No Shortcut to Hard Road to Peace in Ukraine

Executive Summary:

• Ukraine has intensified its behind-the-scenes multilateral political maneuvering, as evidenced by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s promotion of his own victory plan, despite little change on the battlefield.
• Zelenskyy’s proposal emphasizes that only a bold stride toward victory can make his plan feasible, but a significant shift in the balance of forces is necessary for bringing the Russians to the table as part of a second peace summit.
• Moscow tries to peddle a narrative that it is also interested in peace. However, this is transparently false, and world leaders know that Russia is only interested in exploiting violent conflicts around the globe and promoting instability.

As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches its 33rd month, no drastic changes are expected on the battlefield. Ukrainian forces are slowly advancing in Russia’s Kursk oblast and making Russian forces pay dearly for every minor advance in Donbas (Meduza, October 16; Republic.ru, October 17). Kyiv and Odesa are under fire from Russian missile attacks, Ukrainian drones hit Russian arsenals and oil depots, and prisoners-of-war exchanges are often taking place, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) performing the role of an intermediary (RBC, October 19). Despite slow-moving frontlines and few changes on the battlefield, Ukraine’s campaign of behind-the-scenes multilateral political maneuvering is only intensifying.

After presenting his “victory plan” in the United States, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy continued his tour of major European capitals, visiting key partners supporting Ukraine, including the European Council and a meeting of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense ministers (see EDM, October 18; Izvestiya, October 19). Zelenskyy’s proposal of the plan before the Verkhovna Rada was met with applause, though some propositions in the plan remain confidential (Svoboda.org, October 16). The thrust of Zelenskyy’s message is that a bold stride toward victory—in other words, a significant shift in the balance of forces on the battlefield—is a prerequisite for a future second peace summit, if it is to be productive (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 16).  

Zelenskyy remains confident that such a turn in the war’s trajectory is realistic. This is predicated on an assumption that such a change could be accomplished if Ukraine were to receive a sustained inflow of external military aid and the lifting of restrictions on strikes with long-range missiles supplied by Western allies on military targets inside Russian territory (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 17). Ideas regarding a ceasefire, stronger security guarantees, and even an invitation to NATO are gaining traction among Ukraine’s European allies. All possible developments on this front are being keenly monitored by Moscow (Forbes.ru, October 13).

A new (and much necessary) boost to Zelenskyy’s diplomatic offensive was delivered by US President Joe Biden (NV.ua, October 18; RBC, October 18). During a trip to Germany, Biden met with several major European leaders, including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, French President Emmanuel Macron, and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who all declared their unequivocal support of Ukraine (Kommersant, October 18). The collected group did not publicly comment on the victory plan, though French officials appear to be pushing to invite Ukraine to join NATO (The Moscow Times, October 18). Additionally, no formal announcement was made regarding the major power’s stance on the use of long-range missiles, though in terms of military effectiveness, such a shift would be better done behind the scenes, so as to preserve the element of surprise. Their joint stance amounted, nevertheless, to a firm assertion that the war constitutes an existential threat to the Western alliance, and not a local conflict that can be managed by smart diplomacy and resolved by a territorial compromise (Re: Russia, October 7).

Pundits in Moscow seek to diminish this message, asserting that Europeans are not ready to pay for their own defense nor shoulder the burden of supporting Ukraine (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, October 17). The main theme in Russia’s attacks on Western unity is, however, juxtaposing it with the aspirations of the “global majority,” which are supposed to be on display at the BRICS (a loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit scheduled for October 22–24 in Kazan, Russia (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, October 16). The Kremlin has instructed its propagandists to wax poetic about the unique significance of this gathering (RIAC, October 15). Every possible measure is being taken to make Kazan look presentable for the occasion (Mediza, October 17). What makes this occasion special for Russian President Vladimir Putin is the fact that he is likely to miss the next BRICS summit in Brazil. This is due to the country’s obligation to execute the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant against Putin should he attend in person—much the same way the various parties handled the 2023 summit in South Africa, which Putin ultimately opted to attend virtually (Vedomosti, October 18).

Moscow tries to project an image that it is interested in bringing the war to an end and is positively inclined to the peace initiative advanced by China and supported by Brazil (RIA Novosti, October 18). This notion is, however, transparently false, and the leaders of key states in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East know perfectly well that Russia is primarily interested in exploiting violent conflicts around the globe and promoting instability (Carnegie Politika, October 17). These countries may believe Zelenskyy’s peace plan to be far-fetched, but few are deluded by the glaring absence of any Russian peace plan, which hints that Putin is set on a path of permanent war (Novaya Gazeta Europe, October 19). The “import” of some 1,500 special forces soldiers from the pariah state of North Korea supports this conclusion (The Moscow Times, October 16).

Further evidence can be found in the Russian 2025 state budget, which allocates far greater funding for the defense sector than was initially planned (see EDM, October 3). For the first time, the new budget prescribes significant cuts in expenditures on education, pensions, and other social programs (Re: Russia, October 4). Russia’s partners in the Global South may be inclined to take the Kremlin’s assurances of domestic stability for granted, but cannot fail to see the unhealthy consequences of Russia’s economic militarization. Said militarization has caused Russia to be cut off from most tracks of technological innovation, leaving the country unable to invest the necessary resources into the crucially important energy sector (Svoboda.org, October 1; see EDM, October 16; Meduza, October 19).

Zelenskyy expects and demands greater effort from the Western coalition for mobilizing support for Ukraine than their divided societies and risk-averse political elites are prepared to make. His persistence, nevertheless, represents an effort to stay on course to achieve a just and sustainable peace, which would assure Ukrainian security and prosperity while also yielding a new peace dividend to all European states currently compelled to pay the costs of arming Ukraine and themselves. It would also answer the interests of major powers such as India, Brazil, and Türkiye, who are presently finding some opportunities to benefit from the war but more likely to prosper more from an enduring peace in Europe. While Putin’s regime is the main obstacle blocking the road to peace—a formidable and dangerous one, it must be admitted—not even China, the Kremlin’s pivotal strategic partner, would describe it as insurmountable.