Rules for Thee, but Not for Me

Executive Summary:

• Beijing’s diplomatic rhetoric advocates upholding international rules and norms, but this diverges sharply from both its words to party officials at home and its actions abroad that undermine and violate international laws and institutions.
• Beijing benefits from an international order in which other powers are restrained by rules that it claims are biased and so chooses not to follow. This explains how Foreign Minister Wang Yi can both promise to “safeguard … the international system with the United Nations at its core” and reject inconvenient international rulings as “a political circus dressed up as a legal action.”
• Polls suggest Beijing’s rhetoric is resonating with other countries, as Beijing offers itself as a new partner of choice to provide stability in an uncertain world. Its actions instead suggest it intends to divide democracies and create more freedom of action for Beijing.

“We are ready to work with the international community, including Australia, to safeguard the victory in the Second World War and the international system with the United Nations at its core,” said Wang Yi (王毅), foreign minister of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), to Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong on February 21 (MFA, February 22). This is the latest statement over many years in which the PRC presents its foreign policy as reinforcing the international order that the United States and Europe claimed to uphold. However, Beijing’s status quo language belies the fundamental changes to the international order that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been pursuing. Beijing has benefited enormously from the international system to date, but especially when other powers are restrained by rules it claims are biased and so chooses not to follow.

Beijing’s Messaging Appeals to Partners

The Party’s political rhetoric appears to be resonating with other countries, as Beijing offers itself as a new partner of choice to provide stability in an uncertain world (The Economist, February 16, 2023; China Brief, February 28; South China Morning Post [SCMP], February 28). At the Munich Security Conference, one of Beijing’s best united front messengers, Wang Huiyao (王辉耀; “Henry”), emphasized the PRC’s ability to provide stability and possibly even replace the United States as a provider of global public goods (Center for China and Globalization [CCG], February 14). Wang even suggested cooperation in the automotive industry and electric vehicles, a sector in which European companies have steadily been losing market share and where the European Union has imposed tariffs to prevent PRC dumping (European Commission, October 28, 2024; CCG, February 15).

Since early 2017, Beijing has presented the PRC as a responsible power that upholds the status quo of the old international order. That message has often come from the very top. A survey of these statements shows that the Foreign Ministry is the primary messenger through Wang Yi, but Xi Jinping and his trusted aide Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥) also have given important speeches directed at Americans and Europeans (see Table 1 below). For example, Xi Jinping told the World Economics Forum in January 2017 that “We should adhere to multilateralism to uphold the authority and efficacy of multilateral institutions. We should honor promises and abide by rules” (CGTN, January 17, 2017). Later, Wang Yi told the China-France Strategic Dialogue “China adheres to multilateralism and supports the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core” (FMPRC, January 24, 2019). The refrain has continued to the present day. Last fall, Xi criticized European tariffs on electric vehicles at the 19th G20 Summit, saying, “We should press ahead with reforming the World Trade Organization (WTO) [and] oppose unilateralism and protectionism … It is important to avoid politicizing economic issues, avoid fragmenting the global market, and avoid taking protectionist moves in the name of green and low-carbon development” (FMPRC, November 19, 2024).

These words from the CCP leadership may be soothing to the outside world, but they diverge sharply from internally oriented words for the Party faithful that emphasize struggle and change (Xinhua, October 25, 2022). Here and with select partners, Xi has been clear for years about his desire to change the international system. In his first international trip as CCP general secretary in 2013, Xi told a Russian audience about the need for a “New Type of International Relations” that amounts to a fundamental restructuring of the values embedded in international institutions and the application of the CCP’s so-called “consultative democracy” on a global scale (China Brief, April 25, 2013). More recently, Xi’s speech at a study session of the Central Committee in 2023—which was reprinted in the 2025 New Year’s issue of Qiushi, the Party’s theory journal—repeatedly noted the challenge that the PRC’s development constitutes to the Western-centric order (Qiushi, December 31, 2024). This divergence in rhetoric suggests that the words of CCP leaders should not be taken at face value and that instead Beijing should be judged by its actions. However, there, too, it has consistently violated rules and norms that do not align with its preferences.

Rejecting International Order From the South China Sea to Washington, D.C.

One notable example of Beijing’s claim to uphold international law is in the South China Sea. In 2002, Beijing entered into a non-binding agreement, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations. This committed the parties to “universally recognized principles of international law” and noted “their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over flight above the South China Sea” per the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (ICNL, December 2002). Numerous statements repeat these broad commitments to international law as a fundamental part of international relations. Wang Yi’s 2020 statement that “to build a pattern of global governance, it is necessary to establish a sense of law” is emblematic in this regard, as are others from Xi and Ding Xuexiang (MFA, December 28, 2018, September 24, 2020, December 25, 2022; Xinhua, October 19, 2024, January 22; State Council, November 18, 2024).

Beijing’s behavior gives lie to these commitments. In 2016, a Tribunal established under UNCLOS found unanimously in the Philippines favor that the PRC had breached its obligations under no fewer than 16 articles of the Convention, was often “aware of, tolerated, protected, and failed to prevent” harmful activities, and “has not cooperated or coordinated with the other States bordering the South China Sea” to attempt to resolve them (PCA Cases, July 12, 2016). In 2024, the spokesperson for the PRC Embassy in Manila responded to a question about the ruling, characterizing is as “essentially a political circus dressed up as a legal action … China does not accept or recognize it, and will never accept any claim or action thereon” (PRC Embassy in the Philippines, July 13, 2024). Last year, the PRC Coast Guard escalated the confrontation with Philippine counterparts, leading to physical ship-to-ship altercations in which at least 8 sailors were injured powerful water cannons to damage Philippines supply ships (China Brief, June 21, 2024). The PRC has claimed areas like the sea around Second Thomas Shoal where these clashes took place as its own territorial waters. As such, it argues that freedom of navigation does not apply and that the Coast Guard can engage in so-called domestic law enforcement operations. Such aggressive and dangerous operations have continued in 2025 and remain in violation of international law (YouTube/Associated Press, February 1).

Other examples also reveal Beijing’s commitment to international order and global governance as a cynical effort to exploit the rules. In reality, its policies have capitalized on the restraint of other countries in areas like trade and international law. For instance, Wang Yi’s discussion of international cooperation in the auto sector is undermined by the PRC’s predatory, brute-force economics that have long been antithetical to the trading order (Texas National Security Review, March 3, 2023). Additionally, the PRC has used the World Bank to legitimize its mass repression in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region through vocational programs (CECC, August 23, 2019, April 11, 2022).

Conclusion

Beijing’s ostensible support for international rules and institutions that restrain the United States and European powers will continue to be a theme as long as the CCP leadership sees that the narrative has traction. Concerns about the Trump Administration’s inconsistency make the CCP’s status quo narrative seem soothing. However, American and European governments should not mistake these narratives for anything other than a wedge to divide democracies and create more freedom of action for Beijing.

On the same day that Wang Yi met with his Australian counterpart, the People’s Liberation Army Navy conducted a live-fire drill in international waters off the country’s east coast, without providing the customary 12–24-hour advance notice to the government (China Brief, March 11). This is as clear an illustration of any that, when analyzing PRC intentions, focusing on rhetoric is a poor a substitute for focusing on actions. The CCP’s rhetoric is not an opening for balancing between the PRC and the United States: it is a hollow facade to allow those unwilling to face the realities of PRC actions and the challenges it presents to persist in their inaction.

Mr. Mattis would like to thank Peace Ajirotutu for research assistance and formatting of the table.

Table 1: Selected CCP Leadership Statements on the International Order (January 2017–February 2025)