Moscow’s Anti-Migrant Campaign Accelerating Formation of Ethnic Ghettos in Russia

Executive Summary:

• Russia is now facing a problem that did not exist in Soviet times and one that in the years since 1991, Moscow has denied exists now: the appearance in Moscow and other major cities of ethnic ghettos consisting of members of Central Asian migrants.
• This development is linked not only to the transformation of slums into ghettos as poorer immigrants replace the indigenous population but also about social attitudes and government policies that have driven the migrants to band together to defend themselves.
• All signs point to an intensification of Moscow’s anti-immigrant campaign and the exacerbation of rising crime and violence in Russia due to xenophobia, all of which come at a time when Russia faces severe labor shortages.

Prior to the Russian Revolution in 1917, Russian cities had ethnic quarters, or ghettos, where members of some minorities lived to maintain their ethnic identities and protect themselves against Russification. Between 1917 and 1991, such ghettos largely disappeared as a result of Soviet policies such as the propiska system, which allowed officials to determine who lived where. Following 1991, the propiska system was formally banned, and neighborhoods began gradually separating themselves again. Russian officials continue to insist that their country does not have any ghettos. In recent years, however, research and reality have forced them to acknowledge that there are, in fact, “ethnic enclaves,” a euphemism for ghettos, a word few are prepared to use (Window on Eurasia, February 23, 2023). The influx of migrant workers from Central Asia and the Caucasus into Russian cities has subsequently caused growing anger among the population and policies against immigrant workers. As a result, real ghettos have emerged in Russian cities, exacerbating tensions between their residents and the surrounding Russian community and creating conditions in which tensions spill over into violence that even the increasingly repressive Putin regime is finding difficult to subdue (see EDM, May 9, 15). 

Most discussions about the reappearance of ghettos in Russian cities have suggested this development is simply the result of slums transforming into ghettos, a process in which poorer migrants replace ethnic Russian residents in poorer parts of urban areas (Natsional’nyi Aktsent, February 2, 2023). There can be little doubt that this is the primary factor in the recent rise of ghettos in Russian cities. It is increasingly evident, however, that this issue has been exacerbated by Moscow’s anti-immigrant campaign and how Russian officials and the Russian population have responded. This includes not only refusing to rent to migrants but also educators’ and parents’ attitudes toward the increasing number of migrants’ children in schools who do not know Russian well (Window on Eurasia, May 29, 2016). A common narrative is that their presence has the effect of slowing the education for others, leading to declines in all-important test scores—upon which teachers’ and administrators’ salaries depend (RIA Novosti, April 8, 2021; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 12, 2021; Zavtra.ru, April 14, 2021).  

Declining test scores have led to calls by some Russian nationalists that the children of immigrants be excluded from Russian public schools. These appeals have been dismissed as political grandstanding from parties that would like to expel all migrant workers from Russia, something that the Kremlin cannot afford to do. Such dismissals, however, have failed to recognize that these attitudes are already having an effect, keeping immigrant children from attending many schools. 

This is such a politically explosive topic that few studies have been conducted on how ghettoization is affecting urban life in Russia. One study on the situation in St. Petersburg recently released by Russian independent news agency Bumaga provides the clearest indication of just how far ghettoization has progressed. The study found that the situation was developing due to political reasons connected to anti-immigrant campaigns, rather than for economic ones. These campaigns have been carried out in response to a call from the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) to strip children without Russian citizenship of the right to free public education (TASS, September 5). The Bumaga investigation found that in the wake of the Crocus City Hall bombing in March 2024, many Russian public schools are now refusing to admit immigrant children, citing overcrowding or other more spurious reasons. This has led to younger immigrant children being concentrated in certain schools and, in numerous cases, older immigrant children not attending at all, being left to their own devices on the streets (Bumaga, October 17).

Both of these consequences, Bumaga researchers conclude, are leading to the rapid ghettoization of immigrants, to an even slower adaptation of migrant children to Russian life, and perhaps most disturbingly of all, to the emergence of sometimes violent and often fanatically politically radical youth culture (see EDM, March 22, 2018). While there are fewer immigrants to Russia now than in the past, the problems they pose are growing. This conclusion is supported by reports concerning increasing clashes between migrant youth and their Russian counterparts and even the formation of militias by each group to defend against the other (Svobodnaya Pressa, July 24, 2021; Window on Eurasia, September 15, 2023).

Despite these risks, there is broad support both within the educational system and by the ethnic Russian majority for exclusionary policies, according to Bumaga. As previously stated, schools, teachers, and parents of non-immigrant children support excluding immigrant children because their presence means that teachers have to devote more attention and time to those who do not know Russian well. This redirection of educators’ attention means that all get relatively less preparation for government-tested subjects—something which is already sparking calls for the number of immigrant children to be limited to only a handful in each class. As discussed earlier, school directors and teachers’ pay is threatened by a lower average score on said tests, which likewise determine other students’ opportunities to move on to higher education. As a result of this, there is a large group of people whose interests oppose admitting children of non-citizenship immigrants to schools.

The solution in the educational system, activists and experts tell Bumaga, is to establish special schools for immigrants to provide them with the Russian language education they need if they are to remain in Russia. Some acknowledge, however, that there is a danger to setting up such schools, as it could also lead to further ghettoization. While there are no statistics available on how large either of these trends has become due to its controversy, Bumaga suggests that both are large and growing. The issue is expected to negatively impact migrant and non-migrant children in schools and Russian society overall.

In the broader problem of ghettoization, migrant children play only a small part, but the Putin regime has been presented with a Hobson’s choice about migrant workers. On the one hand, the Kremlin recognizes that Russia cannot afford to expel migrants or their children. On the other hand, the Putin leadership has yet to develop a strategy to curb the growth of ghettos and the violence their rise may provoke, especially amid the increasingly nationalist attitudes among the Russian population. Relying solely on repression—a tactic that proved ineffective in controlling such conflicts during the late imperial period—is unlikely to succeed in the current crisis (on that history and that prospect, see EDM, October 15).