Harnessing Hydropower, Sparking Tensions: PRC Mega-Dam and India’s Water Security Fears

Executive Summary:

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has officially approved a 60-gigawatt hydropower dam on the Yarlung Zangbo river in Tibet, estimated to cost over 1 trillion renminbi ($137 billion) and surpass the capacity of the Three Gorges Dam.
• The project aligns with national goals to provide clean energy, ensure energy security, and develop Tibet’s regional economy.
• India and Bangladesh, through which the river also flows, fear the impact on their own water security. The absence of a formal water-sharing agreement has exacerbated tensions in a region already heightened by the PRC’s territorial claims to parts of Arunachal Pradesh (South Tibet).
• More than four years after the project was initially announced, details remain limited, obscuring information on its environmental and social impact.

At the end of December 2024, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) approved for construction of a 60-gigawatt (GW) hydropower dam. The project is planned for the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo river (雅鲁藏布; known as upper Brahmaputra in India) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (Tibet) (Xinhua, December 25, 2024). An ambitious project, it reflects the PRC’s broader efforts to bolster infrastructure capabilities and harness the immense hydropower potential of the Yarlung Zangbo (The Paper, November 28, 2020).

The hydropower dam is described in the Xinhua report as a “security project that adheres to ecology as the priority (坚持生态优先的安全工程).” Beyond enhancing the PRC’s energy security and commitment to addressing climate change, it is also aimed at the “high-quality development (高质量发展)” of the region, with the intention of driving the growth of local industries such as logistics (Xinhua, December 25, 2024).

Recent estimates suggest that the cost of the new hydropower dam could exceed renminbi (RMB) 1 trillion ($137 billion), with an anticipated annual production of nearly 300 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity (The Paper, November 28, 2020; South China Morning Post, December 26, 2024). This would far surpass the country’s renowned Three Gorges Dam, which cost over RMB 250 billion ($35 billion) and generates over 88 billion kilowatt-hours annually (State Council, July 11, 2023; Zaobao, December 26, 2024).

Details Lacking Despite Official Sanction

First announced in November 2020, the project was later incorporated into the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee’s 14th Five-Year Plan (State Council, March 13, 2021). The exact location of the project remains uncertain, but media reports from 2020 and 2021 suggest it will be constructed near the river’s “Great Bend” in Medog County, Nyingchi Prefecture (林芝地区墨脱县) (China Sand and Gravel Association, November 29, 2020; Zaobao, November 28, 2020). Medog, the final county before the Line of Actual Control on the PRC’s border with India, is strategically positioned for hydropower generation. Sandwiched between the mountains, the river descends two kilometers over the course of 50, accumulating nearly 70 million kilowatts of exploitable energy—more than triple the capacity of the Three Gorges Dam (The Paper, November 28, 2020).

The Power Construction Corporation of China (PowerChina; 中国电力建设集团), a state-owned enterprise administered by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC; 国务院国资委), is expected to oversee the project in collaboration with the government of the Tibet Autonomous Region (西藏自治区). When the proposal was unveiled in late 2020, PowerChina’s chairman Yan Zhiyong (晏志勇) described it as an “historic opportunity for the Chinese hydropower industry (对于水电行业来讲，这是一次历史性机遇)” (The Paper, November 28, 2020). [1]

While limited information about the project has been released since its announcement, PRC media have reported on various official visits and site inspections. For instance, in November 2020, then-deputy secretary of the Party Committee and Chairman of the government of the Tibet Autonomous Region Qi Zhala (齐扎拉) visited Medog County to inspect the proposed site for the hydropower development project on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo. During his visit, he was briefed on the progress of the planning (Tibet Autonomous Region [TAR] Government, November 9, 2020). Subsequently, in July 2021, PRC president Xi Jinping made an unannounced visit, where he inspected the ecological preservation efforts in the river basin. He emphasized the need for continued efforts to protect the region’s ecological balance while highlighting its strategic importance as a foundation for building national clean energy bases (State Council, July 23, 2021; People’s Daily, July 23, 2021; see also State Council, April 22, 2024).

As of January, 2025, authorities have yet to release comprehensive hydrological data or detailed plans for the proposed hydropower dam. Critical information, including the number of residents potentially displaced and environmental impact assessments, remains undisclosed. Additionally, no official acknowledgment has been made regarding the region’s vulnerability to natural disasters, including landslides, earthquakes, and floods, which could pose significant risks to the dam’s safety and stability.

Tibet’s Untapped Hydo Potential

The PRC’s growing focus on hydropower development in Tibet stems from the region’s vast renewable energy potential, which aligns with the country’s ambitious domestic energy targets and commitment to “green, low-carbon circular development (绿色低碳循环发展)” (TAR Government, March 29, 2021; Xinhua, December 25, 2024). Xi has committed the PRC to achieving peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060, as articulated in the central priorities outlined in 14th Five-Year Plan (The Paper, November 28, 2020).

Increased focus on hydropower also stems from concerns related to energy security. In response to recent shortages, the PRC has adopted a dual approach to its low-carbon transition by simultaneously expanding renewable energy sources and, counterintuitively, constructing hundreds of new coal-fired power plants to prevent power blackouts. [2] This strategy aims to ensure a stable energy supply while advancing toward a greener energy mix. For now, however, coal still provides more than 55 percent of the PRC’s total energy consumption (State Council, September 19, 2024). As the PRC gradually shifts away from coal, Tibet is set to play a pivotal role. The region’s 14th Five-Year Plan specifically highlights the development of clean energy resources, including hydropower, solar, and wind (TAR Government, January 14, 2021).

The idea of harnessing the hydropower potential of the Yarlung Zangbo River and its tributaries has been considered for decades (The Paper, December 22, 2014; TAR Government, November 26, 2018; March 29, 2021). However, its official inclusion in the national 14th Five-Year Plan underscores the project’s elevated importance.

Unlike other regions where the government has successfully exploited accessible resources, Tibet is one of the few areas in which the PRC is yet to invest heavily for this purpose. But with its unique geography and massive water reserves, Tibet holds the highest untapped hydropower potential in the country. [3] Currently, the country’s hydropower resources total over 676 million kilowatts, the largest in the world, of which Tibet accounts for approximately 30 percent (Guancha, November 28, 2020). Despite this significant potential, only 1 percent of the region’s technically exploitable capacity has been developed. Among the region’s rivers, which include the Nu, Lancang, and Jinsha, the Yarlung Zangbo stands out as the key resource, with its steep gradient and high flow rate giving it the capacity to generate nearly 80 million kilowatts of energy (The Paper, November 28, 2020).

Local Interests Drive Hydropower Development in Tibet

The PRC’s national interests drive the construction of dams on transboundary rivers in Tibet, including those on the upstream of the Yarlung Zangbo, but the strong influence of local governments and hydropower companies also plays a part in advancing these projects (TAR Government, March 29, 2021). The local government in Tibet, along with hydropower interests, has consistently promoted hydropower development as a strategy to address regional economic disparities and stimulate growth in one of the PRC’s most economically underdeveloped areas (TAR Government, March 29, 2021; November 26, 2018).

The government of the Tibet Autonomous Region outlined a three-step plan for the development of its electricity and hydropower sectors in the early 2010s. These included addressing power shortages by 2012, ensuring electricity access throughout the region in 2013–2015, and accelerating hydropower development over 2016–2020. The long-term vision articulated around the time that Xi Jinping came to power aimed to transform hydropower into a strategic industry for “outward transmission (藏电外送)” of electricity, positioning it as a major economic pillar for Tibet and generating substantial economic benefits to the region (China News, January 4, 2013).

The latter part of this vision has been supported by the regional government’s 13th and 14th five-year plans. Local leaders have entered into cooperation agreements with major state-owned power companies, like China Huaneng Group (中国华能集团公司), PowerChina, and the China Three Gorges Corporation (中国长江三峡集团公司), to expedite hydropower development on the region’s major rivers, including the Yarlung Zangbo (TAR Government, March 29, 2021; November 26, 2018; January 8, 2024; November 22, 2024; CPNN, September 23, 2021). One aim is to export hydroelectricity to other provinces, such as those in central PRC that have faced power shortages in recent years. The Yarlung Zangbo project alone will generate an annual revenue of RMB 20 billion, according to government estimates (The Paper, November 28, 2020).

Delays Expected Despite Announcement

The reason for the timing of the approval, over four years after its initial announcement, is unclear, but there are several reasons to be cautious about any developments soon. First, although an official construction date has not yet been made public, four years is not necessarily an unusual timeframe for such a project. The 510-megawatt Zangmu Hydropower Station project, finally declared fully operational in 2015, was first signaled as far back as the early 1970s, and was first incorporated into a regional five-year plan in 2006 (State Council, November 23, 2014; SASAC, October 14, 2015). Other mega hydroengineering project proposals have floated around for years, if not decades, like the Shuotian Canal (朔天运河) and the Red Flag River Water Diversion Project (红旗河西部调水工程). [4] Scholars have questioned their feasibility, however, and to date neither has received approval from Beijing. [5]

Second, geographic realities make the Yarlung Zangbo project unusually difficult to execute, as the site is located in one of the most remote and seismically active parts of the world. [6] Third, and relatedly, technological and infrastructural barriers remain. Medog County lacks adequate infrastructure for transporting electricity. The complexity of the topography will make it difficult to build the infrastructure, and it is unclear how it will be achieved, according to engineers, hydrologists, and geographers (Author interviews, January 2025). It remains unclear how this energy would be transported outside of Tibet to various other provinces (TAR Government, January 14, 2021).

Fourth, the broader economic situation in the PRC, characterized by high levels of debt and dwindling revenues for local government, is not conducive to the construction of massive infrastructure projects with expensive up-front costs and long lead times. Particularly in less affluent regions such as Tibet, any funds available to governments are more likely to be prioritized for more immediate demands.

Finally, political considerations always loom large for such projects. Domestically, a faster timeline could be affected by a desire to promote economic development in Tibet, while recent corruption scandals in the region could have the opposite effect. In late January, Qi Zhala was put under investigation by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection for “being suspected of having committed serious disciplinary violations (涉嫌严重违纪违法) (The Paper, January 23). Internationally, an attempted thaw in Sino-Indian relations could lead the PRC to slow-walk work on the project, as could backlash from other lower riparian-basin countries. Indeed, the proposed project initially sparked concern in India and Bangladesh, where there are acute geopolitical and hydrological implications for downstream regions (China Brief, June 7, 2021). The river is a lifeline for millions in these countries, where it is critical for agriculture, livelihoods, and regional stability. It supplies 30 percent of India’s freshwater and approximately 40 percent of its hydropower potential (CNA, May 2016; The Hindu, January 31, 2021). While the PRC has previously pledged to consider the interests of downstream nations, its previous engagement with India on hydrological issues has been characterized by a lack of clarity and communication. The absence of a formal water-sharing agreement exacerbates mistrust, and contributes an additional point of tension in the bilateral relationship (MFA, December 3, 2020; China Brief, June 7, 2021). [7]

As a result, the PRC recently has sought to downplay concerns over the potential impact of the project. In December 2024, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning (毛宁) reiterated the PRC’s “responsible attitude (负责任的态度)” to managing transboundary rivers, claiming the planned dam would not harm downstream regions. However, she provided no substantive evidence in support of this claim. She also highlighted Beijing’s commitment to dialogue and cooperation with neighboring countries on disaster prevention efforts (MFA, December 27, 2024). India is not convinced, and has spent the years since the initial announcement of the Yarlung Zangbo project planning to build a 10–12 gigawatt hydroelectric dam in Arunachal Pradesh in response (Business Standard, October 21, 2024).

Conclusion

The proposed hydropower project on the Yarlung Zangbo is primarily motivated by domestic priorities, including Tibet’s economic development, the PRC’s clean energy goals, and national security concerns. While the project is expected to boost regional industries and contribute to national energy security, its potential hydrological impacts on downstream regions introduce uncertainties, underscoring the risk tied to its ambitious scope. For this reason, and for several other factors, observers should not hold their breath in anticipation—the project is unlikely to be operational any time soon, if indeed it is ever completed.

Notes

[1] This Yan Zhiyong should not be confused with the Yan Zhiyong sanctioned by the U.S. government for transporting goods from the PRC to North Korea on behalf of the latter’s principal intelligence agency (OFAC, accessed January 27).

[2] During the winter of 2020, provinces including Hunan, Jiangxi, Inner Mongolia, and Zhejiang encountered significant power supply constraints. This situation recurred in September and October 2021, affecting 18 out of the PRC’s 30 provinces, with shortfalls in the range of 1–16 percent. Consequently, several provincial governments decided to approve and build large amounts of new coal capacity to address power shortages. See Shen, Bo, et al. “Coping with power crises under decarbonization: The case of China.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 193 (2024): 114294. According to the Global Energy Monitor, the PRC accounted for 95 percent of the world’s new coal power construction activity in 2023.

[3] See also Physics.org, June 26, 2017.

[4] The proposal aims to annually divert 60 billion cubic meters of water from the major rivers of the ecologically fragile Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, including three transnational rivers (Mekong, Salween, and Brahmaputra), to arid Xinjiang and other parts of northwest China.

[5] Yang, Qin-ye, Jing Ke, Xu Jian-hui. The Query: The Feasibility of the Water Diversion Function of “Hongqi River”. JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 2018, 33(5): 893–898 https://doi.org/10.11849/zrzyxb.20180429. https://www.jnr.ac.cn/EN/10.11849/zrzyxb.20180429.

[6] Shortly after the announcement in late December, a 6.8-magnitude earthquake struck Tingri county in the Shigatse prefecture-level city in TAR on January 7, resulting in the deaths of at least 126 people (CCTV, January 8). See also 1950 Medog Earthquake (also known as Assam-Tibet Earthquake).

[7] India’s concerns are exacerbated by the PRC’s unilateral territorial claims to parts of Arunachal Pradesh. (The United States does not recognize the PRC’s claims.) In a PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs conference in early 2024, spokesperson Lin Jian asserted that “The Sino-Indian border has never been demarcated … [but] the area of southern Tibet has always been China’s territory … Chinese has always exercised effective governance [of this territory] (中印边界从未划定 … 藏南地区一直是中国领土 … 中国一直对藏南地区行使有效行政管辖)” (MFA, March 25, 2024). Beijing uses these claims to justify its right to develop the Yarlung Zangbo.