Pashinyan Press Conference Highlights Progress and Pitfalls in Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Talks

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(Source: Primeminister.am)

Executive Summary:

  • Pressure on Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to deliver a peace agreement with Azerbaijan before the 2026 parliamentary elections is mounting, driven by questions surrounding the longevity of Armenian economic growth.
  • Pashinyan’s efforts to advance negotiations have seen both progress and setbacks. Unresolved issues, particularly those related to regional connectivity and the influence of external actors such as Iran, highlight the complexity of achieving a lasting resolution.
  • The Armenian prime minister’s ability to navigate these challenges, balance domestic and international expectations, and address geopolitical dynamics will be crucial in determining whether a sustainable and effective peace agreement can be achieved.

Toward the end of July, opposition media sent a written inquiry to the Office of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan asking whether Yerevan would send a delegation to the UN Climate Change Conference (COP-29) scheduled for November in Baku (Hraparak, July 31). The move came following an announcement from Azerbaijani presidential advisor Hikmet Hajiyev that such an invitation had been sent (Azatutyun, July 23). There had also been speculation that Baku was seeking to initial the basic principles for any peace agreement by the time of the event (Trend, July 1). Pashinyan’s office replied, saying he would address these issues in a press conference after returning from a vacation in early August. Pashinyan has consistently used live press conferences to clarify and promote his policies, especially regarding normalization between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While the said press conference did occur, it did so only at the very end of August, during which Pashinyan did not rule out sending a high-level delegation to COP-29 (ArmenPress, August 31). It took place one day after a regulatory document for the respective Armenian and Azerbaijani border commissions handling delimitation and demarcation was finalized and signed by both sides (Azatutyun, August 31). The agreement is significant because it must also be approved by the constitutional court and ratified by parliament (Azatutyun, September 5).

As domestic discontent grows in Armenia and geopolitical tensions between Armenia and Russia, Azerbaijan develop, however, how Pashinyan addresses the ongoing peace process with Azerbaijan will determine his place in the future of Armenian politics.

The press conference also aimed to clarify Armenia’s stance on various issues related to an agreement on normalizing relations between the two countries before November (Daily Sabah, May 7). Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has emphasized this deadline, while Pashinyan and senior officials, such as Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, have expressed hopes for an earlier resolution and a signed treaty (Daily Sabah, June 27). Although progress on border delimitation and demarcation has been notable, the press conference itself was more of a mixed bag. The event highlighted the  notable differences that remain between the sides and suggested that Pashinyan may be trying to balance multiple objectives simultaneously.

Yerevan and Baku have indicated that the text of their agreement is about 80–90 percent complete (Anadolu, September 6). During his press conference, Pashinyan revealed that the draft currently includes 17 articles, with 13 fully agreed upon, 3 partially agreed upon, and 1 major point of contention (Radar, August 31). The specific details of the four unresolved articles remain undisclosed. Just weeks earlier, however, the sides announced that the contentious issue of the unblocking of regional economic and transport links would not be included in the current agreement. Instead, both parties agreed to address the matter separately at a later date (Interfax, August 8; Azatutyun, September 4).

The re-establishment of an overland route between Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia has been particularly challenging, especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 (see EDM, January 25). With this issue removed from the agreement, Armenia’s constitution appears to be the primary remaining obstacle to a peace treaty (see EDM, June 25). Baku claims the document’s preamble refers to territorial claims on Azerbaijan, while Pashinyan claimed the opposite during his press conference (ArmenPress, August 31).

Securing a peace treaty remains Armenia’s top priority. Pashinyan promptly removed the four contentious points from the draft sent to Baku, much to Azerbaijan’s annoyance (ArmenPress, August 31; (APA, September 2; September 10). Pashinyan also acknowledged that he found direct talks with Aliyev productive and invited him to meet at the border between their countries (ArmenPress, August 31).

This development came shortly after Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Baku, where he once again offered to mediate (Hurriyet, August 20). Additionally, Pashinyan’s actions—including suspending Armenia’s membership in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), ending the presence of Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards at Zvartnots airport, and signaling a shift away from Russian influence both politically and economically—underscore a strategic pivot in Armenia’s foreign policy (see EDM, August 15; ArmenPress, August 31).

Yerevan seems cautious about doing so completely (News.am, September 9). Pashinyan still avoids saying whether Armenia will leave the CSTO altogether while Armenian Speaker of Parliament Alen Simonyan has ruled out leaving the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) given that a peace treaty depends on it (ArmenPress, September 9). HisPashinyan’s press conference also stated that he is not considering removing the Russian military base in Gyumri or its small presence in Yerevan (ArmenPress, August 31). Russian FSB border guards continue to operate on the Armenian border with Iran and Türkiye with no existing plan to remove them. It also remains unclear how Yerevan can diversify away from Moscow given its economic reliance on Russia. Likewise, the question of how Armenia plans to handle its dependence on Russian companies to maintain and modernize the country’s aging nuclear power plant is under discussion (see EDM, July 22).

Pashinyan emphasized that the issue of retaking Karabakh is now absent from Armenia’s focus. During his press conference, he also stated that discussions about the return of Karabakh Armenians are unrealistic, given the demands voiced by the territory’s former leadership (ArmenPress, August 31). Pashinyan also opposed Baku’s proposal to dissolve the now-defunct Organization for Security of Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group before finalizing a peace treaty (ArmenPress, August 31). Additionally, Hajiyev has called for the withdrawal of the European Union Mission to Armenia (EUMA) (see EDM, March 11; Azatutyun, September 2).

Domestic opposition to the peace process is increasing, with many claiming that Pashinyan urgently needs an agreement before the next parliamentary elections, which are required to be held by mid-2026 (MediaLab, September 1; News.am, September 2; Hraparak, September 11). The Armenian economy, heavily dependent on re-exports to Russia and the inflow of money from Russian migrants, is already declining and cannot rely on these sources indefinitely (Business Media, August 27). Genuine economic diversification necessitates open borders with Azerbaijan and Türkiye. Given that Pashinyan made the peace agenda a cornerstone of his 2021 re-election campaign, failing to secure a deal would be considered a significant failure.

The pressure is mounting as November approaches, and the situation is further complicated by geopolitical tensions that continue to rise, with Iran expressing strong opposition to any land route from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan controlled by foreign powers. Although this issue has reportedly been excluded from the peace treaty, the blockage of regional economic and transport connections has resurfaced as a significant obstacle, potentially hindering progress. During his press conference, Pashinyan signaled that a foreign private company could exert control of the route from Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan via Armenia, as was the case with an still unfulfilled agreement between Russia and Georgia over the railroad through the breakaway region of Abkhazia (DF Watch, May 21, 2018; 1lurer.am, August 31; Hraparak, September 4).

On September 10, speaking at the first inaugural Yerevan Dialogue conference, Pashinyan reiterated that a peace treaty with Azerbaijan was realistic even though Baku has ruled out the signing of an incomplete agreement  with the constitutional impasse still unresolved (Azatutyun, September 10). He also emphasized his own regional connectivity project, the Crossroads of Peace. Baku and Moscow consider this issue addressed in the trilateral ceasefire statement ending the Karabakh War in 2020 (see EDM, April 15). Pashinyan disagrees but has no intention of withdrawing his signature from the agreement (Verelq, August 31; News.am, September 10). With Armenia due to enter another election cycle and a globally uncertain 2025, the next few months will be critical in shaping the future of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and Pashinyan’s political legacy.