Putin’s Degradation of Education Increasing Cynicism Among Young Russians

Executive Summary:

• The effect of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on Russian life is typically measured in terms of political opponents arrested, items in stores no longer available, or other “objective” figures. A more insidious and important metric, however, is its degradation of institutions.
• Nowhere is this degradation more apparent than in Russian schools, where Putin’s policies since February 2022 have fundamentally transformed the education of Russian children in ways that deeply impact children as they grow to adulthood and will be difficult to correct.
• Changes inside the Russian school system are extremely difficult to track, but a new study by independent experts suggests that the Kremlin’s insertion of propaganda in the curriculum may be having unintended results, producing increasingly cynical and alienated youths.

The Kremlin’s war against Ukraine’s effect on Russian life is typically measured in terms of political opponents arrested, consumer goods no longer available, and other “objective”  figures. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has contributed to the degradation of Russian institutions, however, in far more insidious and important ways. Nowhere is this degradation more apparent than in Russian schools, where Putin’s policies since February 2022 have transformed the education of Russian children, impacting youth development in long-lasting ways (see EDM, September 9, 2024, April 2). Changes to Russian schools are difficult to track, but a new study by independent, anonymous Russian experts highlights new education policies and suggests that Putin’s efforts are likely to have unintended consequences (Peremena School, September 2025).

The 16,000-word study, conducted over the last two years and focusing on changes from 2022 to 2025, is based on interviews with teachers and parents, as well as content analysis of online posts in a selected number of urban and rural settings (Peremena School, September 2025). This is the first study of its size about Russian schools since Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began. The study also carefully distinguishes between longstanding trends, such as the consolidation of schools, low wages for teachers, and aging facilities—which the full-scale invasion may have exacerbated but did not cause—and newer trends that the full-scale invasion sparked, such as tighter central control and curriculum shifts. The anonymous authors note that there has been significant resistance to these recent changes, illustrating the reactions of teachers, students, and parents. The study is valuable for those tracking Moscow’s goals and the sometimes unintended effects of its efforts to change the Russian education system.

The study’s main conclusions are the following:

After 2022, the system of school education in Russia was subjected to rapid institutional rearrangement. The changes have touched the content of programs, academic materials, rituals, and the balance between instruction and education, and between the classroom and extra-curricular activities. Instead of the relative flexibility of educational work in the schools before, a single ideologized program has been introduced, de jure voluntary but de facto obligatory … These measures were accompanied by a strengthening of control over the school as a space for the formation of attitudes and behaviors (Peremena School, September 2025).

As a result of these changes, the study states, “the psychological climate in the schools has also continued to worsen: conflicts between parents and teachers have intensified,” and both self-censorship and mechanical compliance in response to official demands have increased (Peremena School, September 2025).

Moscow has imposed new rules via direct orders and through regional officials, including increasingly detailed directives concerning what is to be taught and how. The Kremlin’s greater control over schools’ curriculum has reduced the hours devoted to traditional subjects. Putin is encouraging regime-aligned discussions of current politics and his war against Ukraine, using veterans to make presentations to the pupils (see EDM, August 18, 2023, February 13, 2024, February 20, May 28, September 24). Children of veterans now have greater access to better schools, invariably at the expense of the children of non-veterans. There is every indication that these trends will persist as long as Putin remains in power, which would have a profound effect on the future of schools and Russian society as a whole.

The independent Posle Media outlet covered this study, featuring an interview with a Russian teacher whose comments about what has changed in Russian schools since 2022 provide useful context for evaluating the study’s conclusions (Posle, October 8). Olga (no last name was provided) has been a social studies teacher since 2021, is an opponent of the war, and is appalled by many of the steps Putin has taken with respect to the schools and their relationship to broader Russian society. She feels, however, that the Kremlin may be producing unintended results, a pattern that gives her both hope and fear about the future.

Olga agrees with the report’s conclusion that “the war quickly affected the educational system” by “introducing essentially ideological ‘lessons’ and new patriotic rituals,” centralizing school management and limiting autonomy, and putting ever greater pressures on teachers (Posle, October 8). As Posle Media says, “learning about these changes from the media is quite different from experiencing this new reality firsthand” (Posle, October 8). Olga points out that teachers, pupils, and parents have all adopted strategies to cope with the new reality, ranging from passive acceptance to opposition, including making it clear that they are only doing what is required and are increasingly indifferent to the messages that the Putin regime is trying to convey. Teachers, she says, overwhelmingly go through the motions, sometimes subverting them with their comments. Many parents are quite prepared to have the schools bear more of the burden for inculcating values. Olga claims, “some parents just want their children to be somewhere and they do not particularly care about educational outcomes”  (Posle, October 8). The pupils can see all this, Olga continues, generating an increasingly cynical and even alienated population.   

“It seems to me,” the Russian social studies teacher says, “that the only lesson students are learning from their teachers’ behavior is that we must adapt to the situation and act as if we believe in everything. In other words, we simply must fake it” (Posle, October 8). If Olga is right, the Kremlin’s propagandized curriculum will produce an increasingly cynical and unengaged generation that will do what it must to survive but will not provide the kind of genuine support the regime would need in the event of a real crisis.