PLA Factions and the Erosion of Xi’s Power Over the Military

Executive Summary:

• Two waves of recent purges in the People’s Liberation Army have focused on Xi Jinping’s two major bases of support, the Shaanxi Gang and the Fujian Clique, likely eroding his power over the military.
• A series of articles in the PLA Daily in late 2024 written by people aligned with Central Military Commission Vice Chair Zhang Youxia advocate for collective leadership and more internal democratic decision-making, in a rebuke to Xi’s call for centralized and unified leadership.
• Xi likely does not face any genuine rival, but internal power struggles nevertheless remain fierce.

A year-long anti-corruption campaign has purged major senior personnel from the ranks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). While graft is endemic to the Chinese military, purges in Leninist regimes also serve a political purpose. Fierce internal power struggles are another feature of such regimes, with control over the military seen as vital to consolidating power. In the Chinese military system, Xi Jinping is not the only person who has power over personnel. Recently, some observers have suggested that his vice chair on the Central Military Commission (CMC), Zhang Youxia (张又侠), may have ordered recent purges in the PLA Navy. If this is true, it could suggest that Xi Jinping’s traditional bases of support in the PLA are weakened and that his authority over the PLA is far from absolute (People’s Report, October 11, 2024; X/@yanmingshiping, November 28, 2024).

Two Purges Have Targeted Two Xi Factions

The current CMC consists of five men besides Xi, according to the Ministry of National Defense website. These individuals are pulled from Xi’s two major bases of support in the PLA, the Shaanxi Gang (陕西帮) and the Fujian Clique (福建系). The former stems from Xi’s family connections as a princeling—both Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin (张升民) hail from Shaanxi Province. Zhang Youxia also has close familial ties to Xi, as the two men’s fathers served in the same unit during the civil war. The latter group is composed of He Weidong (何卫东) and Miao Hua (苗华), who worked with Xi when he was an official in Fujian Province. This leaves Liu Zhenli (刘振立), who is more aligned with the Shaanxi Gang by virtue of his relationship with Zhang Youxia, under whom he served during the Sino-Vietnamese War (VOA Chinese, October 24, 2022; MND, accessed March 3). [1]

The current anti-graft campaign in the PLA can be divided into two distinct waves, the first beginning in 2023 and ending in mid-2024, and the second beginning in November 2024 and continuing to the present. Officials connected to the Shaanxi Gang and the Fujian Clique, respectively, were caught up in these two waves, likely resulting in an erosion of Xi Jinping’s base of support.

The first wave primarily targeted the PLA’s aerospace apparatus, eliminating key leaders in the PLA Rocket Force, Air Force, Strategic Support Force, and the aerospace industry. Those who were purged often had ties to Shaanxi Gang leaders via superior-subordinate relationships. This wave centered around Defense Minister Li Shangfu (李尚福) and his predecessor Wei Fenghe (魏凤和). The probes traced Li’s misconduct to the Equipment Development Department, where he succeeded Zhang Youxia as director. In December 2023, the National People’s Congress announced the removal of nine senior military officials. Of these, five were associates of Li in the Rocket Force, and two, Zhang Yulin (张育林) and Rao Wenmin (饶文敏), were officials in the Equipment Development Department (Xinhua, December 29, 2023). They likely had a hand in the misconduct that also ensnared Li (Lianhe Zaobao, July 29, 2023, December 29, 2023). While Zhang Youxia himself was not implicated, the removal of his former subordinates damaged the standing of the Shaanxi Gang. Li was replaced by a member of the Fujian Clique, Dong Jun (董军), confounding months of speculation that he would be succeeded by the more closely aligned Liu Zhenli (Lianhe Zaobao, October 12, 2023; Radio Free Asia, November 24, 2023). This suggests that factional interests were at play in the personnel reshuffle.

Following a brief hiatus, the purges ramped up again in November 2024 with rumors that Dong Jun was under investigation and the announcement that Miao Hua was suspended. The PLA Navy became the principal focus of investigations, with suggestions that Miao was the patron of all those under scrutiny (China Military Online, November 28, 2024; National People’s Congress, December 25, 2024). [2] The Fujian Clique, the beneficiary of the previous round of purges, now finds itself in the probes’ crosshairs. Speculation abounds that Zhang Youxia is flexing his political muscle following the downfall of his supporters. This is supported by a series of meetings Zhang hosted with senior PLA officers in late 2024, from which Xi was conspicuously absent (MND, September 13, 2024, October 22, 2024; China Brief, December 3). Even if this analysis is correct, however, it remains unclear what Zhang’s motives might be.

Whose Authority? Xi Versus the System

Party literature hints at this unfolding PLA power struggle. In December 2024, Xi penned an article in the Party’s theory journal Qiushi, emphasizing that the first step of revolution is to “adhere to the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee as the fundamental guarantee” (以坚持党中央集中统一领导为根本保证) (Qiushi, December 16, 2024). By contrast, other parts of the PLA leadership have been advocating for collective decision-making. In other words, control should remain within the Party but not under a particular apparatus (such as the central committee) that Xi directly controls.

Several commentaries published in 2024 in the PLA Daily newspaper stressed the importance of “adhering to collective leadership” (坚持集体领导) and maintaining “democratic centralism” (民主集中制). These include an article from July and a series of five further pieces published in September and December (PLA Daily, July 9, 2024, September 13, 2024; December 9, 2024, December 11, 2024, December 16, 2024, December 18, 2024). A majority of the authors can be traced back to organizations Zhang Youxia’s faction previously had ties to, including three connected to the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) and one from the Aerospace Force. [3]

The article from July emphasizes collective leadership under “each level of party organization” (各级党组织). It states that “only if secretaries and deputy secretaries adhere to collective leadership and focus on developing democracy will they extract the correct views on how to conform to the laws of development and to the basic interests of the masses and create scientific policy” (书记、副书记只有坚持集体领导，注重发扬民主，才能把符合事物发展规律、符合广大人民群众根本利益的正确意见提炼出来，作出科学决策). It goes on to discuss the need for “multiple voices” (多种声音) in any debate, saying that this is the basis for adhering to collective leadership and scientific decision-making, especially during the current phase of military modernization where such decision-making is becoming increasingly complex.

The September 13 piece is the first in a five-part series and is titled “Consciously Set an Example of Upholding Democratic Centralism” (自觉做坚持民主集中制的表率)—a phrase that also serves as the subtitle of the subsequent articles. The main titles of the other four articles all take the form of exhorting readers to “Take the Lead and …” (带头 …), which is followed by “Uphold Collective Leadership” (坚持集体领导), “Develop Democracy Within the Party” (发扬党内民主), “Protect Group Unity (维护班子团结), and “Seek Reality, Deal With Reality, and Implement Based on Reality” (求实务实落实), respectively. Several themes emerge across these pieces.

First, the articles often emphasize the importance of the “democratic” side of the “democratic centralism” equation. One article writes, “in a system of democratic centralism, first comes democracy, then comes centralism” (民主集中制，先有民主，后有集), while another similarly argues that “democracy comes first and then centralism” (先民主后集中). A third notes that intra-party democracy is “the life of the Party; it is the important basis for the Party’s positive and healthy internal political life” (是党的生命，是党内政治 生活积极健康的重要基础). In this context, democracy refers to ensuring collective decision-making, deemphasizing the power of individuals, and encouraging internal debate.

Collective leadership and decision-making are mentioned in three of the articles. One describes the former as “the core and basis” (核心和本质) of democratic centralism and “one of the highest principles of the Party’s leadership” (党的领导的最高原则之一). It goes on to note that “Party leadership is the leadership of the party committee collective” (党的领导是党委集体的领导). Another argues that “Collective leadership should give prominence to the roles of team members” (‘集体领导’要突出发挥班子成员作用), while a third piece notes that, “when discussing issues, everyone must have an equal voice and decision-making power” (在讨论决定问题时具有平等的发言权和表决权).

In contrast, the notion that individuals should have outsized power is repeatedly rejected. One formulation appears identically across three separate articles: “Individuals ‘do not set the tone’ before meetings, ‘do not make the final decision’ in discussions, and ‘do not settle things conclusively’ when drafting resolutions” (个人在开会前‘不定调’，讨论中‘不定音’，形成决议时‘不定局’，做到正确集中、集中正确). This message is reiterated amply elsewhere. One piece writes that Party leadership “is not the leadership of one or two people” (而不是一个、两个人的领导) and that “individuals must submit to the organization; the minority must submit to the majority, and individuals must not put themselves above the collective leadership” (个人要服从组织，少数要服从多数，个人绝不能凌驾于领导集体之上).

In this understanding, leaders are still seen as crucial, but mainly as people who take responsibility for decisions and facilitate “a democratic atmosphere” (民主氛围) within their respective groups or party committees. This entails making sure that “various views are articulated and collide and various bits of knowledge and insight are actively triggered” (各种意见交流碰撞，各种真知灼见积极迸发), or that “committee members dare to talk straight … and the wisdom and strength of the group can be gathered to the greatest extent” (委员敢于直言 … 最大限度地凝聚一班人的智慧和力量). This “relaxed, democratic atmosphere” (宽松民主的氛围) should “encourage everyone to speak freely and equally while carefully listening to and respecting every suggestion, especially from those who hold differing opinions” (鼓励大家畅所欲言、平等交流，认真倾听尊重每份建议，特别是对那些和自己意见相左的同志).

Focusing on the roles of the secretary and deputy secretary, one article notes that it is “extremely important” (非常重要) for them to be “broad-minded and tolerant” (容人雅量和宽广胸襟). Another writes that secretaries “are ‘the head of the team,’ but absolutely should not regard themselves as ‘the head of the family’” (是‘一班之长’，但决不能把自己当作‘一家之主’); while a third argues that secretaries should be “good at accepting advice” (善于纳谏). While a level of vigorous internal debate is called for, the articles nevertheless are clear that maintaining unity is “an important expression of party spirit and moral fiber” (党性、品德 … 的重要体现) for “leading cadres, and especially high-level cadres” (领导干部尤其是高级干部). However, they also make clear that unity has its “basis” (基础) and “root guarantee” (根本保证) in democratic centralism.

The series is intended, at least in part, as a rebuke of Xi Jinping’s leadership style. Xi himself is mentioned in each article and is sometimes quoted, but only briefly, and only by the title “general secretary” (主席), with no additional epithets or descriptors. By contrast, other former leaders are quoted and praised. Two of the articles refer to Deng Xiaoping. One in particular praises his close relationship with military strategist Liu Bocheng (刘伯承) as an example to show that “whether a team works or not depends on the top two people” (班子行不行，就看前两名). The piece uses a language pun—that the term “comrades” (同志) comes from having a “common” (共同) “ambition” (志向)—to suggest that unity does not derive from a single person but rather a common goal under the ideology of the Party. Another phrase, which implies that Xi’s position today depends on the work of numerous others and advocates for listening to diverse voices, comes from a Qin dynasty advisor: “If Mount Tai does not accept small soil hills, how can it grow bigger? If the river and sea do not accept small streams, how can they become deeper?” (泰山不让土壤，故能成其大；河海不择细流，故能就其深). This is perhaps the closest the series comes to a direct critique of Xi. Mao is also quoted as saying that “the secretariat are the equals of the commission members” (书记是党的委员会中平等的一员)—a stark contrast with Xi’s Qiushi piece, which emphasizes Party-CMC unity but omits discussion of the necessity of avoiding a single decision-maker or the commission’s equal role.

This line of criticism signals a narrative shift from the period just before the purges and through their first wave. In speeches delivered in April and September 2023, respectively, Zhang Youxia and He Weidong discussed understanding and implementing various tenets of Xi’s ideological formulations. [4] However, as the second wave of purges began in late 2024, both leaders began placing greater emphasis on rooting out corruption and political loyalty, but with diverging undertones. In a speech given on January 10, 2025, He Weidong explicitly identified loyalty with adherence to Xi’s directives while calling for efforts to fight corruption (Xinhua, January 10). Soon after, Zhang made a similar speech but instead emphasized the need to “ensure obedience to party directives and loyalty to the Party” (进一步铸牢听党指挥、对党忠诚的政治品格) (Xinhua, January 26). In other words, Zhang focused on acting in accordance with the CCP itself, without mentioning Xi. These statements coincided with purges affecting leaders within Zhang’s and He’s circles, weakening the Shaanxi Gang and the Fujian Clique, respectively. However, the language used could indicate growing tension between senior PLA leaders and Xi Jinping as well as among PLA officers. While both Zhang and He have made public statements in support of anti-corruption campaigns spearheaded by Xi, Zhang Youxia’s remarks, in particular, appear to align with a sentiment espoused by the PLA Daily articles that emphasizes the importance of collective leadership in the Party over Xi Jinping’s personal authority.

Conclusion

The purging of PLA officials in Xi Jinping’s two bases of military support weakens his political power, irrespective of the intentions behind the actions of Zhang Youxia or any other CMC member. Zhang, for his part, is unlikely to attempt to rebel against Xi given the institutional culture of the PLA and his advanced age (China Brief, January 17).

When analyzing PLA discourse, much remains unknowable, and inferences are often speculative. Nevertheless, the developments hinted at in the PLA Daily series merit further investigation and careful observation for clues as to what may come next. At a minimum, it seems that Xi’s power over the PLA is far from absolute and that the PLA’s leadership is not monolithic. Instead, the PLA contains a collection of factions, each with patronage networks and their own interests, and these have the potential to come into conflict with each other and with Xi.

Notes

[1] The makeup of the CMC has changed since its unveiling in 2022. Former Minister of Defense Li Shangfu (李尚福) disappeared from public view in 2023. His replacement, Admiral Dong Jun (董军), has not been added to the CMC (nor has he been made a State Councilor). Dong was allegedly put under investigation in late 2024, while Miao Hua was dismissed in a new wave of anti-corruption probes, though his name still appears on the ministry’s website.

[2] Dong Jun received career assistance from Miao Hua, as did Southern Theater Navy Commander Li Pengcheng (李鹏程), who has since been sacked. For more on those in the PLA Navy who are supposedly under suspicion, see Erickson, Andrew S., and Christopher H. Sharman. “Admiral Miao Hua’s Fall: Further Navy Fallout?” CMSI Note 11 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 28 November 2024). https://digitalcommons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/11/.

[3] Jin Jiliang (金继亮), Wu Chenggang (武成刚), and Wang Jun (王军) have ties to the JLSF, while Wu Zhibao (吴之保) is from the Aerospace Force. The current commander of the JLSF, Wang Liyan (王立岩), once held a command within the Second Artillery Corps, the Rocket Force’s predecessor organization, and the former Rocket Force commissar Xu Zhongbo (徐忠波), once served in the JLSF (The Paper, May 31, 2015, August 7, 2018). Xu was one of the first to be caught up in the initial wave of purges targeting the Rocket Force (The Diplomat, January 3, 2024). The creation of the Aerospace Force following the dissolution of the Strategic Support Force directly followed the removal of the latter’s commander and space component commander during the first wave of purges (Lianhe Zaobao, August 3, 2023). Among the other authors of the PLA Daily series, Chen Qinghua is from the CMC Reform and Organization Office (中央军委改革和编制 办公室), Shao Tianjiang (邵天江) is a commander of a People’s Armed Forces unit in Henan Province, and Liu Huibin (刘会宾) is a staff writer for the PLA Daily.

[4] These include the “two establishes” (两个确立) and the “two upholds” (两个维护) and implementing the CMC Chairman’s “responsibility system” (席负责制) (People’s Daily, April 11, 2023; Xinhua, September 15, 2023). Note that the “two establishes” are:

• Establish Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the Party Central Committee and the core position of the entire Party; and
• Establish the guiding position of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.

The “two upholds” are:

• Resolutely uphold General Secretary Xi Jinping’s core status as the core of the Party Central Committee and the entire Party; and
• Resolutely uphold the authority and centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee.