Inside Taiwan’s Opposition: How the KMT’s Future Could Shape Cross-Strait Stability

Executive Summary:

• The Kuomintang (KMT) is undergoing a complex transformation, seeking to redefine itself by moving away from its perception as a “pro-China” party to one grounded in support for the Republic of China’s (ROC) democratic institutions. Internal factions—ranging from pro-unification traditionalists to sovereignty-leaning localists—reflect deep strategic and ideological divergences.
• The KMT’s credibility on national defense and sovereignty remains undermined by inconsistent messaging, legislative actions perceived as weakening deterrence, and lingering commercial ties to Beijing. These dynamics reinforce the party’s trust deficit both at home and abroad.
• For the United States and its allies, a clear-eyed understanding of the KMT’s evolving role and key players is essential. Engaging with reformist elements within the party can strengthen Taiwan’s democratic pluralism and ensure strategic continuity in cross-Strait and Indo-Pacific policy.

Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te is currently touring the island, urging voters to recall Kuomintang (KMT) lawmakers perceived as supportive of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (CNA, June 28). Meanwhile, former President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT is visiting China (CNA, June 27). This contrast underscores why Western audiences often hold differing perceptions of Taiwan’s political parties. Amid heightened tensions across the Taiwan Strait driven by strategic competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a nuanced understanding of Taiwan’s internal political structure is imperative. While the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has held executive authority since 2016 and remains Washington’s primary interlocutor, the Kuomintang (KMT)—Taiwan’s oldest political party—is frequently perceived as “pro-PRC” or even “pro-Communist” in U.S. policy circles. Such characterizations often rest on outdated Cold War paradigms and media biases, overlooking the party’s evolving factional politics and recent strategic recalibrations (The Diplomat, January 18, 2023).

The KMT faces challenges both internally and externally. Internally, the party today is marked by contestation. In place of a cohesive ideological platform, closer observation reveals leadership shifts, ideological debates, and policy realignments. Competing views on national identity, cross-Strait relations, and security policy reflect a process of democratic deliberation and strategic recalibration to evolving geopolitical realities. These are worth paying attention to, as prevailing misperceptions risk strategic miscalculations. Externally, the KMT is losing ground among younger voters and those who identity primarily as Taiwanese (China Brief, February 16, 2024). These people increasingly are alienated by the party’s historical baggage, factionalism, and ambiguous cross-Strait messaging. While certain deep-blue factions advocate closer ties with Beijing, other party members are seeking alternative approaches to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty—ones distinct from those of the DPP (China Brief, May 30).

KMT Evolving From ‘Pro-China’ to ‘Pro-Republic of China’

Founded in 1912, the KMT is one of East Asia’s most historically significant political parties (Taiwan Insight, December 20, 2022). After retreating to Taiwan in 1949, it claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all China under the Republic of China (ROC) constitution, upholding a staunch “One China” and anti-communist unification policy that defined much of Taiwan’s postwar identity and foreign policy orientation.

In the 21st century, however, the political terrain has shifted dramatically. With over 90 percent of Taiwanese now favoring the status quo and fewer than 2 percent supporting unification, the KMT’s traditional narrative has grown increasingly disconnected from public sentiment. This renders it both strategically impractical and electorally unsustainable (National Chengchi University, January 13). In response, the KMT has begun redefining its identity—from “pro-China” to “pro–Republic of China.” A new generation of party leaders advocates preserving Taiwan’s democratic system and constitutional order while approaching cross-Strait relations through the lens of economic resilience and defense readiness (Brookings, October 12, 2023). This evolution reflects a growing alignment with the civic nationalist values shared by much of the electorate.

The party’s transformation remains incomplete, despite this shift. Legacy institutions such as the Central Committee still serve as informal conduits for engagement with Beijing, and some party elites with vested interests in the PRC have remained silent during episodes of military intimidation. This hesitancy, while often pragmatic, perpetuates the “pro-China” label and undermines public trust in the KMT’s ability to defend Taiwan’s national interests.

This disconnect has become a persistent liability—one that the DPP routinely capitalizes on to cast doubt on the KMT’s strategic reliability. Within the KMT, however, there is growing recognition that restoring credibility on sovereignty and defense is essential for regaining centrist and youth support.

To complete its transition, the KMT will need to go beyond rhetoric and implement structural reforms—clearly separating political leadership from commercial entanglements and projecting an unambiguous commitment to Taiwan’s democratic sovereignty. Only then will the party be able to reestablish itself as a viable, modern opposition capable of leading in a complex regional environment.

Factional Dynamics and Strategic Divergence Within the KMT

The KMT encompasses a spectrum of internal factions with divergent views on a range of policy domains, including cross-Strait relations and national identity. This internal diversity has led to strategic inconsistencies, impacting the party’s coherence and public perception.

Greater China Traditionalists

Led by figures like Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) and Chang Ya-chung (張亞中), this faction adheres to the orthodox “One China” principle, advocating for a “One China, Joint Interpretation” approach to cross-Strait integration (一中同表，兩岸統合), with the ultimate goal of reunification with the mainland (Yazhou Zhoukan, November 7, 2016). It allows for differing interpretations of what that might mean, suggesting room for engagement without fully endorsing the PRC’s preferred definition of unification. It promotes cultural and educational exchanges to foster closer ties. This position holds little appeal among younger Taiwanese, who increasingly identify with a distinct Taiwanese—rather than “Chinese” identity.

Pragmatic Centrists

Represented by former President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), this group promotes engagement with the PRC through frameworks like the “1992 Consensus,” aiming to maintain peace and economic cooperation without compromising Taiwan’s sovereignty (U.S. Congress, December 12, 2024). Their ultimate goal is “peaceful democratic unification” (和平民主統一論), emphasizing that any consensus must be reached democratically and with mutual respect. This approach facilitated significant cross-Strait agreements during Ma’s tenure, but has since faced criticism from both sides. Beijing views it as overly focused on Taiwanese public while ignoring sentiment on the mainland; in Taiwan, it is increasingly seen as out of step with prevailing public sentiment, which favors a stronger assertion of Taiwanese identity (UDN, July 2; LTN, June 28).

Dual-Track Strategists

Figures such as Eric Chu (朱立倫) and Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) advocate a balanced approach. This combines dialogue with the PRC through the principle of “seeking common ground while respecting differences” (求同尊異) while simultaneously strengthening Taiwan’s defense capabilities to reassure the United States—an approach often referred to as the “2Ds” strategy (China Brief, February 16, 2024). Aimed at appealing to centrist voters desiring stability and security, this pragmatic line has struggled to gain traction due to inconsistent messaging and ongoing divisions within the party.

Sovereign Localists

Emerging leaders like Hou You-yi (侯友宜), Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕), Johnny Chiang (江啟臣), and Chiang Wan-an (蔣萬安) represent a generational shift toward emphasizing Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic values. They advocate for increased defense spending and stronger ties with democratic allies, while distancing themselves from the “One Country, Two Systems” (一国两制) model. Hou’s “3D” strategy—Deterrence, Dialogue, and De-escalation— illustrates this pragmatic approach. Grounded in the so-called “Constitutional 92 Consensus” framework (憲法九二), which ties cross-Strait policy to the existing ROC Constitution, the approach views constitutional amendments as major shifts in the status quo—one reason even the DPP avoids initiating them. This framework combines a strong deterrence posture with flexible diplomacy to maintain peace without compromising Taiwan’s autonomy (World Journal, March 19, 2023; Foreign Affairs, September 18, 2023).

The interplay among these factions underscores the KMT’s ongoing struggle to reconcile its historical legacy with evolving public opinion. According to the KMT’s institutional norms, the party’s cross-Strait policy is primarily determined by the party chair. While differing views from individual factions may be discussed if the chair is open to inclusion, the party’s overall direction ultimately rests on the chair’s authority. As voters increasingly prioritize a distinct national identity and democratic values, the KMT’s upcoming leadership election will be pivotal (Yahoo/FTNN News, May 25). Whether the new chair can unify the party’s internal dynamics and present a cohesive strategy will be crucial for its future relevance.

Recalibrating Trust: The KMT’s Security Posture and Strategic Perception

The KMT as a whole faces a growing credibility gap amid Taiwan’s shifting security landscape. Its strategic ambiguity and inconsistent defense posture have undermined domestic support and drawn concern from international partners.

KMT leaders such as Eric Chu and Hou You-yi advocate for cross-Strait dialogue under the ROC constitutional framework paired with a baseline defense posture. This message is often contradicted, however, by legislative actions—particularly KMT-backed proposals to freeze or cut U.S. arms procurement under the banner of fiscal discipline. Without clear strategic justification, such moves are widely perceived as weakening deterrence and aligning, intentionally or not, with Beijing’s interests (Focus Taiwan, March 5; ASPI, March 21).

At the core lies a deeper issue: segments of the KMT still adhere to the outdated belief that dialogue alone ensures security. In the face of escalating military pressure and gray-zone tactics, this posture—absent credible deterrence—raises doubts about the party’s commitment to safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereignty. In Washington, especially in national security circles, this is viewed less as prudence and more as strategic unreliability (Financial Times, January 22).

Taiwan’s 2025 defense budget totals 647 billion New Taiwan dollars (NTD) ($22 billion)—approximately 2.45 percent of GDP (Reuters, August 6 2024; Overseas Community Affairs Council, August 24, 2024). The proposed NTD 4.68 billion ($160 million) cut in the regular budget is modest, but controversy has centered on the special budget, where the KMT supported temporary freezes on several line items. These included half of the funding for the indigenous submarine program, 30 percent of military operational expenses, and one-third of funding for drone industrial infrastructure. [1] These are procedural holds, not permanent cuts, but the optics matter.

When such actions are led by legislators with friendly ties to the PRC, perceptions of conflict of interest are difficult to dismiss (CNA, April 26, 2024). For international observers, the gap between rhetoric and behavior is central to the KMT’s trust deficit. Unless the KMT recalibrates its security strategy—recognizing that deterrence is not a substitute for dialogue but its precondition—it risks further marginalization. Without greater clarity and consistency, the party’s ability to function as a credible opposition in Taiwan’s democratic system will remain in question.

Upcoming Party Election is Democratic Crossroads for KMT

Taiwan’s KMT continues to struggle with the “pro-China” label—a perception shaped not only by individual lawmakers’ controversial rhetoric but by deeper structural and institutional factors within the party itself.

The KMT’s internal governance system, particularly its largely symbolic Central Committee, has long served as a platform for political elites to gain status, enabling business ties in the PRC. In dealing with Beijing, such titles often confer political protection and economic advantage. As a result, some within the KMT have remained silent during episodes of PRC military or diplomatic pressure—or even voiced support for Beijing. For instance, Fan Cheng-lien (范成連), a former expelled Central Standing Committee member recently convicted of vote-buying, runs businesses in the PRC (LTN, May 24). During Johnny Chiang’s chairmanship, Fan argued that the KMT’s cross-Strait messaging should seek Beijing’s approval—an approach that badly damaged the party’s domestic credibility. The pattern of institutionalized silence or accommodation on sovereignty issues sends mixed signals. Domestically, it appears evasive; internationally, it raises concerns about the KMT’s democratic commitment and defense posture. For many among Taiwan’s youth, this ambivalence increasingly appears as tacit approval of PRC pressure, contributing to declining party support and identity.

A new generation of KMT leaders is now starting to show that the situation is more nuanced than this “pro-China” stereotype suggests. These Party members reject Beijing’s “One Country, Two Systems” model and have reaffirmed support for the ROC’s constitutional democracy. Their primary challenge is structural, not simply ideological: dismantling outdated symbols, breaking entrenched patronage networks, and restoring policy clarity.

The upcoming KMT Chair election in late September will be a pivotal moment. A new party image is urgently needed. Whoever takes the next leadership role will need to implement institutional reforms that sever ties to commercial interests in the PRC and anchor the party’s identity in constitutional integrity and national dignity. Concrete steps—such as banning party officials from business activity in the PRC—would enhance the KMT’s credibility at home and abroad. Most crucially, the KMT will need to articulate a coherent, values-based cross-strait policy that aligns with Taiwan’s national security consensus and unites the party under a clear democratic vision. Only by doing so can it shed its “pro-China” stigma and play a constructive role in Taiwan’s democratic system.

Conclusion

For the United States and its democratic allies, a realistic and forward-leaning Taiwan strategy must include a clearer more nuanced understanding of the KMT. Long shaped by Cold War-era assumptions, perceptions of the KMT among many outside Taiwan often reduce the party to a monolithic “pro-China” force. This view no longer captures the complexity or internal evolution of the party within Taiwan’s competitive political landscape.

In the short term, the KMT is preoccupied with recall campaigns and electoral defense, sidelining structural reform. The looming party chairmanship election is steadily bringing internal debates to the fore. Those on hot-button issues like cross-Strait relations and national security will likely intensify.

Two key dynamics warrant close attention. First, whether the KMT can genuinely distance itself from longstanding commercial entanglements with the PRC—an essential step toward enhancing its reform credibility and aligning more closely with Taiwan’s democratic values. Second, whether the party can consolidate its political and electoral leadership and avoid a repeat of the “two suns” (两个太阳) scenario in which party leadership and presidential candidacy are split (CNA, March 26, 2018). This will be critical for maintaining strategic coherence ahead of the 2028 election. More broadly, any future KMT engagement with Beijing should be evaluated on its grounding in democratic principles and strategic transparency. Distinguishing authentic reform from mere tactical repositioning will be vital for U.S. policy planning.

Proactive engagement with KMT reformers—such as Lu Shiow-yen, Johnny Chiang, Chiang Wan-an, and Chang San-cheng (張善政)—also would provide Washington with long-term insight into Taiwan’s evolving political dynamics and help maintain steady bilateral channels through periods of transition. [2] Diplomatic engagement is not equivalent to political endorsement; rather, it affirms U.S. support for transparency, institutional competition, and democratic accountability. The KMT’s future direction will ultimately be determined by Taiwanese voters, but electoral outcomes will shape Taiwan’s regional posture and have implications for the credibility of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

Notes

[1] Taiwan’s annual regular defense budget stands at NTD 476 billion ($16 billion). Proposed cuts of NTD 4.68 billion ($160 million) are lower than the NTD 6.1 billion ($210 million) trimmed in 2024, despite a larger base. The controversy lies primarily in the special defense budget, where the KMT supported temporary freezes on several line items: half of the funding for the indigenous submarine program, 30 percent of military operational expenses, and one-third of funding for drone industrial infrastructure.

[2] Taoyuan Mayor Chang San-cheng (張善政) has not been with the KMT for long and views on cross-Strait policy remain to be seen. He is undoubtedly a potential future leader, however, and one worth watching closely.