Kremlin to Increase Frivolous Repression on Russians’ Personal Lives

Executive Summary:

• The Kremlin is increasingly enacting restrictive laws and policies under the vague definition of “destructive ideology” that target not only political dissent but also aspects of everyday life in an attempt to align society with “traditional” Orthodox values.
• The Kremlin’s policies and rhetoric, including support for neo-fascist groups and anti-immigrant campaigns, are creating divisions among ethnic Russians, non-ethnic Russians, and various minority groups.
• These repressive measures aim to strengthen loyalty and cohesion but are causing growing resentment among the public, including groups previously supportive of the Kremlin.

Despite recent successes on the front, there has been growing tension inside Russia due to a string of increasingly repressive laws due to be passed relating to the private lives of ordinary Russians (X.com/JulianRoepcke, October 27). These have stoked division between different ethnic groups and anger even amongst the Kremlin’s loyal base (see EDM November, 5, 12). In addition to the proposed ban on “childfree ideology,” Russian lawmakers are preparing to go a step further as they finalize a bill forbidding “destructive ideology” (see EDM, October 1). Duma Vice-Speaker Anna Kuznetsova confirmed this on October 17 when discussing the development of a motion toward “banning destructive information in general” (T.me/sotaproject, October 17). The definition of “destructive information” has not been specified and is likely to remain ambiguous. This provides the Kremlin with yet another legal framework for flexibly criminalizing any behavior deemed detrimental to its aims. As the Kremlin intensifies its repression of ordinary Russians, public discontent is likely to grow, ultimately causing Moscow’s attempts at control to backfire.

This development will undoubtedly affect movements such as feminism and information campaigns facilitating draft evasion. Draft evasion has become an increasingly prevalent problem in Russia, demonstrating how Russians are becoming tired of the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine. The growing resistance to participating in the war makes the government’s moves to exact pressure predictable (Verstka.media, October 18).

Such laws will not only target those who do not show unwavering support for the war in Ukraine but also seemingly insignificant parts of people’s lives that the Kremlin views as Western influence. The law will likely censor frivolous activities such as those of “quadrobers,” a new youth subculture where tweens and teenagers dress up and impersonate quadruped animals (Verstka.media, October 24). At the beginning of October, United Russia State Duma Deputy Sergey Kolunov sent a letter to the office of the Children’s Rights Commissioner with a proposal to prosecute parents of quadrobers and deprive them of parental rights, citing the risks of quadrober activities, such as physical injury and public disturbance. Kindergartens and schools have also begun to distribute brochures on “preventing quadrobers” (Verstka.media, October 17).

While it seems absurd that the Kremlin considers these trends to be a threat, it is part of a general trend toward institutionalizing traditional Orthodox values, purging “decadent Western influence” (hence bans against feminism and LGBTQ), and restricting personal freedoms. Judging from the speed with which even innocent youth hobbies may be classified as “destructive ideology,” the adoption of a framework law permitting any activity not controlled by the state to be brought under its purview seems logical. Independent journalist Slava Taroshchina noted, not without irony, “Unbridled regulation of all spheres of life makes a clash with the state inevitable for even the most obedient citizen,” especially when there is no end in sight to these increasingly prohibitive initiatives (Novaya Gazeta, September 27).

The new bill has not yet been introduced in the State Duma, but the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is once again trying to beat the legislators to the punch. At the latest congress of the World Russian Peoples’ Council, participants called for a ban on the in vitro fertilization (IVF) program, which, in their words, “resembles trade in embryos” and “is used in same-sex families.” The ROC additionally proposed introducing flogging, the physical beating of children, as a rule in the Russian Federation to better control them (Т.me/russicaRU, October 28). The ROC has also disciplined a number of schools across Russia that chose to replace Halloween celebrations with Velesova noch’—a celebration honoring Veles, a pagan Slavic god of earth, waters, livestock, and the underworld. While these institutions intended to demonstrate their upstanding patriotic nature, eager to cleanse themselves of Western culture, representatives of the Orthodox Church instead lambasted the display, calling celebrations of Velesova noch’ “pagan heresy” and a “crime against the law, behind which stands Ukraine” (Verstka.media, October 29). 

While ethnic Russians may be prepared to stomach such interventions—many will no doubt have resonated with much of the Kremlin’s agenda—ethnic minorities are likely to have a shorter fuse. The near-constant churn of ethno-nationalist rhetoric and defamations of Ukraine as an “ethnic chimera” is increasingly causing irritation among non-ethnic Russians, spreading to targeted racialist discussions of Russia as a whole (Topwar.ru, October 29). The Kremlin and ROC have recently thrown their support behind the Union of the Russian People, a neo-fascist revival of a tsarist pogrom group, further alienating non-ethnic Russians (see EDM, October 29).

In addition to the anti-immigrant campaign, there has also been a recent uptick in the persecution of Roma people in Russia (see EDM, November 12). In October, police detained two suspects for the murder of taxi driver Yelena Sarafanova in the city of Korkino, Chelyabinsk oblast, one of which was a 17-year-old deaf-mute Roma. This has led the governor of Chelyabinsk oblast to order raids against areas “where gypsies are concentrated,” inciting several ethnic clashes which have resulted in burned homes and cars (Meduza, October 26). Communities close to the Ministry of Defense pounced on the topic and called for the mass deportation of Roma from Russia, not only for their perceived connection with the crime but also for doing little in the way of “supporting the special military operation” (Topwar.ru, October 29). Besides this, tensions between the ethnic Russian and Muslim populations are well-documented and are only worsening. In some regions, schools have moved to ban the wearing of hijabs in niqabs (Vot-tak.tv, October 28).

Relations between ethnic minorities in Russia are additionally fraught. In mid-October, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov declared a blood feud against Dagestan senator Suleiman Kerimov, as well as State Duma deputies Bekkhan Barakhoev and Rizvan Kurbanov, accusing them of ordering his murder. Earlier, there was a shootout between Kadyrov’s and Kerimov’s people in central Moscow, related to the division of the Wildberries company (BBC–Russian Service, October 10). Presidential Press Secretary Dmitriy Peskov timidly tried to restrain Kadyrov, advising him to turn to the police (RBC, October 16). It is clear, however, that tensions between the Russian government and society, as well as between different parts of society, will only increase regardless of the situation at the front.

The Kremlin’s escalating interventions into the private lives of Russian citizens under the guise of protecting “traditional values” risk generating more discontent than loyalty. The state’s increasingly arbitrary restrictions on lifestyle choices and cultural practices, along with efforts to stifle “destructive ideologies,” are fueling social divisions that cut across ethnic, cultural, and generational lines. By targeting not only those who oppose the war in Ukraine but also ordinary citizens engaged in seemingly harmless activities, Moscow is pushing the boundaries of public tolerance. These rigid, authoritarian policies may temporarily suppress dissent, but they are likely to backfire in the long run, driving more Russians to question the Kremlin’s motives and eroding trust among even the most patriotic. As a result, the Kremlin’s attempts at control may unintentionally intensify the very social fractures it seeks to eliminate, leading to deeper, more pervasive instability within Russian society.