Moscow Capitalizes on Wins From Recent Prisoner Swap

Executive Summary:

• The largest prisoner swap between Russia and the West since the Cold War occurred on August 1 in Ankara and seemed to work in Moscow’s favor based on those prisoners swapped.
• The uneven status of those swapped confirmed the effectiveness of Moscow’s strategy of using foreign, dual, or Russian citizens opposing the Kremlin as assets for triggering the release of high-profile international criminals.
• The rhetoric of some freed Russian opposition leaders on the impact of Western sanctions was received negatively by some in the West, which would work in the Kremlin’s favor if it means further isolating the opposition.

On August 1, the biggest prisoner swap between Russia and the West since the Cold War took place in Ankara. A total of 26 prisoners were freed, including 16 detainees from Russia and Belarus and eight detainees and two minors from the United States, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, and Norway (BBC Russian Service, August 2; see EDM, August 5). It was undoubtedly a joyful moment for those civil activists, journalists, and opposition leaders who had been unjustly held in Russian and Belarussian captivity and their families. In the aftermath, however, the opinions of Russian opposition figures on Western sanctions and how they affect the general Russian population were met with mixed reactions in the West (Kyiv Post, August 5). On the other side, Russia welcomed its prisoners back with open arms and organized a personal meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The dichotomy between the Kremlin’s reactions to the return of its prisoners compared to the West’s and the type of prisoners exchanged—Russia’s release of journalists, activists, and opposition figures compared to the West’s release of dangerous criminals—demonstrates how Putin’s Kremlin continues to illegally detain opposition figures and foreign nationals for Moscow’s own gain. The nature of the swaps also demonstrates a sharp difference in the goals of the two sides: the West seeks to free its people, while the Kremlin hopes to repatriate criminals and use them once again to achieve its own interests. 

From a strategic perspective, this swap worked in Russia’s favor in several ways. First, Moscow received confirmation that its strategy of using foreign, dual, or Russian citizens opposing the regime as an asset for triggering the release of high-profile international criminals works. The strategy was successfully tested in late 2022 when an international criminal and arms trafficker Viktor Bout was exchanged for the unlawfully detained US basketball player Brittney Griner (Vedomosti.ru, December 8, 2022). The most recent swap will likely encourage Russia to continue acting this way, especially if Moscow needs to de-escalate tensions with the West (see EDM, August 5). The Kremlin presumably views any foreign or dual citizen living in Russia or members of the Russian opposition as legitimate targets for kidnappings or arrests on phony charges. Given that the West is unlikely to ever replicate Moscow’s approach and retaliate against relatives of Russia’s high-profile figures living in the West, the Kremlin can continue this practice without fear of an equivalent or escalated response.

Another way this prisoner swap worked to Russia’s advantage was in how the prisoners exchanged were imprisoned on vastly different charges. The Kremlin freed some marginal figures who are either unknown or  have limited influence, including Lilia Chanysheva, Ksenia Fadeyeva, Oleg Orlov, Vadim Ostanin, Andrei Pivovarov, Alexandra Skochilenko, and Ilya Yashin (Forbes.ru, August 1). In return, Russia received highly skilled murderer Vadim Krasikov, who was an alleged hitman for the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB); experienced spies, such as Artem Dultsev and Anna Dultseva, Mikhail Mikushin, and Pavel Rubtsov; as well as the cyber criminals Vladislav Klyushin and Roman Seleznev. Their skills, competencies, deep knowledge of foreign environments, and contacts will likely be utilized by the Russian state both now and after Putin’s reign. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chair of the Russian Security Council, alluded to this fact in emphasizing the value of Russian exchanged prisoners to the state and its national interests (RBC, August 4).

Numerous questions and uncertainties have been circulating about the freed Russian opposition figures and their public image in Russia. The Kremlin’s reaction to the return of Russian prisoners from the West demonstrates how they are assets to the regime. Putin’s personal greeting for the exchanged individuals on Russian soil is rather telling of his own interest in them (RG.ru, August 1). The Kremlin leader publicly acclaimed the “work” of these individuals for Russia’s interests abroad. The West’s welcoming of released Russian citizens could serve to strengthen the conviction of the Russian population that these individuals, and, by extension, other opposition figures, are Western assets. This is precisely the outcome Russian propaganda has been trying to achieve for years. As a result, the public image of Russian opposition in the country could deteriorate further.

The first official press conference with the freed Russian opposition figures proved to hand Moscow even more capital. Pivovarov, a Russian opposition activist who headed the pro-democracy organization Open Russia, stated that the West should weaken its sanctions “leveled against ordinary Russians.” He added that this would “help [Russians] see the world and receive education” and “will allow for the destruction of the myth about the besieged fortress,” which is how Russia’s political leadership seeks to depict Russia domestically to achieve internal consolidation. The other opposition figures generally echoed these sentiments (RBC, August 2).

The position of these Russian opposition figures is complex and challenging to explain. On the one hand, the “sanctions issue” has been addressed very much in line with what Moscow’s backchannel diplomacy has been trying to accomplish since the sanctions were introduced. Russia has been trying to portray sanctions as a futile measure by the West while asking to ease sanctions as a “concern” for ordinary Russians that “should not suffer” (Kremlin.ru, June 14). On the other hand, as political economist Konstantin Sonin substantively claimed, the worsening of economic conditions in Russia is not related to sanctions (with very few of them leveled against ordinary Russians). Rather, they are a direct outcome of the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine (X.com/k_sonin, August 3). Another opposition figure, Ilya Yashin, has become a target of criticism from various camps. While some are blaming him for not being sensitive enough to the sufferings of the Ukrainians, others have criticized him for not expressing support for the population of Russia’s border regions, especially the Kursk region (Paperpaper.io, August 8). On top of that, the theme of “easing sanctions” does not carry the same weight at a time when the Russian economy is experiencing a visible downturn and becoming dangerously overheated, which has been openly admitted by representatives of Russia’s ruling elite and most prominent Russian oligarchs (RBC, July 26; The Moscow Times, August 8).

Despite rhetorical confidence, the Russian economy and armed forces in Ukraine are plagued with numerous problems that do not look to diminish anytime soon (see EDM, May 30, June 27, July 22, 25, August 1). The Russian leadership is well aware of this fact. Thus, Moscow hopes to diminish the impact of sanctions and put the war on a much-needed pause to regroup and rebuild. The Russian government will employ all the tools at its disposal, including “reconciliatory” gestures, to buy more time.