New Security Arrangements Between Moscow and Minsk Cement Russia’s Influence (Part 2)

Executive Summary:

• The Treaty on Security Guarantees within the framework of the Russia-Belarus Union State allows for a nuclear weapons response to the use of nuclear or weapons of mass destruction, or certain threats to territorial integrity, against either Belarus or Russia, but it remains ambiguous by not clarifying  the procedure for such a response. 
• Contrary to official statements, centralized command and control of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus is exercised by the Kremlin, while Minsk does not possess the authority to veto decisions from Moscow.
• Moscow’s rush to ratify the treaty indicates it is preparing legal grounds for including Belarus in Russia’s military planning, effectively turning the territory of Belarus into a launching pad for nuclear weapons and for waging war against Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Treaty on Security Guarantees within the framework of the  Union State between Russia and Belarus, signed on December 6, 2024, stipulates that the Kremlin has the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against Belarus or Russia. Additionally, Russia may respond with nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against any of the parties with conventional weapons that pose a critical threat to its sovereignty or territorial integrity. The criteria for determining such a critical threat, however, are not explicitly defined (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 6, 2024). This provision aligns with the recently updated nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation (see EDM, October 2, November 26, 2024).

The treaty does not define the procedure for actions in a scenario in which either Russia or Belarus are the objects of nuclear weapons attack or a WMD attack, or in which their territorial integrity is threatened. It only indicates that the decision on the use of Russian nuclear weapons located on the territory of Belarus will be made in accordance with a procedure additionally established by the parties. The recently updated Russian nuclear doctrine, however, clearly states that the decision to use nuclear weapons belongs only to the President of Russia. Moreover, it assumes the Kremlin’s centralized control of nuclear weapons, including those deployed outside Russia, for example, tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus (EDM, October 2, November 26, 2024; Pravo.gov.ru, November 19, 2024).

In the weeks following the signing of the treaty, Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated that the defense of Belarus is a very important component of Russia’s updated nuclear strategy. He stressed that threats to Belarus will be considered as threats to Russia and that the Kremlin will take all necessary measures to ensure Belarus’ security, including with the use of nuclear weapons (TASS, December 19, 2024)

Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, in turn, has confirmed the covert deployment of several dozen Russian nuclear warheads in Belarus (EDM, May 9, 2024). He emphasized that these activities were taken at his request and that tactical nuclear weapons remain under his control, stating that only the president of Belarus has the authority to use the nuclear weapons located on Belarusian territory (President of Belarus, December 10, 2024). 

The Minister of Defense of Belarus, Viktor Khrenin, confirmed that the unique operation to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory was executed with exceptional speed and discretion. He explained that deploying Russian nuclear weapons was a response to broken promises on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastward expansion and sanctions against Belarus. Defense departments of both states were coordinating this operation (TASS, January 23).

The State Secretary of the Security Council of Belarus, Aliaksandr Valfovich, asserted that Lukashenka possesses his own “red button” and “nuclear briefcase.” Echoing Lukashenka’s claim, Valfovich said that weapons located on the territory of Belarus can only be used under the authority of the President of Belarus. Similarly, weapons situated on the territory of Russia are subject to the use and command of the President of Russia alone (Belta.by, December 6, 2024). Valfovich also claimed that with the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus, the head of state has corrected the strategic mistake made in the 1990s,  when Belarus signed the Lisbon Protocol to the START I treaty (1992), Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1993), and Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances (1994), agreeing not to withdraw and possess nuclear weapons (Ibid). Belarus will have at its disposal a strike capability that allows it to inflict considerable damage on any potential aggressor: the Iskander-M missile system, tactical nuclear weapons, and the Oreshnik hypersonic missile system (TASS, January 16; see EDM, February 2). The latter system is planned to be deployed on the territory of Belarus as early as this year (Ibid).

These statements appear designed to mitigate public perceptions in Belarus and abroad regarding increased strategic dependence on Russia and potential loss of sovereignty, but they do not reflect political-military and legal realities. Most likely, the “red button” and the “nuclear briefcase” in Lukashenka’s possession refer to the codes needed to activate the permissive action link (PAL) of nuclear warheads (Aif.ru, December 26, 1991). According to Russian doctrinal documents regarding nuclear strategy, the authority to use nuclear weapons in a theater of military operations can be delegated by the President of the Russian Federation to commanders of strategic or operational-strategic formations upon receiving an appropriate order or signal (Levshin, V.I. Nedelin, A.V. Sosnovsky, M.E. On the use of nuclear weapons for de-escalation of military hostilities // Voennaya Mysl, 1999). For the Union State, this formation may include the Regional Troops Grouping (RTG) of Belarus and Russia. Consequently, at the end of this decision-making chain, the Belarusian military leadership within the RTG Joint Command would be involved in activating  PALs of nuclear warheads.

The procedure for the use of tactical nuclear weapons is structured in such a way that Belarus acts solely as an executor of the decisions made by the President of the Russian Federation, without any capacity to block their application. The Belarusian side only possesses a formal advisory vote on their use within the framework of the RTG Joint Command/Nuclear Planning Group but does not possess the authority to veto any decision from the Kremlin (see EDM, June 17, 2024). 

The Belarusian leadership, via public statements, attempts to maintain some degree of sovereignty by claiming that Minsk ostensibly has access to the nuclear arsenal (Belta.by, December 10). On the use of the Oreshnik hypersonic missile system, which is capable of both a nuclear and conventional payload, Putin confirmed in a press conference with Lukashenka that the “determination of targets on the territory of a potential enemy will … remain with the military-political leadership of Belarus” (President of Belarus, December 6, 2024). According to Lukashenka, the same is true when it comes to algorithms and targets for the tactical nuclear weapons deployed on the Belarusian territory (Belta.by, June 27, 2023). This delegation of authority—and consequently responsibility—may be advantageous for Russia. In the event of a retaliatory strike by NATO in response to the Kremlin’s use of nuclear weapons, the primary target would be Belarus rather than Russia.Recently, Putin submitted the Treaty on Security Guarantees to the State Duma for ratification (TASS, February 5). According to its chairman Vyacheslav Volodin, the draft bill will be considered in the priority order by the end of this month, emphasizing the importance of this agreement for the Kremlin (State Duma of the Russian Federation,  February 10). 

Once the treaty is ratified and entered into force, it instantly forms the grounds for expanding the Russian military presence in Belarus. This would draw the Belarusian Armed Forces into the war against Ukraine, using Belarus as a “launching pad” for Russia’s potential nuclear strikes on Ukraine and NATO member states. The document also requires Minsk to pursue a foreign policy that will be focused on protecting the interests of Russia and the Union State, leaving no room for hedging between the West and East (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, December 6, 2024). The treaty will be reviewed twice annually by Minsk and Moscow. Its duration is  10 years with an automatic 10-year extension, likely extending beyond the Lukashenka era. This undermines Minsk’s attempt to participate as a neutral party in international negotiations on Russia’s war in Ukraine, positioning it as a military and geopolitical ally of Russia. In the event of any escalation of conflict with Ukraine and NATO, Belarus may serve as Russia’s launching pad for nuclear weapons and a military springboard for waging the war, thus shifting the burden of first retaliatory strikes to the Belarusian side rather than to Russia.

Part 1 of this article is available here.