Moscow Unwittingly Promoting Rise of Radical Islam in Dagestan by Not Addressing Problems

Executive Summary:

• Moscow is unwittingly contributing to the rise of Islamism in Dagestan by failing to address social and economic problems and by handing over the region to siloviki who view all protest there as Islamist.
• The problems in Dagestan and elsewhere in the North Caucasus are so numerous and complex that the Russian government does not understand them or have the financial and other resources to address them.
• These failures mean the Kremlin is producing exactly what the siloviki appear to think already exists, a powerful and often violent Islamist movement that is rapidly acquiring the ability to challenge both Dagestani authorities and Moscow’s control.

Dagestan is an extremely complicated society that faces many problems—some unique to the region and others completely analogous to problems within other federal subjects of the Russian Federation. Both Moscow and those the Kremlin has appointed to manage the North Caucasus, however, primarily view protests in the region as reflecting the expansion of Islamist ideas (Kavkaz Realii, May 6; Window on Eurasia, May 10). The Russian government not only backs but also frequently rewards siloviki (силовики), Russian security forces, who follow this understanding of the region and report success when they use force to crush protests. This decision reflects how complicated the problems in Dagestan are and how deeply the authorities do not understand them. Moscow, especially amid Russian President Vladimir Putin’s expanded war against Ukraine, lacks the resources and attention span to deal with these issues. By responding with force, however, the Putin regime is producing exactly what it has good reason to fear, a powerful and increasingly violent Islamist movement, which may soon be able to challenge the Kremlin-approved Dagestani authorities and Moscow’s control there (see EDM, June 25, August 6, 2024).   

Some Russian experts on the region increasingly understand this unintended shortcoming in Russian policy. In an interview with Kavkaz.Realii in early May, Rinat Mukhametov, an expert on Islamism in the North Caucasus and author of the NeRussky telegram channel, argued that Moscow must turn away from that view (Kavkaz Realii, May 6; Telegram/ar_mukhametov, accessed May 15). He says that the North Caucasus in general and Dagestan in particular are so complicated and have so many problems that it is perhaps understandable why Moscow has decided to hand over the region to the Russian force structures and wait for better days. By doing so, however, Moscow has effectively adopted for itself and for its agents in place the idea that everything that happens in the North Caucasus is about Islam. This view is shared by all too many both inside and outside Russia and acts as a universal moral solvent to disarm any criticism of what the Russian authorities are doing (Kavkaz Realii, May 6).

The over-simplified notion that everything in Dagestan is a contest between Islam and the opponents of Islam does not reflect reality on the ground, Mukhametov continues (Kavkaz Realii, May 6). Dagestan has all kinds of problems, including land disputes, protests against the Russian draft for its war against Ukraine, infrastructure problems, crime and corruption, and disputes within Islam itself. Reducing everything to “Muslims versus Russians” misses the point, as even the most cursory survey of developments in Dagestan confirms. As a sign that at least some in the Russian capital are beginning to understand this, Mukhametov cites the words of an unnamed senior official who compared work in an ordinary region with work in a North Caucasian one. In the other regions, he said, he could “open a safe” with the region’s problems and solve them from there. In Dagestan, however, he recognized that upon “opening a safe,” he found a significant number of other “safes” full of problems within it that would have to be opened and their contents dealt with first (Kavkaz Realii, May 6). (For a survey of various recent disputes in Dagestan ranging from fights over building schools and roads to demands for clean water and energy to redrawing regional borders among ethnic groups and opposing Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s push to restore a Chechen district in Dagestan, none of which are especially Islamist and that thus confirm Mukhametov’s argument, see Window on Eurasia, February 18, 25, March 9, April 17.)

Just how dangerously counterproductive Moscow’s approach has been in the region was highlighted earlier this month by new armed attacks on the militia in Dagestani cities. Exactly who was behind these attacks is uncertain. It may be criminals, it may be groups within the government, or it may be Islamists who want to overthrow the Russian-backed government in Makhachkala. Many Muslim radicals not only in Dagestan but elsewhere, however, are all too happy to accept what Moscow and its siloviki are saying at face value as it boosts their standing in the community, suggests they are a growing power, and thus may win them more support (Exo, May 5; Kavkazskii Uzel May 5, 6 [1], [2], 7; Kavkaz.Realii, May 9.) Even as Moscow and the siloviki portray those who attack them in Dagestan as Islamists, some Russian officials are trying to promote the view that no one needs to be afraid of vacationing in Dagestan (Kavkaz.Realii, May 13).

Unless and until Moscow and its agents in place change their approach, the situation in Dagestan will almost certainly continue to deteriorate. There is little evidence to support the belief of many in Moscow that more repression alone will solve the problems there, or even evidence that the siloviki are reporting what is going on accurately. Instead, there is a great deal of evidence that suggests that neither a harsher line nor the suggestion that everyone in Dagestan and the North Caucasus is an Islamist or at least proto-Islamist is correct (Kavkaz Realii, May 6; Window on Eurasia, May 10). The recent series of attacks on militiamen in Dagestan suggests that Moscow has now entered a period in which using force alone is much like throwing water at a grease fire. Moscow may be tempted to continue to use force, but it is likely to spread the conflagration unless more repression is used than the Kremlin can readily afford.