Moscow Uses Cossacks’ Cultural Significance as Part of New War Narrative

Executive Summary:

• Russia is more openly highlighting the significant role Cossacks are taking in its war against Ukraine and within Russian society through the media and promoting cultural and militaristic Cossack events and organizations.
• The Kremlin’s transition to promoting the Cossack narrative versus its previous rhetoric on Ukrainian Naziism has an emotional and historical appeal to people throughout Russia, creating a new motivation for the Russian people to support the war.
• The Kremlin may turn its attention to Eastern Ukraine after the war ends, likely using the region’s Cossack legacy to historicize Russia’s crusade to take over more Ukrainian territory.

Vitaly Kuznetsov, the leader of the All-Russian Cossack Society (VsKO), discussed the role of Cossacks in Russia’s war in Ukraine during an interview with Russian news outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda on September 14. He highlighted the significant number of Cossacks on the frontlines and the different roles they play in the Russian Armed Forces (Komsomolskaya Pravda, September 14). When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it did so on the dubious pretense that “the neo-Nazi, Banderovite regime in Kyiv is a genocidal phenomenon” (see EDM, February 25, 2022). Although the Kremlin has not tired of repeating such claims, it is realizing the declining power of this narrative to legitimate what has turned into a long and grueling conflict. Moscow is now seeking a new cultural impetus for its invasion to motivate the Russian people to support and participate in the war. Against this background, Kuznetsov’s interview in Komsomolskaya Pravda demonstrates the regime’s promotion of a more active role for Cossacks, both registered and non-registered, in Russian society.

Kuznetsov claimed, “More than 40,000 of our brother Cossacks” have fought in the full-scale war since it began, and of those, “18,500 are defending the faith and the Fatherland on the line of military contact.” He gives details, saying that “from this number, more than 8,000 serve under contract, and about 6,000 Cossacks in different Cossack volunteer units, as well as a further part under the framework of the partial mobilization.” He goes on to list “25 Cossack units” such as the reconnaissance brigade “Terek,” the Cossack shock-reconnaissance brigade “Don,” and six Cossack BARS units (Komsomolskaya Pravda, September 14). While the Cossacks have not hidden such information in the past, it has not been presented in such a frank accounting, and previous analysis has had to pull from multiple sources (see EDM, January 16). Stating it so directly in a major newspaper now suggests that the Cossack narrative—which frames the invasion as a reconquista of ethnic Cossack lands—is being fortified as a substitute for mass public consumption.

The regime is simultaneously promoting Cossack culture and events throughout Russia. In the interview, Kuznetsov responds to a question about the “measures being taken in the coming years to secure and popularize Cossack culture” with a litany of events. First, he highlights that on the territory of the Kolomenskoye museum-reserve, the X international festival “the Cossack village in Moscow” is currently taking place. Second, the annual all-Russian folklore competition “Cossack Circle” and its final gala concert will be held in Moscow in November, where representatives from each Cossack host who won regional qualifying stages will participate. Third, in terms of Cossack culture as a whole, he mentions that the Central Museum of the Russian Cossacks—which has been built in honor of a Cossack who died during the war—is scheduled to open at the end of December. The museum will feature a special exhibition dedicated to the history of the modern Cossacks. Kuznetzov also states that “many all-Russian, military, regional, and municipal festivals, competitions, forums, and rallies are held annually” (Komsomolskaya Pravda, September 14). As if to underscore this point, the interview with Kuznetsov took place at the same time as the Cossack village festival, where “guests may get acquainted with Cossack history, its unique warriors, and cultural traditions on 12 thematic squares” (Kazachestvo.ru, September 14). Cossack culture is not only being promoted through cultural events. Throughout Russia, new Cossack Cadets Corps in parts of Russia are being created where they had never been previously established to promote Cossack culture in children (Russia Post, February 5). The attention and emphasis on Cossack culture at this time is being used as a replacement legitimation for the full-scale invasion and gives insight into potential Kremlin plans after the fighting has stopped.

The Kremlin is promoting Cossack culture both throughout Russia and in the “new regions” in occupied Ukraine. While the regime is using the Cossack motif as a means of educating the next generation of paramilitaries and gaining regular recruits for the army—particularly in light of Putin’s declaration that the army will increase to 1.5 million personnel—the same could have been achieved with organizations such as the Young Army Cadets National Movement (Yunarmya) and the Movement of the First, two successors to the Soviet Pioneers (see EDM, February 13, 14, 27, March 25, September 19; Gazeta.ru, September 18). Using a Cossack narrative, however, has an emotional and historical appeal to people throughout Russia and unites them with the ostensible inhabitants of the new territories. Moscow has been constructing new Cossack societies in the occupied Ukrainian territories of Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Luhansk, which presumably will be offered as evidence of authentic Cossack sentiment (see EDM, April 10, July 24; CEPA, August 14).

This suggests a possibility for the Kremlin to focus its attention on Eastern Ukraine after the war ends. Moscow will probably use the Cossack legacy to historicize its possession of Ukrainian territories. After all, the Cossacks are important to articulations of Ukrainian national identity, and the national anthem even calls Ukraine “the Cossack nation” (see EDM, May 22). Turning the region of Eastern Ukraine into a “Cossack republic” similar to other ethnic republics in Russia is one option for the Kremlin. It fits with the renewed pretense that the registered Cossacks are a “nation,” as implied by the fact that responsibility for them has shifted to the Russian Federal Agency for Nationalities (See, for example, FADN, September 16; see EDM, July 24). Russia’s colonial tendencies throughout history and now in its war in Ukraine necessitate a cultural connection to  attract the interest and loyalty of the Russian people. As the war continues, the Cossack legacy of both Russia and Ukraine becomes ever more important.