Putin Uses Victory Day Spectacle to Mask War Fatigue and Court Partners

Executive Summary:

• Celebrations for the 80th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War were used to reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin’s personal authority and militaristic agenda, recasting Russia’s war against Ukraine as a continuation of heroism from World War II.
• Ukraine rejected Putin’s three-day ceasefire initiative throughout the celebrations as a political ploy and instead invited Western leaders to Kyiv to reinforce European support for Ukraine’s war effort.
• People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping’s high-profile visit to Moscow emphasized strong PRC-Russia ties, but diverging approaches to their relationships with the United States expose underlying tensions between Moscow and Beijing.

The celebration of the 80th anniversary of Russia’s victory in the Great Patriotic War was designated as the main political event of 2025 in Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin ensured his centrality in ruling the state and society was duly illuminated. The propaganda machine was switched to the maximum volume, turning the sombre memories of tragic battles and painful sacrifices into a celebration of militarism (The Moscow Times, May 9). This was the fourth parade on Moscow’s Red Square since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and it maintained the policy of presenting the aggression against a close neighbour as a continuation of the heroic resistance against the German invasion. Public support in Russia for continuing the offensive operations, however, has dropped to just 30 percent (Levada Center, May 6). Some new aspects of Russia’s militarization were, nevertheless, visible, besides the presentation of the Geran-2 combat drones (modified from the Iranian Shahed-136 loitering munition), and they may indicate a forthcoming change of pattern in the deadlocked war (Meduza, May 9).

For once, Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s former defense minister, who outshone Putin in his resplendent uniform in the 2024 parade, was absent from the tribunes, despite still holding the position of Secretary of the Security Council and regularly performing delicate missions to Iran and North Korea (Tsargrad.tv, May 9). Current Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, in a plain black suit, did not cut an impressive figure at all, and neither did 70-year-old Army General Oleg Salyukov, the commander of the Ground Forces, who led the parade (Penza.AiF.ru, May 7). Putin has been more generous than usual this year with promoting colonels to generals, but he remains reluctant to reshuffle the top brass, including the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, 70-year-old Army General Gennady Gerasimov, who recently reported to Putin about the high performance of troops from North Korea in the Kursk oblast battles. This still did not earn them the right to march on Red Square (MK.ru, April 26; RBC, May 5).

The most significant novelty in organizing the Victory Day parade was Putin’s initiative on a three-day-long ceasefire in his war against Ukraine, which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy rejected as manipulation (Gazeta.ru, April 28). The Kremlin was so worried about Ukrainian drone attacks that satellite coverage and most internet connections in Moscow were shut down, disrupting city life far worse than any possible strike (Currenttime.tv, May 9). Zelenskyy refrained from any direct action and opted for responding with a political counter-strike, insisting on extending the truce for 30 days without any preconditions—and with precise reference to U.S. President Donald Trump’s efforts to make a “peace deal” starting with a month-long ceasefire (Forbes.ru, May 9). Putin is concerned about the growing irritation in the West about his excessive demands for Ukrainian territories. He gave an unusual statement for the media late Saturday night again suggesting direct talks with Ukraine in Istanbul to discuss the “root causes” of the conflict—North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement being the main of one—instead of a ceasefire that can only happen if Western military aid to Ukraine is halted (President of Russia; Rossiiskaya gazeta, May 11).

Another part of Zelenskyy’s response to the pompous celebrations in Moscow was inviting the leaders of France, Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom to Kyiv. This invitation was made in hopes of forging a common position not only on the ceasefire but also on the composition of the European forces that would guarantee the implementation of the yet-to-be-agreed peace deal (Svoboda, May 10). Russia remains adamantly against such deployment, and can only hope that European determination for peace will dissipate in the absence of a U.S. contribution. The presence of Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico at the parade in Moscow has been advertised as an important crack in the EU unity (Izvestiya, May 10). The plan for a coalition of the willing force remains a draft with many holes, but the plan for punishing Russian intransigence with harsh sanctions is better prepared and coordinated between the United States and the European Union, and multiple assertions by Russian officials that new sanctions would not make any difference betray worries about the accumulating economic distortions (Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 6).

The guest treated by Putin with the highest deference was the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) president, Xi Jinping, who came to Moscow not merely to attend the parade, but for a three-day visit. He was accompanied by an entourage of aids and correspondents of such size that the Kremlin protocol department was stretched to the limit (Kommersant, May 8). No flowery compliments to the unique strength of bilateral ties were spared by either leader. Their priorities, however, have been quite out of synch in recent weeks as Putin sought rapprochement with Trump, while Xi took a firm stance against the U.S. tariffs (Re: Russia, May 8). The U.S.-PRC talks in Geneva may defuse the tensions, but it is still essential for Beijing to ensure that the softening of Moscow’s anti-U.S. rhetoric is merely a tactical maneuver, which cannot reduce Russia’s dependency, apparent in Putin’s plea for more PRC investment (The Moscow Times, May 8).

One of Putin’s ideas for Russia-U.S. dialogue is new talks on strategic arms control (President of Russia, May 8). Xi has effectively blocked this avenue by making his “dear friend” sign a lengthy Russia-PRC statement on strategic stability, which condemns the U.S. “Golden (Iron) Dome” missile defense plan and the increase of defense expenditures in NATO, but omits any mention of nuclear tests (President of Russia, May 8; Kommersant, May 9). Xi found it opportune to mention the need for just and stable peace for Ukraine, implying that it should not be made on U.S. terms, and Putin’s renewed insistence on direct talks with Kyiv answers this wish (RBC, May 11).

The end of the self-glorifying festivities leaves Putin facing the need to make a disagreeable decision on the ceasefire, without which the negotiations in Istanbul are certain to produce an instant fiasco. His game of playing on multiple disagreements between the United States, Ukraine, and the Europeans is cancelled by their newly forged unity centered on the demand for terminating the hostilities, and his demonstrated closeness with the PRC is set to strengthen this Western consensus. Ukraine will undoubtedly use the pause to regroup and resupply its forces. This is the least of Putin’s worries, however, shaped primarily by the fear of showing weakness and yielding to hostile pressure. The majority of Russians will rejoice with the prospect of turning a ceasefire into a longer armistice, but the question about what the war was really about is certain to be asked soon after the first collective sigh of relief.