Prisoner Exchanges and the Prospects for Peace Talks

Executive Summary:

• The timing of the recent prisoner exchanges between Russia and the West has reawakened notions of negotiating a ceasefire with the Kremlin, though Moscow has shown no willingness to accept Kyiv’s most basic terms.
• More likely, Russian President Vladimir Putin used the exchanges to signal to various operatives and “sleeper agents” that the risks of failure are low because the pool of Western and Russian hostages for future exchanges remains vast.
• Moscow may increasingly look to more desperate measures to feign readiness for negotiations, as replenishing the decimated “big battalions” is an increasingly difficult task in the face of a slowing offensive in Ukraine.

The timing of the unprecedented exchange of prisoners between Russia and the West on August 1 remains a difficult question. The final decision was most likely made in the Kremlin. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s red carpet reception of the released Russian spies along with an official honor guard leaves few in doubt of that (RBC, August 1). Most mainstream Russian commentary draws an implicit connection with the US electoral campaign and emphasizes presidential candidate Donald Trump’s objections to the deal (Izvestiya, August 3). Managing relations with Washington has always been a top priority in Moscow’s foreign policy, and Putin likely sought to make his mark on a wild and unpredictable month in US politics. The immediate resonance was strong, but it is nearly certain to be overtaken in a matter of days by other breaking news, particularly from the Middle East. The prisoner exchanges, nevertheless, have once again highlighted notions of peace negotiations for ending Putin’s “long war,” though the Kremlin’s willingness to negotiate on Kyiv’s terms remains nonexistent.  

The question of the exchange’s timing is linked with the hypothetical but intensely debated format of talks for ending the long war in Ukraine. Dmitry Peskov, long-serving spokesperson for Putin, asserted that such talks were an “entirely different matter,” which may very well mean that this link does in fact exist (Interfax, August 2). Some “military-patriotic” pundits, who advocate for continuation of the war until a decisive victory, express worries about clandestine preparations for a “treacherous” ceasefire (TopWar.ru, August 1). More insightful experts argue that Putin’s irreducible ambitions for annexing more territory and subjugating Ukraine leave no space for compromise. Thus, his “flexibility” in arranging the prisoner exchanges is merely a tactical move camouflaging preparations for escalating hostilities (Carnegie Politika, August 1).

The resumed exchange of prisoners presents an ambivalent sign that some might see as Moscow’s attention to the humanitarian element of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s “peace formula.” Since May, about a hundred soldiers from each side have been returned home (Forbes.ru, July 17). Letters from prisoners of war, many hundreds of which are still in captivity, as well as bodies of fallen soldiers are now also being exchanged regularly (Vedomosti; RBC, August 2). The United Arab Emirates acts as the main conduit for these arrangements. For its part, Türkiye played a key role in facilitating the recent exchange of prisoners, which took place at the Ankara airport. Both states indicate their readiness to provide mediation services for peace talks (Interfax-Ukraine, August 2). Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan fancies himself peacemaker, but the chemistry in his personal relations with Putin has soured due to trade disputes between Ankara and Moscow and the approval of a free-trade agreement with Ukraine on August 2 (Svoboda, July 31; Forbes.ua, August 2).  

This diplomatic maneuvering is completely detached from the high-intensity trench battles at the front. Russia continues to push in several tactical directions, focusing particularly on Pokrovsk to the northwest of previously captured Avdiivka (see EDM, July 24; Meduza, August 3). Russian command continues to exploit to the maximum its readiness to accept heavy casualties in exchange for every square kilometer, while the Ukrainians desperately try to avoid unnecessary losses (Republic.ru, July 31). Replenishing the decimated “big battalions” is an increasingly difficult task, however, and Russian authorities are thus being compelled to raise the bonuses for signing military contracts many times above the average annual salary (see EDM, July 29, BFM.ru, July 31). Every new soldier’s value for society has in turn grown. When the new units arrive at the front,  however, the Russian command treats them as an entirely expendable material (The Moscow Times, July 29).

The Russian High Command is most worried about a shift in the balance of military capabilities with the arrival of the first squadron of F-16 fighters to Ukraine (Novaya Gazeta, August 1). For several weeks, the Russian Air Force has been stockpiling Kh-101 long-range cruise missiles to deliver a concentrated strike on air bases in western Ukraine. Air bases closer to the front are being targeted by shorter-range Iskander ballistic missiles (Nezavisimaya Gazeta; Rossiiskaya Gazeta, August 1). The initial task of the F-16 squadron is expected to be the interception of Russian missiles jointly with the MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air batteries. The deployment of several more squadrons later this year will make it possible to fly missions targeting Russian military bases in occupied Crimea and deeper in Russian territory (Izvestiya, August 2).

The pattern of combat operations in the long war will remain fluid. The war’s outcome is inevitably determined by the volume of resources the two sides are able to mobilize for sustaining the fighting (Svoboda, July 31). Western support for Ukraine has continued on a level that the Russian leadership never expected, and Russia’s own economy is struggling with the pressure of war demands (see EDM, April 3, June 26; The Moscow Times, August 1). Elvira Nabiullina, governor of the Russian Central Bank, has declared that the unprecedented overheating of the economy has been the main cause for raising the interest rate hike from 16 to 18 percent last week (RBC, July 26).

Nabiullina is one of only a few officials who can give Putin the real picture of the current situation. It is unclear, however, whether he is listening or rather counting on what he perceives as growing “Ukraine fatigue” in the Western coalition (Kommersant, August 2). The Kremlin leader’s window for entering negotiations from a position of strength is narrowing as Ukraine’s capacity for regaining the strategic initiative is growing. He may yet again overestimate the scope of the presumed advantage, and converting that into political gains will likely require meaningful compromises. Even some of Russia’s closest partners, including China, are yet to see any signs of readiness in the Kremlin to curtail Putin’s imperial ambitions (Carnegie Politika, August 3). 

The exchange of prisoners necessarily involved compromises from all parties. However, interpreting the action as an indication of Putin’s reckoning with the reality of his disastrous war requires a stretch of wishful political thinking. More probable is his intention to escalate the “hybrid war” against the West by signaling to various operatives and “sleeper agents” that risks of failure are low because the pool of Western and Russian hostages for future exchanges remains vast (see EDM, April 23). Zelenskyy can count on new Russian transgressions of the norms of international behavior for boosting the appeal of his proposal for a new peace summit, but prospects for real peace will still require difficult collective work to defeat Putin’s aggression.