Public Opinion in Russia Falls as Citizens Experience Reality of War

Executive Summary:

• Despite fear of punishment for voicing opposition and the Kremlin’s aggressive propaganda, public support for its war in Ukraine has waned, especially as those returning from the front expose the reality of the conflict.
• Research indicates that Russians increasingly prioritize regional issues over the war. A “gray zone” of apathetic citizens could potentially shift their views as personal and regional challenges outweigh nationalistic propaganda.
• This shift in focus could lead to a future de-imperialization of Russia, as more people focus on how their personal lives have been affected by the Kremlin’s actions.

On September 9, the acting secretary of the ruling United Russia Party general council, Vladimir Yakushev, reported that 308 participants of the “special military operation” running his party were elected to public office during Russia’s 2024 regional and local elections (T.me/tass_agency, September 9). Independent election watchdog Golos, however, reported that it received more than 600 reports of violations during the election, most of which came from Moscow (Golos; The Moscow Times, September 9). The Kremlin aims to use veterans from its war of aggression against Ukraine as pawns to promote support for the war through the patriotic glorification of its participants (see EDM, March 13). 

Today, many observers believe that the majority of Russians support the war against Ukraine. The Kremlin’s imperial propaganda wields remarkable influence on Russian citizens. This may seem surprising for a country that underwent democratic perestroika, which culminated in the 1990 press law that abolished all censorship (Svoboda.org, August 1). Contrary to the optimistic expectations of information society theorists of the 1990s that the Internet would promote democratization, television remains the main source of information for most Russians. Television, however, is now dominated by heavy propaganda intended to indoctrinate individuals into believing in the Kremlin’s cult of a “great [Russian] empire” (Gorby.media, July 25). This partially explains why respondents today are often afraid to answer sociologists’ questions, especially about the ongoing war in Ukraine. An “incorrect” answer may entail criminal liability under the law for “discrediting the Russian army” (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 30, 2022). Because of this, it is impossible to know if accurate sociological studies are even possible in conditions of war and dictatorship. Any data collected on the public’s opinion about the war in Russia will almost certainly be skewed by Russians’ fear of consequences for saying anything against the Kremlin.

This past summer, the Public Sociology Laboratory—considered a “foreign agent” by Moscow—published the results of its research on public opinions on the war in three regions of the Russian Federation: Sverdlovsk oblast, the Republic of Buryatia, and Krasnodar krai. The sociologists in question used qualitative rather than quantitative methods for collecting their data. Instead of direct questions, they conducted “deep interviews” based on informal communication in different groups. This methodology, however, did not reveal anything particularly new. When the topic of war arose, many respondents avoided it or refused to answer at all (Svoboda.org; Public Sociology Lab, July 8; see EDM, July 30).

Nevertheless, the Public Sociology Laboratory’s research did show two indirect, but relatively positive results. In many regions of the Russian Federation, militaristic propaganda has ceased to captivate the public en masse over the past year. In the absence of direct protest against the war, which is punishable by law, public support of the “special military operation” has significantly decreased (see EDM, April 1). Many sign military contracts for financial reasons, as opposed to “patriotic” conviction, as it is simply impossible to earn large sums of money in civilian life in many regions (see EDM, August 7). Additionally, those who have returned from the war in Ukraine often tell their fellow countrymen about the realities of the front, which radically differs from the “victorious” depiction on television (see EDM, January 19, July 29). The previously voluntary mass displays of Z-symbols are disappearing almost everywhere (Euronews, May 18, 2023). In ordinary life, the war is simply avoided as a topic of conversation altogether, much less glorified. 

The second important result gained from this research is evidence that Russians would prefer to discuss their own urban and regional problems, rather than “all-Russian” topics which inevitably connect back to the war. This desire to focus on local affairs hints at the prospect for a future de-imperialization of Russia. According to sociologists, people are more likely to justify their own inability to change the current situation in Russia, rather than defend the war (see EDM, February 29; Istories.media, July 11). As surveys show, principled supporters of the war and their opponents constitute a social minority in Russia, while between them, there is a large “gray zone” whose sentiments, although influenced by propaganda, may gradually change (Public Sociology Lab, July 8).

Lev Gudkov, head of the Levada Center (a “foreign agent” organization that conducts sociological research), stated that 82 percent of Russians do not have an understanding of what the Kremlin is trying to achieve in Ukraine. In part due to this, many have no idea what to expect going forward and thus how to plan for that future. To that point, according to the Levada Center, half of Russian citizens today do not look further than the next three months (Gorby.media, March 27).

The “special military operation” against Ukraine has effectively stalled, with Russian troops having attempted unsuccessfully to capture small towns in the Donetsk region for months. Under these circumstances, the government may announce a new mobilization, which will undoubtedly change many people’s plans (see EDM, January 22, August 14). Additionally, the war has returned to Russia itself, and many have begun to fear attacks by Ukrainian drones, which are now capable of reaching even remote regions (Focus.ua, August 22; Kyiv Post, September 9). This makes planning for the future even more challenging for the average Russian citizen.

According to sociologists from the ExtremeScan group, which conducts research in border regions, the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk oblast could lead to a significant reassessment of the war by Russians (see EDM, August 14, 15, September 3; ExtremeScan, August 16). The mass evacuation of the local population, often without the support of the Kremlin, will inevitably reduce the level of loyalty from Russian citizens. It is already the case that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine and subsequent transition to peace negotiations are supported by 52 percent of those who were forced to leave the Belgorod and Kursk oblasts (The Moscow Times, August 19).

Even the official All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion admits that during the Kursk events, Putin’s ratings fell by 3.5 percent (Svoboda.org, August 24). Of course, according to pro-Kremlin sociologists, support for Putin still exceeds 70 percent, but developments could lead to a much more significant fall. This happens to all dictators who begin to suffer defeats in the wars they themselves unleashed. As the long war continues and more Russian citizens experience its effects, future results collected by sociologists about everyday Russians’ opinions regarding the war may become more truthful. This will be all the more true as the already harsh reality of life in Russia becomes harder to ignore and Russians’ discontent with the negative impacts of the Kremlin’s actions grows.