demands, as the latter has insisted on a central state with one army (Kurdistan 24, July 9). In spite of this, the SDF and the local self-administration, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North East Syria (DAANES), expressed a preference for continued decentralization with the empowerment of local councils. In April, the Interim Government and SDF-linked local authorities in Aleppo agreed to deescalate tensions in Kurdish neighborhoods in the city (Ajansa Nûçeyan a Firatê, April 2). While some progress was made on local issues, as previously stated, the July 9 talks ultimately failed, with even the small agreements worked out there put on hold, according to a Kurdish official (Rudaw, June 9).

Druze–Kurdish Parallels

Kurdish groups fear that the situation in Suwayda will soon be mirrored with the government fostering or tolerating resentment between Kurds and Bedouins in SDF-held regions. This was stoked by a statement from Syria’s information minister, who accused Druze leader Hikmat al-Hijri of attempting to create “sectarian tensions” and noted that the Damascus would adopt the same strategy toward the Druze as the Kurds, integrating them into “one single Syrian army” with little to no armed ethnic autonomy (X/@TurkishIndy, July 20).

It should therefore be no surprise that the Syrian Kurds have shown support for the Druze in Suwayda. During an online event, SDF foreign relations head Îlham Ehmed stated that the new regime’s deployment of its General Security forces to Suwayda “will not create a stable security situation and will lead to revenge case[s] and massacres of the population, and won’t lead to any trust for the population to integrate into the new government.” [1] Senior Kurdish official Bedran Çiya Kurd also urged in a post on X that “state sovereignty cannot be imposed through tools of repression” (X/@bedranCiyakurd, July 17).

Syrian Kurdish officials responded to a call from Hikmat al-Hijri for assistance and offered to open a humanitarian corridor to Suwayda (Facebook/Spiritual Leadership of the Druze Unitarian Muslims, July 17; Facebook/Ronahî TV Arabic, July 18). However, it is unclear how any aid could arrive, since such convoys would have to travel through Syrian government-controlled territory and would therefore need approval from Damascus (Rudaw, July 18). This would not be the first instance of Kurdish humanitarian efforts to Syria’s other minorities, however. In March and April, the Kurds also sent aid from Qamishli through Tabqa to Alawite areas hit by violence (Rudaw, March 17; Medya News, April 11).

The General Command of the Kurdish Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) has even claimed that they are “fully prepared to confront all attacks by dark forces targeting women” after the “massacres against Druze and brutal attacks on women” (Hawar News Agency, July 16). The sympathy among Syrian Kurds for the Druze goes beyond their shared goals of decentralization and autonomy in Syria, but the Kurds also fear they could be next if Damascus takes Suwayda. “As the Arab tribes advance toward Suwayda, the SDF are living a nightmare that could repeat itself if these tribes march toward SDF command centers,” Syrian journalist Ghassan Ibrahim noted (X/@Ibrahim_Ghassan, July 18). While the conflict raged in Suwayda, the SDF held a military parade in Raqqa, apparently intended to be a show of force and demonstration of solidarity with the Druze (X/@vvanwilgenburg, July 16).

Kurdish Concerns

There are concerns that what occurred against the Alawites in March and what is occurring in Suwayda signal future efforts under the new regime to crack down on Kurdish autonomy. Kurdish analyst and former Democratic Union Party (PYD) spokesperson Nawaf Xelil predicts that “Suwayda and the Druze are not the only target. Their [al-Sharaa and his government’s] thought process is that, because no one opposed their massacre of the Alawites in Latakia, they could provoke and attack the Druze. If this trend continues, it is likely that the Kurds will also be targeted [by al-Sharaa’s rule].” [2]

Xelil expects that attacks “could also repeat against the Alawites and the Druze” for a second time. According to Xelil, the mentality of al-Sharaa and those around him “is not one of statehood and governance. They are jihadists within a jihadist group.” Another Syrian researcher, Mohammad Ibrahim, suggests that after Suwayda, “There is concern that Damascus may attempt similar tactics in the northeast, potentially inciting tribal groups to confront the SDF in an effort to pressure them into concessions at the negotiating table.” However, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm notes that developments in Suwayda and along the coast in Latakia demonstrate that such approaches carry significant risks and may ultimately backfire. Indeed, he argues the pursuit of a centralized power structure “appears unsustainable in a country as socially and politically diverse as Syria.”

Additionally, Xelil expressed concern over the fact that the U.S. Special Envoy for Syria, Ambassador Thomas J. Barrack, parroted the al-Sharaa talking point of Syria becoming “one central state with one army” (Asharq Al Awsat, July 13). By his estimation, this could have been construed as giving al-Sharaa the green light to attack the Druze—and the Kurds, in time—under the pretense of national unification. “Many Syrians are waiting for Mr. Barrack to correct his former statements,” Xelil and Senior Kurdish official Îlham Ehmed stated. [3] As a result, Ambassador Barrack met with SDF Commander-in-Chief Mazloum Abdi on July 20 to assuage Kurdish concerns (X/@USEmbassySyria, July 20).

Conclusion

The Suwayda conflict between the Druze and Damascus may breed more distrust between Damascus and the SDF, while increasing the likelihood of future clashes. The new regime could also use Arab tribal elements to spark unrest in SDF-held areas of northern and eastern Syria. Following the Suwayda events, it seems less likely that the SDF will integrate into the new Syrian army under al-Sharaa in the near future. For said integration to happen, the SDF would need guarantees from Damascus and the United States that no attacks on the SDF would subsequently occur, as well as evidence of meaningful steps toward the decentralization of the new Syrian state.

Notes:

[1] New Lines Event with Ilham Ahmed, co-chair of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, July 15, https://newlinesinstitute.org/event/inside-syrias-northeast-negotiations-governance-kurdish-unity

[2] Author’s interview with Nawaf Xelil, Director of The Kurdish Center for Studies, and former PYD Spokesperson, July 18.

[3] Author’s interview with Syria researcher Mohammad Ibrahim, July 18.