EASTERN AND WESTERN UKRAINE IN THE MIRROR OF PUBLIC OPINION

Eastern and Western Ukraine in the mirror of public opinion

By Volodymyr Zviglyanich

A poll was taken in two of Ukraine’s leading regions — Galicia in the west and the Donbass in the east — in December 1997 and January 1998. The aim was to sound the mood of the population on the eve of the upcoming elections. To this end, 1500 people were polled in Lviv Oblast in western Ukraine and in Donetsk Oblast in the east.

The poll, which was taken by the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Sociology and the Institute of Strategic Research, had a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percent. The poll reveals striking and persistent differences between the populations of east and west Ukraine on cultural issues, but considerable unanimity between people in both communities on social and economic issues. The prevalence of pessimism over optimism on economic issues in both regions suggests that the reforms that have been carried out so far are perceived by a large part of the population as having brought more pain than benefit.

The Leaders and the Led

The reforms taking place in the post-Communist countries will be realized only if they command popular support and if a positive image of reform is created in public opinion. This has not yet happened in Ukraine. The leaders and the led do not yet trust one other, and the population takes a dim view of the situation in the country. The results of this poll show that only 1.3 percent of respondents in eastern Ukraine and 1.5 percent in western Ukraine think that things are going well in the country and that Ukraine has a good chance of emerging from its present difficulties. A further 18 percent of respondents in eastern Ukraine see both positive and negative aspects to the situation. There are more optimists in the western part of the country — 25 percent. Meanwhile, 38 percent of Donetsk residents, as opposed to 33 percent of Lviv residents, think that the situation is likely to deteriorate further and that chances of emerging from the crisis are slim.

One of the reasons for the continuing crisis, according to public opinion, is that the country’s leaders have chosen the wrong development strategy. Only five percent of those polled in Donetsk and seven percent in Lviv think that the country is going in the right direction. The overwhelming majority — 56 percent in the west and 62 percent in the east — think that Ukraine’s development is chaotic in nature.

Ukraine’s National Priorities

Respondents were asked to say what they thought Ukraine’s priorities should be. The results are given in Table 1:

What are the most important development priorities for Ukraine? (Replies in percent)

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Donetsk …………. Lviv

1. Creating a powerful Ukrainian army ………………………………………………………. 11.50 ………………. 16.62

2. Guaranteeing a multi-party system, freedom of speech …………………………….. 9.98 ………………. 10.7

3. Guaranteeing the population’s material prosperity …………………………………… 68.30 ………………. 69.3

4. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders ..8.41 ………………. 21.13

5. Reviving the Ukrainian nation …………………………………………………………………..7.44 ………………. 30.99

6. Protecting citizens’ economic interests ……………………………………………………. 50.49 ………………. 37.46

7. Protecting the environment ……………………………………………………………………. 36.99 ………………. 15.77

8. Creating effective legislative, executive and judicial branches ……………………… 26.81 ………………. 21.13

9. Guaranteeing civic order and security ……………………………………………………… 28.96 ………………. 28.17

10. Participating in international cooperation ……………………………………………….. 9.98 ……………….. 7.61

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Broad Agreement on Social and Economic Issues

Of these priorities, guaranteeing the material prosperity of the population takes first place in both east and west. The population is in difficult economic straits and its thoughts are devoted primarily to the problem of physical survival. In a similar poll taken in December 1991, at the time of the breakup of the USSR broke up, a majority of respondents said that the new regime’s ability to solve its socio-economic problems would be the key to its future. Even then, economic problems took priority over cultural and political issues. In 1991, only 12 percent of respondents western Ukraine and 10 percent in the east said that guaranteeing a multi-party system and freedom of speech should be the state’s top priority, while 50.3 percent in the west and 61.6 percent in the east ranked material prosperity in top place.

In second place in the 1997/98 poll came protecting the economic interests of citizens. This is an indicator of the development of economic relations in society and of the role of individualism and entrepreneurship. At the same time, it is traditionally a source of social tension. This problem is seen as especially acute in the east (50.5 percent), and significantly less so in the west (37.46 percent). The pressing nature of this problem is evidence of the growth of economic activity and increasing independence of citizens from the state.

The stress on these two priorities means that the people, in undergoing the difficulties of this crisis period, have begun to rely on themselves, but that they still look to the state to provide transparent and stable "rules of the game."

The continuing absence of such rules, in conjunction with the extremely dire material situation for the population, could lead to a leftist victory in the March 1998 elections. This in turn would likely lead to the suppression of the tendency observed among the most enterprising strata of the population to cast off the old, paternalistic attitudes.

Cultural and Political Differences

As shown above, people in western and eastern Ukraine are remarkably similar in their evaluation of economic and social issues. When it comes to cultural and political attitudes, however, sharp differences emerge between the two communities. Reviving the Ukrainian nation was considered a priority by 31 percent of respondents in the west but by only 7.4 percent in the east. Approximately the same percentages — 21.13 percent in the west and 8.4 percent in the east — said they considered the inviolability of borders and the preservation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity to be a priority. Twice as many in the east (37 percent) as in the west (15.8 percent) said protecting the environment was a pressing issue.

Just as in 1991, people in western and eastern Ukraine are united by: (1) overwhelming concern about the socio-economic situation; (2) the relatively low importance assigned to democratic values; (3) a sharp fall in the assessment of Ukraine’s international status (10 percent in the east in 1997, versus 47 percent in 1991; 7.6 percent in the west in 1997 versus 34 percent in 1991). This last circumstance is at first sight surprising: one thing Ukraine can boast of is its international cooperation. In 1991, the population saw this as a key to bettering their economic situation. But the well-publicized program of international assistance to Ukraine did not bring perceptible benefits for the man and woman in the street. Instead, the money settled in the pockets of the elite. The population has accordingly lost interest in international issues.

What people say they fear most is unemployment — 53.8 percent in the west and 42.3 percent in the east; followed by crime — 42.3 in both west and east; and hunger — 42.3 in the west and 53.1 in the east. Dictatorship and repression, by contrast, are feared by only 3.9 percent in the west and 3.1 percent in the east. This shows that the possibility of a "Latin-American" scenario in Ukraine is not taken seriously by the population and that they still believe in civilized means of putting pressure on the government. Collecting signatures on petitions as a means of putting pressure on the government is given priority by 54 percent in the east and 62 percent in the west.

Regional differences in the perception of political values have stabilized and are unlikely change in the next five years. The first wave of the Ukrainian political elite (Leonid Kravchuk and the Rukh activists who supported him) stressed political values. They did not, however, succeed in forming a national idea that would be acceptable to all regions of the country. Differences between the regions — the stress on national-patriotic values in the west versus the economic preoccupations in the east — remain what they were in 1991.

The Leaders and the Led

The population have formed some harsh opinions about their leaders. In eastern Ukraine, 47 percent of respondents, and in western Ukraine, 32 percent, say their politicians are ineffectual, amoral, and selfish. There is a view, held by 26 percent in the east and 28 percent in the west, that ordinary people cannot get their problems solved through the government. The majority trust only their families (74.5 percent in the east and 44 percent in the west). There is also a growing perception that politics has been criminalized.

Table 2. Who wields real power in Ukraine? (in percent)

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Donetsk …………………….. Lviv

1. The President ………………………………………… 22.70 ………………………. 30.00

2. Local government ……………………………………. 23.00 ………………………. 18.00

3. The Mafia ……………………………………………… 73.44 ……………………….. 69.43

4. Business persons ……………………………………. 39.10 ……………………….. 32.70

5. Directors of state enterprises …………………… 10.70 ……………………….. 10.30

6. The police ……………………………………………… 10.30 ……………………….. 10.00

7. The Cabinet …………………………………………….. 8.00 …………………………. 4.30

8. Parliament ……………………………………………….. 3.90 ………………………… 6.60

9. Political parties ………………………………………… 3.10 ………………………… .3.70

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These data attest to the people’s harsh evaluation of the political system as a whole. The conception of the Mafia in Ukraine has taken on a mythological character. In the absence of generally accepted rules of economic and social order, organized crime stands for tacit, unwritten rules of societal behavior which penetrate all social institutions. The deep reason for the fusion of politicians and the criminal class is the perceived symbiosis of government and property. This could make Ukraine a "virtual" state, where nothing is taken seriously, and which is not taken seriously by its neighbors.

Conclusion

As the 1998-1999 elections approach, the Ukrainian people face many of the same social and economic problems that they faced back in 1991. The prerequisites for a market democracy still do not exist in Ukraine. The division into "us" and "them" is firmly rooted in the mass consciousness. Tax evasion on a massive scale shows the people’s lack of trust in the government. In these circumstances, the new parliament could turn out to be significantly "redder" and more oppositionist than the present Verkhovna Rada. In this case, the stage would be set for a fresh period of confrontation between parliament and president.

Translated by Mark Eckert

Volodymyr Zviglyanich is a senior research fellow of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Sociology, a research associate at George Washington University, and a Senior Fellow of the Jamestown Foundation.

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