Moscow Uses Force to Get More Soldiers from North Caucasus

Executive Summary:

• Moscow is facing greater resistance to its military draft in the North Caucasus because of increasing quotas and the disproportionate impact of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine on the region.
• The Russian government is applying more repressive pressure on North Caucasians to serve, a policy that is generating further anti-Moscow sentiment.
• The Kremlin’s strong-arm efforts to enforce the draft in the North Caucasus may trigger a new wave of armed resistance in the region.

Moscow has been cautious about drafting men from the North Caucasus since the end of the Soviet Union. Between 1991 and 2013, the Kremlin called no Chechens and only tiny numbers of men from the other non-Russian, predominantly Muslim republics to military service (see EDM, July 10, 2012, April 19, 2016, July 26, 2018, March 31, 2022). Moscow feared that providing men from the North Caucasus with military skills would enable them to possibly use them against the Russian Federation, as was the case during the two post-Soviet Chechen wars. Russian commanders who observed ethnic conflict within their ranks, including among North Caucasians, were concerned that drafting North Caucasians would undermine unit cohesion in the Russian military (Window on Eurasia, October 27, 2015, February 27, 2016). Faced with Russia’s demographic decline and increased demands for manpower after the beginning of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, however, Moscow has concluded that it has no choice but to draft more North Caucasians. The Kremlin appears to be raising draft quotas in the region, although these remain lower relative to the population than in non-North Caucasian regions (Mediazona, April 25, 2022, accessed June 20; see EDM, January 20, 2023; Vazhnie Istorii, October 13, 2023).

Increased draft quotas are very unpopular among North Caucasians. Men from this region can recall a time when they did not have to serve, and no longer view service in the Russian army as a means to secure jobs in the police and security services. Before Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, North Caucasians viewed the military as a highly lucrative career option, with some men paying substantial bribes for the opportunity to serve (Window on Eurasia, April 2, 2017, October 20, 2018; Kavkazskiy Uzel, January 2, 2022). Now, casualties among ethnically non-Russian troops in the Russian military are proportionally much higher than those among ethnically Russian troops, rendering service much less appealing (Kavkaz Realii, May 1, 2022; Vazhnie Istorii, October 13, 2023; see EDM, October 19, 2023; Media.zona, accessed June 20). Men across the North Caucasus are refusing to report when drafted, and the Russian authorities are responding with massive and increasingly heavy-handed force (Kavkaz Realii, April 24, June 9). Unfortunately for Moscow, its attempts to force compliance with the draft are fueling local nationalism rather than compelling obedience. The Kremlin is on the brink of triggering a new wave of North-Caucasian armed resistance, something that Putin thought he precluded through his defeat of the separatists in the Second Chechen War.

The Kremlin is concerned about the effectiveness of the draft and what it indicates about their level of control in Chechnya and Dagestan, the two largest republics in the North Caucasus. Putin is counting on Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov to deal with the situation, something that Kadyrov has largely been effective in doing by having Chechens serve in national units that he at least nominally commands. Moscow’s control over Chechen conscription is indirect, though robust, through Putin’s close ties with Kadyrov (see EDM, September 7, 2016, May 3, 2018; Window on Eurasia, January 10; Telegram/@iditelesom_help, May 5). Discontent with the draft in Dagestan is more apparent because Moscow lacks an equivalent to Kadyrov there to effectively quell grievances on its behalf. Dagestani society has been at odds with the Kremlin over conscription since Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine—a well-documented fracture that may prove explosive (Versatka, August 12, 2022; Kavkaz Realii, September 27, 2022; Vazhnie Istorii, October 13, 2022, February 14, 2023).

Over the last six weeks, officials working for the Russian draft offices in Dagestan have carried out massive raids in Makhachkala, Derbent, and other cities in the republic. Military officials have detained dozens, if not hundreds, of young men who then vanish without any official communication (Kavkaz Realii, June 3, 9). According to activists from the region, the military prevents these men from contacting their families or friends. It does not allow them the chance to show documents proving that they are lawfully deferred from service. Dagestanis—not just those connected to “the disappeared”—are outraged (Kavkaz Realii, June 3, 9).  

Not having documents on hand is a real problem for non-Russian ethnic groups in general. The head of Buryatia, Alexei Tsydenov, for example, has warned all Buryats to carry their passports with them to prove they are not foreigners amid rising anti-immigrant sentiment within Russia (Astra Press, June 14). The surreptitious nature of raids, combined with the absence of a centralized draft center in Dagestan, makes the issue difficult to address through official channels, leading Dagestani activists to consider collective action (Kavkaz Realii, June 3, 9). Those carrying out the raids and officials in the military commissariats that handle the draft state that they are acting on the orders of Moscow, intensifying anti-Russian feelings in Dagestan. In the small republic, many parents of  “disappeared” men have roles in government and are worried about their children. Some such parents are exhibiting signs of radical anti-Moscow sentiment, indicating that discontent with the center exists in local government and society as a whole (Window on Eurasia, July 4, 2024; Kavkaz Realii, February 13).  

The Kremlin is concerned that the mass roundup of young men in Dagestani cities will lead to the radicalization of the republic and the eventual formation of anti-Russian militant groups (Spiegel Ausland; Dialog.ua, March 2; Aktsenti, March 3). Other observers worry that Dagestani veterans of Russia’s war against Ukraine and veterans belonging to Russian nationalist groups with the arms and skills to engage in violence, such as the Russian Community, could come into conflict once the war ends (Kavkaz Realii, November 15, 2024; Window on Eurasia, June 3). Other Kremlin officials are concerned that Chechen calls for the restoration of a Chechen district in Dagestan before the end of 2025 may consolidate Dagestani national identity, preventing Moscow from using its divide-and-rule policy in Dagestan (Window on Eurasia, March 13, 2024, October 12, 2024; Kavkaz Uzel, February 26).

Last month’s mass detentions of young Dagestanis to meet the republic’s draft quota may trigger a more serious challenge to Moscow’s authority. The chances of unrest are heightened since the Kremlin has stripped the region of its police forces and other coercive resources to support its war against Ukraine and because Moscow is threatening to conscript ever more of its young men (Window on Eurasia, March 7).  If Dagestan becomes a conflict zone, the Kremlin will have only itself and its policies in the North Caucasus to blame.