Rising Arctic Temperatures Threaten Russian Cities and Military Facilities in Far North

Executive Summary:

• The Russian North is negatively impacted by climate change at a rate that is three times faster than in the south. The thawing permafrost, faltering infrastructure, and isolation of the population centers and military bases in Russia’s North place additional requirements on Moscow as it attempts to sustain Northern Sea Route activities and its own Arctic ambitions.
• This problem has grown worse since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has forced Moscow to delay or cancel plans to repair and build more road and rail infrastructure in the North at a time when rivers in many parts of the region no longer freeze hard or long enough to serve as ice roads.
• These developments, in turn, have been exacerbated by the “Atlantification” of the Arctic, meaning Russia now faces greater competition, as the Arctic Ocean itself is ice-free longer each year, allowing foreign vessels to transit without relying on Russian icebreakers.

Temperatures in the Russian North are rising three times as fast as in other parts of the country, a development with enormous but as of yet not fully appreciated geoeconomic and geopolitical consequences. These changes are increasing the ability of other countries to transit the Northern Sea Route (NSR) without relying on Russian icebreakers. Critically, rising temperatures are thawing the permafrost underlying the whole region, in turn undermining and destroying the integrity of local infrastructure, including pipelines and airfields. Rising temperatures are also further isolating population centers and military bases, making it far more difficult for Moscow to exploit natural resources and sustain Russian dominance of the NSR and the country’s claims in the Arctic (see EDM, November 15, 2022, February 22, 2023; The Barents Observer, May 18, 2022; To Be Precise, September 22, 2023; TASS; RIA Novosti, September 11, 2024; The Moscow Times, September 12, 2024). While Moscow celebrates what it has achieved—and often even what it has not—the situation in the North is a quickly escalating problem for the Russian government (Window on Eurasia, January 10).  

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has forced Moscow to cut back and even cancel plans to build railways and highways in the Russian North (see EDM, February 22, 2023). At present, the region severely lacks sufficient road and rail infrastructure. Communities living in the North have instead traditionally relied on “ice roads,” which are formed when rivers freeze, for delivery of supplies and to transport ores of various kinds. Ice roads, however, can no longer be relied on because the surface of many waterways is not remaining frozen long enough or becoming thick enough to carry heavy trucks (see EDM, March 12, 2024; Nakanune, January 28, February 20; The Barents Observer, February 25). This issue is exacerbated by what some scholars are now calling the “Atlantification” of the Arctic. This refers to the influx of warm water from the Atlantic Ocean into the Arctic Ocean, which is itself caused by the increasing amount of sea ice melting in the Arctic from Scandinavia to the Bering Strait (Igor V. Polyakov et al., “Atlantification advances into the Amerasian Basin of the Arctic Ocean,” Science Advances. Vol 11, No. 8 (2025); The Barents Observer, February 25). This trend affects not only the ocean and global weather patterns but also the life of population centers and military bases in northern Russia’s littoral regions. 

In a growing number of places in the region, the only reliable means of transport is by air. This, however, is a serious limiting factor given the carrying capacity of planes, closing of airports in the region, and inadequate roads and rail lines connecting to them. As Sergey Sulyma, a Russia historian who specializes in transportation issues, points out, Russian officials like to brag that jet planes have reduced the time it takes to get from Moscow to Chukotka, located in the extreme northeast of the Russian Federation, to only eight hours (REX Information Agency, February 10). This claim omits the fact that it takes days or even weeks for passengers and cargo to travel to and from the airport in Chukotka because of the absence of year-round roads (REX Information Agency, February 10). These delays mean that the region is not reliably supplied with goods, which has unsurprisingly led to a slow but steady emigration out of Chukotka (see EDM, July 6, 2021; Nakanune, January 28, February 20). This trend, broadly mirrored across the Russian North, makes it almost impossible to maintain the development of natural resources, the maintenance of NSR-related search and rescue institutions or guidance facilities, or the support of military facilities Moscow needs to project power further into the Arctic.

Insufficient highways and rail lines represent only one example of the failure of the Russian government to support regional infrastructure in the North. Another problem involves pipelines. The shifting ground with the melting of permafrost has caused pipelines to fail, spilling their contents and even leading to their abandonment on occasion, as continuous repairs are too expensive. This means oil and gas recovered in the Russian North often does not reach the central areas of Russia where they can be used or exported. In turn, population centers and military bases in the Russian North do not receive a steady supply of the petroleum products they need. Russian officials have long been worried by this fact and in 2017 prepared a 900-page report detailing just how dire the situation had become (Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment of the Russian Federation via Web Archive, 2018; The Barents Observer, October 2, 2018; Window on Eurasia, October 2, 2018). There is no reason to think that the situation has improved since then, and every reason to believe that it has gotten worse as the topic appears to have become politically sensitive in Moscow. 

The impact of global warming on the Arctic Ocean and Russian littoral is especially great with regard to Russian military facilities in the region. Putin has an expansive plan to develop the Arctic seabed and has made claims to portions of the Arctic that are contested by other Arctic states. These claims remain under consideration at the United Nations vis-a-vis its Law of the Sea-mandated process (Window on Eurasia, August 25, 2022, December 27, 2023). Putin’s efforts to develop Russia’s military bases in the North in accordance with his Arctic aspirations have been largely constrained. This is due to the high costs and difficulties of transporting supplies to such facilities, on top of the problems which Russia is experiencing in shipbuilding for its Arctic Fleet (Window on Eurasia, January 19, 2022). Moscow has, as a result, cut back and sought cheaper means of projecting power by building low-cost drone bases and potentially exploring options to purchase ships from elsewhere (see EDM, July 6, 2021, April 18, 2024; , October 15, 2023, October 26, 2024).

As Russia’s Arctic territory continues to warm, the combination of its impact on the ocean and the littoral will only intensify. With less ice on the Arctic Ocean, more ships from other countries will likely make use of the NSR or regions adjoining it, creating a situation in which Moscow will feel even more threatened and prepare to be in a position to respond militarily (Window on Eurasia, August 6, 2024). With higher temperatures on land in the Russian Far North, however, Moscow will find it increasingly difficult to implement such a policy, given the unlikelihood of having either the necessary population or military bases in the region. Moscow will thus likely be inclined to adopt a more aggressive approach to any new international presence in the region, potentially by employing forces further from the Arctic itself (see EDM, May 30, 2024). Such a shift in Russian strategy and tactics will require corresponding shifts by others as the Arctic heats up—both literally and figuratively.