Moscow Warns Oslo on Svalbard but Suggests ‘Deal’ with United States on Arctic

Executive Summary:

• Moscow has declared that Oslo strengthening its defenses on Svalbard is a violation of the Svalbard Treaty, implying that Russia views itself as a defender of that treaty and could take military action to defend it. 
• Nikolai Patrushev, a hardline Kremlin aide close to Putin, has supported this response and declared that the West is threatening Russia across the north, believing Moscow must act now to defend its national interests.
• Russia’s own approach, however, has had one of its senior participants in talks with the United States to persuade that now is not the time for a “cold war” in the Arctic but rather for a comprehensive “deal.”

In the last ten days, Moscow has dramatically raised tensions with the West through conflict in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. The Kremlin, however, is offering U.S. President Donald Trump “a way out” by means of a more comprehensive “deal.” On March 14, the Russian foreign ministry summoned Norwegian Ambassador Robert Kvile to inform him that Moscow views Oslo’s efforts to strengthen its defenses on Svalbard and the Spitzbergen archipelago as a violation of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, which recognizes Norway’s sovereignty over those islands but precludes their military use. Russia, as a signatory, considers itself a defender of that treaty and has the right to take action to defend its provisions (EurAsia Daily, March 14). Only a day earlier, Nikolai Patrushev, a close aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin long known for his hardline views, declared that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was threatening Russian national interests in the Atlantic and Arctic oceans. Furthermore, he claimed that Moscow has the right, and even the duty, to take immediate action to defend itself against such threats (Natsional’naya Oborona, March 13). These two moves were compounded with a classic Russian tactic of misdirection with Kirill Dmitriyev, an influential Russian businessman and official at the center of talks between Moscow and Washington over Ukraine, simultaneously insisting that now is not the time for a new “cold war” in the Arctic but rather for a comprehensive “deal” between Moscow and Washington, precisely the kind of language likely to appeal to Trump (The Barents Observer, March 12). 

The summoning of Kvile was only the latest in a string of Russian moves over the last several years concerning Spitzbergen. Such actions have led some defense analysts to conclude that it and other islands in the Baltic and North Atlantic may be Russia’s first targets if it decides to attack NATO countries (see EDM, July 7, 2022, May 30, June 11, August 15, 2024). Among the reasons for their worries are that these islands are lightly defended and, in the case of Spitzbergen, subject to treaties that limit their militarization. Simultaneously, Moscow’s ability to use the People’s Republic of China to build up its own presence on that archipelago, taking measures behind the façade of international support (Window on Eurasia, September 30, 2024). Norway has refused to be intimidated and instead has taken steps to expand its defense capability in the Spitzbergen archipelago (Window on Eurasia, July 11, September 8, 2024). 

Oslo’s staunch position has provoked two reactions in Moscow. Patrushev has viewed it as evidence that the West is working to undermine Russian interests in the North Atlantic and Arctic, which must be combatted (Natsional’naya Oborona, March 13). Dmitriyev, however, has concluded that the best course for Moscow, especially at a time when Trump is talking about acquiring Greenland, is to ignore European opposition and to make “a deal” with Washington that will divide that region, including Spitzbergen, into well-defined spheres of influence (Window on Eurasia, December 27, 2024; The Barents Observer, March 12). Both positions have support in the Russian capital in part because, superficial appearances notwithstanding, they are complementary rather than opposed, as together they allow Moscow to weaken Europe, further divide the United States and Europe, and expand Russian influence and presence beyond where it has been up to now.  

Patrushev reflects the more traditional Russian approach. In an interview with the Moscow military journal National Defense, he says that Western countries now, as in the past, are carrying out a concerted campaign against Russian interests in the Baltic Sea, the Arctic, and the North Atlantic regions to weaken Moscow (Natsional’naya Oborona, March 13). To prevent the West from succeeding, he calls on the Kremlin to respond by strengthening and building up its naval forces, for which he personally is responsible, and challenging all such Western “provocations,” including in places such as Spitzbergen, where they are, in his view, particularly unacceptable. Many in Moscow share his view, but due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its resources are spread too thin to fully project power in the region without losing ground in Ukraine.

Dmitriyev’s approach is intended to achieve the same goal Patrushev—the expansion of Russian influence at the West’s expense—but by another means, “a deal with Trump” rather than by the use of military force (The Barents Observer, March 12). Writing on X, Dmitriyev argues that “the Arctic is too important for Cold War-style politics” and instead must become part of “a rapprochement” between Russia and the United States. They “must find common ground to ensure stability, resource development, and environmental protection.” In his words, “cooperation is not a choice—it’s a necessity” X/@kadmitriev, March 8).

Dmitriyev has promoted this theme before. Trained at Stanford and Harvard Universities, he rose to prominence as a Russian businessman and Putin ally during the first Trump Administration when he was among the first Russian officials to meet with U.S. leaders.  At the time, he sought to work closely with the then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to reach an agreement on the Arctic that would allow for joint oil and gas exploration and development (The Barents Observer, December 15, 2016). These plans never panned out, but now Dmitriyev and his ideas are at the center of Kremlin thinking and action.

Dmitriyev was a member of the Russian delegation that met with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Michael Waltz in Saudi Arabia on February 18 to try to reach a U.S.-Russian agreement on Ukraine. Putin clearly believes that Dmitriyev is someone who understands Trump and has mastered “the art of the deal” and may be able to craft an even broader agreement between Moscow and Washington than just on Ukraine. For now, appealing to the U.S. president to further Russian engagement in the Arctic and North Atlantic Oceans without the exertions and risks that the Patrushev approach would certainly entail. If no such “deal” is reached, however, Patrushev’s words are a reminder that Moscow has another approach in reserve and to be used when it judges it to be advantageous.