Norwegian Intelligence Assessment on Russian Interference

Executive Summary:

• Following the invasion of Ukraine, Norway faces heightened security risks from Russia, including espionage attempts and incidents involving drones near critical infrastructure.
• In the intelligence’s assessment, Norway’s oil and gas facilities, essential to the European energy supply, are particularly vulnerable targets, necessitating strengthened security measures and cooperation with allied nations.
• The recent threats have exposed weaknesses in Norway’s defense infrastructure, highlighting the urgent need for increased military spending and modern surveillance technologies.

In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, security considerations for Norway have changed significantly. Norway is the only European country still allowing Russian fishing vessels to dock, now with increased control, and on November 1, Russia and Norway announced their fishery agreement for 2025, demonstrating the two countries’ continued cooperation (Fish.gov.ru; Kystogfjord.no, November 1). Despite this cooperation, Russia has been accused of using fishing travelers as spying vessels to research sensitive facilities along the Norwegian coast and has even (TV2, May 13). Russia is openly more hostile to Norway with the occurrence of several well-known incidents, such as an attempt at spying (NRK, December 13, 2023; see EDM, April 18). Russia has established cabins close to Norway’s   largest military installations (TV2, April 4). As well as incidents involving drones crossing into the vicinity of Norwegian power plants (Nettavisen, September 9, 2022). As recently as September 2024, a jamming test at Andøya Air Force base, a base possessing large quantities of intelligence technology, was postponed due to suspected sabotage of the power line (Forsvaretsforum, September 12).

These actions, incidents, or breaches of security point toward Russia having established itself on Norwegian soil or working with partners. The chief of the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) unit is concerned that Russia might be using Norwegian citizens for these operations. By offering cash incentives, Russia may be able to find criminals or even gang members—as is the case in Sweden with the foxtrot gang working on behalf of Iran—to carry out acts of sabotage (Aftonbladet, October 14). For Moscow, this strategy has the benefit of plausible deniability in removing direct Russian involvement in individual operations. No culprits have been found in the cases of the Andøya sabotage or the drone flying incident. Given the nature of the acts, however, the most reasonable candidate would be Russia. 

In the annual threat assessment report conducted by the Norwegian Intelligence Services (Etterretningstjenesten) in early 2024, four targets were identified as more susceptible to Russian interference (Etteretningstjenesten, February 27). These include actors who work with the donations of weapons and training of Ukrainian personnel; businesses and facilities connected to the production of oil and gas; technology of military and civilian value; and Norwegian and allied military assets in Norway.

The most critical aspect of these threats regarding Norway’s role from a security perspective is the oil and gas sector. To a degree, Norway has taken over Russian oil and gas exports to several EU countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands (see EDM, May 13, 2019, May 12, 2020). These facilities are essential for the broader energy supply chain within Europe, and any disruption to this would cause widespread supply issues within most of the European Union in tandem with rising prices. The PST concurs that oil and gas will be particularly vulnerable in the case of Russia being unable to win its war in Ukraine or if it chooses to escalate the conflict (PST, February 12). 

Safety is vital, given that Norway’s oil and gas sector is essential to the European energy supply chain. The Nord Stream 1 and 2 incidents have highlighted the increased need for security and security has, as a result, been strengthened through more maritime patrols (see EDM, October 4, 2022). While Norway has ordered several new naval assets, these will take time. To prepare for the possibility of Russian sabotage or acts of war, energy-dependent countries will need to all work together in an increased capacity to safeguard essential energy facilities. 

In addition to the increase of new naval assets, radar technology (Andøya), routine patrolling, and modern technologies such as drones (both airborne and underwater) should actively be implemented to counteract Russian hostility. Using naval drones in Ukraine has shown the capacity of maritime drones in modern warfare (see EDM, August 13). At any rate, new legislative action toward Russian naval assets, even fishing boats, will be necessary to increase these facilities’ safety by hindering Russian intelligence gathering. With Norway being on the opposite side of Russia relative to Ukraine, the lack of control over Russian boats traversing Norwegian sovereign waters is concerning in securing essential energy infrastructure such as pipelines. Pipelines are among the easiest targets to hit, as they’re relatively undefendable. Furthermore, the pipelines are integral in supplying the rest of Europe with natural gas liquified natural gas facilities along the European coastlines.

The deteriorating relationship between Norway and Russia has resulted in new security paradigms for Norway, such as the vulnerability of energy facilities. It has also exposed weaknesses in the existing security establishment, such as the lack of available radar and naval assets to defend infrastructure. Due to a lack of monetary spending in the defense sector after the Cold War, Norway does not, at present, possess the necessary components to safeguard these installations. Norway is currently undergoing a process of rearmament, but this will take years to be completed (Forsvaret, June 13, 2023).

Given that Russia is bolder and more assertive than before 2022, Norway and other allied states must be vigilant in dealings with it. In the new and ever-evolving security landscape, new emphasis must be placed on safeguarding critical energy infrastructure and other necessary infrastructure in this relation. Cooperation through mutual legislative action is also required when dealing with Russian assets, private companies, fishing boats, or individuals of dubious characters, such as the “scientist’’ who, in reality, was a GRU (Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff) agent utilizing a Brazilian passport. Furthermore, new technology, such as radars and drones, must be implemented to challenge Russia. While other threats, such as spying and recruitment, also occur, the oil and gas fields are the most critical facilities for wider regional cohesion. The European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are, and should be, markedly bolstering the military protection of oil and gas fields in the North Sea.

Norway must bolster its external and internal security measures to deter Russia from interfering. In the wake of the current military restructuring, the country is more dependent than ever on its NATO allies. In this regard, Russia gave Norway perhaps its most significant boost in security through strengthened Nordic military cooperation by adding Sweden and Finland to NATO. Given the likelihood of continued warfare and hostility, the trend of continued threats posed by Russia to Norwegian infrastructure is, in all probability, going to continue much in the same fashion. What can change, however, is the Norwegian countermeasures to Russian aggression.