PLA Declares World-Class Ambitions with ‘Strongest Army’ Benchmark

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The PLA’s first rehearsal for the September 3 Victory Day Parade for the 80th anniversary of the victory in the War against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. (Source: CCTV, August 10)

Executive Summary:

  • For the first time, an official PRC publication explicitly defines its goal to “establish a world-class army” (建设世界一流军队) standards as equivalent to the “world’s strongest military”(​​实力最强的军队), marking a direct competitive framework with the United States and other leading powers.
  • Released weeks before the Victory Day parade commemorating Japan’s defeat and following the PLA founding anniversary, the commentary leverages historical symbolism to declare CCP’s readiness to compete with, and potentially challenge, the existing global military order.
  • President Xi Jinping has expedited its “Three-Step” (三步走) modernization schedule since 2017, moving basic military modernization from mid-century to 2035 while targeting a critical 2027 centenary milestone, despite acknowledging ongoing “inadequate capabilities” and “significant gaps” compared to advanced global militaries. The commentary also heavily emphasizes CCP “absolute leadership” over the PLA, signaling Xi’s effort to reinforce military control while questions persist about his authority over the armed forces.

One week after “Army Day” (八一建军节), the August 1 anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Daily published a commentary titled “Deeply Understand the Significant Original Contributions to Building a World-Class Military in All Respects” (深刻把握全面建成世界一流军队的重大原创性贡献) (People’s Daily, August 7). The piece, written by a professor at the National University of Defense Technology, traces national defense and military strategy development since 1997 and emphasizes Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping’s 2016 goal of “building a world-class army” (建设世界一流军队).

The article establishes that the definition of “world-class” must embody universal standards, making vertical comparisons within the PLA insufficient. Instead, the PLA must reference the “world’s strongest military” (实力最强的军队)—an implicit nod to that of the United States—and assess itself on the global stage. Beyond weaponry, organizational structure, and combat systems, the PLA must achieve world-class standards in military theory, personnel development, and training to realize both “leapfrog strength” (跨越之强) through continuous self-transformation and “surpassing strength” (超越之强) to compete against global rivals.

This marks the first time an official article has explicitly defined the standards of a “world-class army” as equivalent to the “world’s strongest military.” Previously, the closest official description called for establishing an army “commensurate with my country’s status as a powerful nation” (同我国强国地位相称), capable of comprehensively defending national security with strong international influence (PLA Daily, June 8, 2023; PRC Ministry of National Defense, August 5, 2023). While the article does not specify which nation possesses the world’s strongest military, the United States is clearly the primary reference point.

Accelerated Timeline and 2027 Milestone

The article frames the current era as one of military revolution, driven by scientific, technological, and industrial advances. The author argues that is present a “once-in-a-lifetime historical opportunity” (千载难逢的历史机遇) for “strategic overtaking” (弯道超车), warning that failing to seize the moment could result in the PLA losing an entire era (抓不住就可能错过整整一个时代). For the PLA, seizing the moment entails building an “informatized army” (信息化军队), as well as preparing for “intelligentized warfare” (智能化战争) through integrating artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, and cloud computing.

Xi has unveiled a new “three-step” (三步走) strategic arrangement—an update on a previous “three-step” arrangement first announced in 1997, [1] accelerating the timeline for “basic realization of national defense and military modernization” (基本实现国防和军队现代化) from mid-century to 2035, while reaffirming the 2027 “centenary goal” (建军百年奋斗目标). However, it also acknowledges critical challenges. It concedes that  the PLA continues to face the “two inadequate capabilities” (两个能力不够), referring to gaps in meeting national security demands and conducting modern warfare, and “two significant gaps” (两个差距很大) between PRC’s military and global advanced standards. These admissions highlight the urgency and difficulty of building a world-class military on an accelerated timeline.

The specific 2027 centenary objectives remain deliberately vague in official statements, with only general calls to enhance strategic capabilities for safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and development interests (PLA Daily, August 5, 2023). Despite this ambiguity, U.S. officials have explicitly warned against dismissing the possibility that the PLA may aim to be ready for a Taiwan invasion by 2027, underscoring growing concerns over the PRC’s military intentions and capabilities (U.S. Congress, July 25).

At the PLA founding anniversary reception, Defense Minister Dong Jun (董军) made an unusually direct reference to Taiwan, declaring that the PLA stands ready to achieve complete unification and repel any foreign military interference (Xinhua, July 31). As the PLA becoming increasingly aggressive toward Taiwan, the timing of this statement—alongside references to competing with the world’s strongest military—signals both Xi Jinping’s intent to stabilize top military leadership and the PLA’s ambition to assert itself on the global stage (China Brief, May 12).

Questions Over Xi’s Military Control

The article asserts that Xi’s goal of building a world-class military represents “value transcendence” (价值超越) over Western military powers. (This forms the subheading of its concluding section.) Unlike Western militaries, which the article characterizes as pursuing coercion, expansion, and hegemony, the PLA’s development aims to maintain regional and world peace. This value system is anchored in the CCP’s “absolute leadership (绝对领导)”, upholding the people’s stance, and effectively fulfilling new era missions, serving as “ballast stones” (压舱石) for world peace.

The same day, the Party’s theory journal Qiushi published an editorial penned by the Central Military Commission (CMC). This piece reinforced the same themes, reflecting on victory in the Anti-Japanese War while emphasizing absolute CCP leadership and calling for study of Xi’s theories on strengthening the army (Qiushi, August 1).

The emphasis on the CCP’s control comes amid significant military personnel changes. Since 2023, an unusually large number of operational commanders and key PLA leaders have been purged, including extended vacancies in the Beijing Garrison command (中国人民解放军北京卫戍区) and the dismissal of CMC Political Work Department head Miao Hua (苗华). This constitutes one of the largest overhauls of the military leadership since the Mao era. Despite Xi’s efforts to control the PLA, ongoing purges and his lack of military background may limit his authority (China Brief, July 26).

Conclusion

This commentary represents a clear trajectory in CCP and PLA military strategy. Domestically, the repeated emphasis on the Party’s “absolute leadership” functions as Xi’s consolidation of control over the PLA, particularly relevant amid recent high-level purges and uncertainties within the military hierarchy. The message is unambiguous: for both PLA officers and Party cadres, unwavering loyalty to Xi remains the foundational principle of service.

Externally, the explicit benchmarking against the world’s strongest military constitutes an unprecedented declaration of competitive ambition, effectively announcing the CCP’s determination to achieve military parity with, or even potentially surpass, the United States and other leading powers by 2027 and 2035.

Published just weeks before the September 3 Victory Day parade commemorating Japan’s defeat, where the PRC is set to showcase its latest weaponry and military modernization achievements (The Paper, June 24; MOD, August 20), the commentary leverages the 80th anniversary of this “great victory” (伟大胜利) to reinforce the CCP’s narratives of the PRC as a major power.

While the 2027 centenary goals remain deliberately ambiguous, the convergence of accelerated modernization timelines, aggressive rhetoric on Taiwan, and explicit declarations of global military competition suggest that the PLA views this milestone as more than symbolic. Whether this translates to concrete military action, particularly regarding Taiwan, remains uncertain. However, the commentary leaves little doubt about the CCP’s intent to position the PLA as a tool not only for national defense, but for reshaping the global security order.The article ultimately reveals that the PLA is now confident enough to publicly declare its  global military ambitions, even as it works to reassert internal control, a dual-track message that projects strength while hinting at lingering institutional tensions within the PLA’s military modernization drive.

 

Notes

[1] The original “three-step” development strategy unveiled by the Party Center and the CMC, included laying a solid foundation for the modernization of the national defense and the military by 2010, bringing about a major development in the modernization of the national defense and the military in the second decade of the twenty-first century, and basically realizing the modernization of national defense and the military by the middle of the century.