Georgia’s Ruling Elite Plans to Maintain Power by Fragmenting Opposition

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 114

(Source: Facebook.com/KobakhidzeOfficial)

Executive Summary:

  • In the lead-up to the October parliamentary elections in Georgia, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party is campaigning to obtain a “constitutional majority” despite showing concern about the possibility of losing power amid decreasing approval ratings.
  • The pro-Western opposition in Georgia is fragmented and struggling to agree on a way to unite against GD due to narrow party interests and personal ambitions of party leadership, providing GD hope for winning the election.
  •  Russia and China have shown unprecedented interest in Georgia’s future, with Moscow expressing support for GD and Beijing expressing interest in the electoral process, marking a shift in geopolitical influences in Georgia through China’s rising influence.

On July 16, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, stated that the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party has been in power for 12 years and will be in power for at least another 12. Kobakhidze claimed that GD will receive 60 percent of the votes in the upcoming October parliamentary elections (Facebook.com/KobakhidzeOfficial, July 17). The Georgian premier was speaking at the opening of the 2024 election campaign and inauguration of a new office for the ruling GD. At the same event, Bidzina Ivanishvili, honorary chair of GD and informal leader of Georgia, outlined that obtaining a “constitutional majority” in parliament was the main goal of his party for the elections (1tv.ge, July 16). It is unclear, however, why the Georgian ruling elite is sporting such optimism. According to the latest polls, GD has a meager 21 percent of support among the Georgian population (Apsny.ge, July 22). According to local media, Ivanishvili privately admits to the possibility of losing power and is, therefore, in a hurry to sell his large businesses and real estate in Georgia. Local outlets speculate Ivanishvili is preparing to quickly transfer his capital in the form of cash to another country in the event of a GD loss (Tvpirveli.ge, July 21). The potential of a GD loss provides an opening for the pro-Western opposition to take control of Georgian parliament in the upcoming election if they can unify a position to gain the support of a majority of the Georgian population. The elections in October will determine Georgia’s path for the foreseeable future, one either toward Europe or back to Russia.

Russian officials have been vocally supportive of GD’s election campaign. On July 21, Andrey Klimov, deputy chair of the Russian Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs, during a meeting of the Friends of Russia Club in Moscow, said, “Russia is ready to help GD retain power if Tbilisi turns to Moscow with this request” (Tvpirveli.ge, July 21). The Russian politician did not specify how Russia would help the ruling elite of Georgia maintain power. Nevertheless, in this context, Klimov pointed to the example of war-torn Syria. He declared, “When the legitimate government of [Bashar al-Assad] turned to us for military assistance, we provided them with this assistance, and, as you know, the situation in Syria has stabilized.” The Russian official’s statement implies the possibility that the pro-Russian government of Georgia could lose power in the parliamentary elections. Additionally, his statement did not rule out military intervention in Georgia for the benefit of GD.

Meanwhile, to strengthen its anti-Western election campaign, GD announced that for the elections, it will run together with the People’s Power political party (JAM-News, July 17). People’s Power was first launched in 2022 as a movement to criticize the West and hurl insults at Western politicians. Several current GD members of parliament (MPs) are among the party’s founders. In 2024, the People’s Power registered as a political party, though its members continued participating in the ruling party’s activities (Civil.ge, March 18). The re-merger of GD and this quasi-party indicates that the ruling party’s aggressive anti-Western rhetoric will only intensify as the elections approach.

In addition to Russia, China is suddenly showing interest in Georgia’s parliamentary elections. On July 19, the Chinese ambassador to Georgia expressed interest in preparations and visited the Central Election Commission, stating, “As a strategic partner, China is pleased to see an election that is held in accordance with the laws of Georgia.” (Interpressnews.ge; Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry, July 19). The Chinese Embassy in Georgia has never expressed such interest before. This was essentially the first time that Beijing voiced interest in participating in the electoral process of Georgia. Earlier, Ivanishvili, during the opening of the election campaign on July 16, thanked Chinese officials for “expressing special support for Georgia,” though it is still unclear what kind of support he was speaking about (1tv.ge, July 16).

Before this, on June 28, Georgian MP Fridon Injia, leader of the European Socialists party, a satellite of GD, suddenly became interested in Chinese involvement. Unprompted, he posited, “Will there be observers from China, India, and other countries that have their weight in the world?” (Netgazeti.ge, June 28). In response, Kobakhidze replied, “The door is open for them” (Netgazeti.ge, June 28).

The ruling elite of Georgia place particular hope on the fragmentation of the pro-Western opposition, which has not been able to create a united front amid narrow party interests and personal ambitions of party leadership (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, July 25). Even though the main opposition actors have made several attempts to unite recently, they cannot agree on how to do so (Eurasianet, May 28).

At the moment, several blocs are being formed in the opposition camp. The largest is the unification around the United National Movement (UNM), which was in power from 2003 to 2012 and whose leader, Mikheil Saakashvili, is in prison. Instead of specific parties, nine individual politicians and public figures have joined the party, which the party leaders tried to present on July 8 as the creation of a large opposition pro-Western front (YouTube.com/EuronewsGeorgia, July 8). The party itself represents the largest opposition party. According to the inconclusive results of the most recent polls, however, the party’s supporters have reportedly decreased by more than 5 times over the past year—from 17 to just 3 percent (Apsny.ge, July 22).

Other active opposition parties refuse to join UNM, fearing that the party, which was once accused of establishing a police regime in the country, will again come to power (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 10). Apart from the UNM, all other opposition parties have modest capabilities and support among the population. Yet, the possibility is high that they will struggle to overcome the 5-percent electoral threshold. On July 9, three small pro-Western parties—“Akhali” (“New”), “Droa” (“It’s time”), and “Girchi–for more freedom”—unified after they could not agree with the “Lelo” party on the conditions for creating a united front (YouTube.com/mtavaritv; Radiotavisupleba.ge, July 9). The leader of the Lelo party, former banker and millionaire Mamuka Khazaradze, claims to form a so-called “alternative” political center to counterbalance GD and the UMN. The Lelo party has so far only been joined by three young parties, one of which, “Freedom Square,” was created on July 1 and has not yet managed to gain any political weight (1tv.ge, July 1; Netgazeti.ge, July 17). The other party, “For the People,” has no known active party members apart from the party chair. The third small party is “Citizens,” which has two deputies in the current parliament and is in “active negotiations” to join the above mentioned opposition alliance (OC Media, July 24).

One more ambitious party, “Gakharia for Georgia,” under the leadership of former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, who was in the GD government from 2019 to 2021, has also started to campaign. This party stakes its own claims to be the third political center in Georgia, though it has still not been able to agree with other parties about a union and has decided to stand alone in the elections (Interpressnews.ge, March 9).

The pro-Russian ruling GD, without convincing support among pro-Western citizens, intends to maintain power through the cunning use of the fragmentation of the pro-Western opposition. According to Georgian legislation, if any party receives less than 5 percent of the votes, then these votes will automatically be counted in favor of the party that receives the most votes. Thus, the developments in Georgian politics ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections underscore a significant power struggle and the potential for external influences to shape the outcome. Despite weak domestic support, the fragmentation of the pro-Western opposition may give GD officials an opening bolstering support in the run-up to October.