Kremlin Populating its Army Through Apathy and Idealism

By:

Age: 21 hours

(Source: Kirill Zykov / AGN Moscow)

Executive Summary:

  • The number of Russians willing to sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense to fight against Ukraine has recently declined, and several regions have been forced to reduce the payments to contract soldiers.
  • Moscow recently published a new law permitting reservists to be sent to the front, in effect establishing a new form of mobilization without an official declaration.
  • The Kremlin is counting on a new generation of soldiers raised on military propaganda in school to replenish the Russian army’s depleted manpower.

Over the past year, experts have noted a significant decline in the Russian Army’s recruitment of contract soldiers (VoA–Russian Service, December 4, 2024). The downward trend in enlistments has continued through this past summer as well (Deutsche Welle–Russian Service, June 16). A recent investigation from independent outlet Important Stories published on October 16 shows that several Russian regions are attempting to lure new soldiers into the war with promises of high payouts if they sign contracts by a specific date. The investigation identified at least 12 regions that have announced “promotions” to increase pay for signing contracts within one to three months (Vazhniye Istorii, October 16). As Moscow’s war against Ukraine continues, the Kremlin will need to find more creative ways to combat the declining interest in fighting among the Russian people.

Financial stimuli appear to be losing effectiveness. Journalists report that the number of contract soldiers has remained stagnant even in regions offering the highest financial incentives (Idel.Realii, October 12). Furthermore, not every region can come up with funding to make unending payments. For example, recent data shows that at least eight regions have reduced payments to contract soldiers to the minimum legal level. In the Samara oblast, Republic of Tatarstan, Mari El Republic, and Chuvashia, once-record payments have now fallen by five to nine times (Vot Tak, October 16).

Professor Dmitriy Dubrovskiy of Prague’s Charles University suggested last December that the Russian Army’s massive losses, news of which is provided by those returning from the war and their relatives, are responsible for the decline in those willing to fight (VoA–Russian Service, December 4, 2024). Data collection from BBC–Russian Service and Mediazona show that since last August, the number of published obituaries has risen sharply, on average by one and a half times compared to the first half of last year (ВВС–Russian Service, October 17).

Russian society is not prepared to accept veterans from the war against Ukraine as heroes and “a new elite.” This also plays a role in the declining recruitment. According to a recent Levada Center poll, 39 percent of respondents think that the return of veterans to Russia will lead to more crime and conflicts, and 41 percent suggest that the war has “crippled the souls” of participants (Levada Center, October 14). Even last year, 37 percent of respondents thought that those going to war were “solving their material problems,” compared to only 24 percent who thought that the recruits were “fulfilling their civic duty” (Сhronicles.report, September 17, 2024).

Moscow is now attempting to address the recruitment issue by deploying reservists to the front. According to a new law signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin, published on November 4, citizens in the mobilization reserve will be called upon to perform duties in the event of armed conflicts, which is currently only possible during times of full-scale mobilization (Pravo.gov.ru; RBC, November 4). Furthermore, mobilization will now be year-round starting in 2026, instead of the two mobilization periods in the spring and fall that Russia has maintained until now (Neva Today, November 5).

Such a law makes full mobilization more flexible by replacing it with “special military training.” It also permits increasing the number of reservists sent to the front, depending on their region and military service commitment. Aleksey Alshanskiy of the “Farewell to Arms” project notes, however, that today there are few reservists who have not already been sent to the front, potentially decreasing the number of reservists available for the new measures (Vazhniye Istorii, October 14).

Until the new law goes into effect, the Russian military command is sending soldiers recently released from prisoner of war (POW) camps back to the front without allowing them to return home first (YouTube/@VolodymyrZolkin, October 14). Conscripts are also being forced to sign long-term contracts, sometimes under the threat of torture (Verstka, June 26). Even after release from a Ukrainian POW camp, Russian soldiers state that it is practically impossible to escape the war, and those who refuse to fight are often forcibly sent to the front (YouTube/@VolodymyrZolkin, October 14). From an analysis of numerous videos of POWs, most of them appear extremely apathetic. They clearly do not want to return to the war and understand that certain death awaits them at the front, but they do not believe it is possible to change anything. It seems that this apathy is what the Russian authorities are betting on.

A generation of soldiers indoctrinated by militarized propaganda in schools is emerging (RE: Russia, September 4; see EDM, April 2, October 14). Journalists have already found examples of 18-year-old soldiers who “dreamed of getting to the front” since they were 15. One of them, Aleksandr from Chelyabinsk, belonged to the pro-government youth organization “Movement of the First,” where he trained in marksmanship and signed a contract as soon as he turned 18, before dying at the front (ВВС–Russian Service, June 23).

The longer the war lasts, the more such examples will be found. Right now, the Russian authorities are trying to plug the holes on the front lines by any means necessary, with the anticipation that a new generation of “children of war” will be motivated not by money, but by ideals (see EDM, August 18, 2023, September 29).

In October 2024, Russian propaganda widely circulated an interview with Tatarstan native Marta Makarova, who grew up in an orphanage. Marta became one of the leading figures in war propaganda. Upon leaving the orphanage in 2022, she signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense. She was sent to the front where she served in a reconnaissance unit, was wounded, and suffered two concussions. During an interview, Marta said that she had always dreamed of fighting “neo-Nazis” and making her contribution to her country’s history (Gazeta “Respublika Tatarstan”, October 19, 2024). Marta also actively participated in a video advertising contract service, which has become ubiquitous in Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Tatar Inform, May 10, 2024). These types of patriotic appeals, however, have not had a lasting impact.

This new generation of soldiers is likely to become disillusioned when they encounter the harsh reality of the battlefield. The collapse of ideals is a more painful process than the decline of recruitment bonuses for the war. Therefore, the new generation of soldiers, upon experiencing the truth of the front, is likely to become just as apathetic as the current one.