ICC Arrest Warrant Prevents Putin’s BRICS+ Summit Attendance

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Age: 14 hours

(Source: Kremlin.ru)

Executive Summary:

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin was unable to attend the July 6–7 BRICS+ summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, due to the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s arrest warrant, highlighting Russia’s continued international isolation amid its war against Ukraine.
  • The BRICS+ summit advanced Russia-backed initiatives to reduce Western dominance, including criticizing U.S. tariffs, advocating de-dollarization, and reinforcing the group’s role as an alternative to Western alliances.
  • Despite the restrictions the Russian leadership faces on the international stage, the ICC’s effectiveness is limited, as many countries have not ratified the Rome Statute and thus do not recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction or enforce its decisions.

Russian President Vladimir Putin did not fly to Brazil for the seventeenth BRICS+ summit, held in Rio de Janeiro on July 6–7, because of concerns over the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant for war crimes (RIA Novosti, June 29). [1] According to Yuri Ushakov, a Russian presidential aide, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended in his place, as Putin participated in the summit via video link. Ushakov commented, “This is due to certain difficulties in the context of the ICCʼs requirements—you know, it is in this context that the Brazilian government could not take a clear position that would allow our president to participate in this meeting” (RIA Novosti, June 25). As a signatory to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC and entered into force in 2002, Brazil would be obligated to arrest Putin if he were to enter the country (ICC, accessed June 21). Despite Putin’s inability to attend the BRICS summit in person and the international isolation Russia faces due to its war against Ukraine, Moscow continues to try to expand its global influence and promote anti-Western sentiments.

The BRICS+ alliance membership represents more than half of the world’s population, and unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which focuses on military cooperation, the group has prioritized an economic and geopolitical agenda. The summit focused on policies increasingly viewed as hostile by the West. The BRICS+’s declaration issued at the end of the summit raised “serious concerns” about the rise of the U.S. administration’s unilateral tariffs, stating that they are “inconsistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules,” and noting that they “threaten to reduce global trade, disrupt global supply chains, and introduce uncertainty” (BRICS Leaders Declaration, July 6).

People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping also did not attend the summit this year, citing a scheduling conflict (South China Morning Post, June 15). Despite Putin and Xi’s non-appearance at the summit, both the PRC and Russia likely view BRICS as a tool to contest U.S. influence on the global stage and decision-making, and have accordingly urged the grouping to increase its membership (see EDM, January 8, May 21, October 12, 16, 2024, March 10; see China Brief, May 14).

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Riabkov stated that Russia’s primary task at the BRICS+ summit would be to work on the initiatives put forward by Moscow for this year. He clarified that the proposals aim to enhance the role of the BRICS+ member countries in the global monetary and financial system, foster cooperation in the international banking sector, and increase the use of national currencies instead of the dollar (see EDM, December 13, 2022, January 8, 2024, March 10; Gazeta.ru, May 27).

In 2023, Putin’s attendance faced similar uncertainty ahead of the annual gathering of BRICS+ leaders, which South Africa was hosting at the time. The South African government came under pressure from its Russian colleagues to provide assurances that Putin could travel to the August 2023 event without fear of arrest. In the build-up to the summit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated, “Russia has made it clear that arresting its sitting president would be a declaration of war” (The Moscow Times, July 18, 2023). As South Africa was ultimately unable to offer any guarantees, Putin was forced to abandon his plans to attend.

Putin has now officially been a war crime suspect for more than two years, as the ICC issued him an arrest warrant over the mass deportation of Ukrainian children on March 17, 2023. The warrant also included Russian Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova. It accuses Russia of abducting and deporting tens of thousands of Ukrainian children, with many victims reportedly subjected to ideological indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian identity. The warrant notes that the mass abductions may qualify as genocide according to the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention, which identifies “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” as one of five internationally recognized acts of genocide (International Criminal Court, March 17, 2023; United Nations, accessed July 21).

The Russian government responded to the warrant the same day it was issued. Russian Presidential Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov called the issue of Putin’s arrest “outrageous” and “unacceptable,” fulminating, “The Russian Federation, like a number of states, does not recognize the jurisdiction of this court. And accordingly, any decisions from the point of view of law are null and void” (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 17, 2023). In July 2023, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev wrote, “We despise the ICC and wish it a speedy and painful death from incapacity and impotence.” Medvedev added that Russia will never voluntarily become a member of the organization (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, July 29, 2023).  

The ICC has also issued arrest warrants for several senior Russian officials since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. On June 25, 2024, the ICC charged former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Russian Army Chief Valery Gerasimov, Russian Air Force Long Range Aviation Chief Sergei Kobylash, and Russian Black Sea Fleet Commander Viktor Sokolov, in connection with the deliberate targeting of Ukrainian civilians and bombing of Ukraine’s civilian power grid (International Criminal Court, June 25, 2024).

The International Criminal Court, the world’s first permanent international criminal court, was established by the Rome Statute in 1998. A decade after its founding, more than two-thirds of UN Member States had signed or ratified the Rome Statute, stating in its preamble that the gravest of crimes “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world” (United Nations, accessed July 21).

In addition to Russia, more than 40 of the 193 UN member states have refused to sign the Rome Statute, and about 30 more have signed it but have not ratified it (BBC Russian Service, November 16, 2016). These 70 countries include the United States, the PRC, Israel, and India. Earlier this year, U.S. President Donald Trump even signed an executive order imposing sanctions on the ICC for its actions against the United States and its allies (The White House, February 6). 

While the wheels of justice continue to turn slowly at the ICC in The Hague, Kyiv is also pursuing alternative formats to prosecute Russian officials for their war against Ukraine. On June 25, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed an agreement with the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe, the continent’s leading human rights body, to establish a special tribunal that will charge Russia’s national leaders with the crime of aggression. Bolstering Ukraine’s efforts, on July 9, the European Parliament adopted a resolution supporting the ICC’s investigation, castigating Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine, with EU deputies emphasizing that Russia is responsible for the war of aggression and violation of international law (Ukrainian National News, July 9).

Amid international indifference and outright hostility, the ICC continues in its lonely endeavor of “trying individuals for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression,” according to its website. On July 8, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for the Taliban’s Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, and his Chief Justice, Abdul Hakim Haqqani (International Criminal Court, July 8). Afghanistan now shares with Russia the dolorous distinction of having its leadership indicted by the ICC.

Russia continues to find ways to expand its global influence despite the constraints imposed by the ICC. Just days before the ICC issued its arrest warrants for Akhundzada and Haqqani, Russia became the first nation in the world to formally recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government (Kommersant, July 4). The decision followed the Russian Supreme Court’s decision on April 17 to remove the radical group from its list of terrorist organizations (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 17).

The warrants against both Russian and Afghan leaders serve as a clear message that there should be no political normalization of a regime that so explicitly denies fundamental rights and dignity. At present, the International Criminal Court exists more as a global aspiration than a worldwide reality, as many states have unilaterally declared their intention not to cooperate with the judicial body. The persecution and condemnation of the Russian leaders for aggression against Ukraine are not likely to take place in this format, at least for the foreseeable future.

Note:

[1] BRICS+ is a loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, the PRC, and South Africa.