Russia and Ukraine May Agree to Ceasefire in 2025, but Peace Not Guaranteed

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(Source: General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces)

Executive Summary:

  • The last year of Russia’s war in Ukraine saw a number of turning points, including both Ukraine’s invasion of Russian territory and its massive drone attacks on Russian facilities, as well as an expansion in Russian aggression.
  • Many in Kyiv, Moscow, and the West are discussing a potential ceasefire in 2025.
  • There are clear signs that such a ceasefire will not bring peace, and both sides will use any breathing space obtained by a truce to build up their military capabilities.
  • Russia will use a ceasefire to bolster its military capabilities because its ambitions go far beyond the seizure of Ukrainian territory. Ukraine will prepare militarily because Russia will remain an existential threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty.
  • In 2025, political scrambles and potential military actions by all parties involved are expected as Russia tests Kyiv and the West while Ukraine prepares to counter Russian threats, even if the guns fall silent.

Over the course of 2024, both participants and observers of Russia’s war on Ukraine have frequently changed their assessments of its likely outcome. Some once predicted the victory of one side, then shifted to predicting the triumph of the other, only to reverse themselves again at a later point (see EDM, January 16, July 1). This behavior, of course, was on view even earlier in the conflict (see EDM December 13, 20, 2023, January 28.) On the one hand, this pattern reflects changing definitions in Kyiv and Moscow as to what victory would look like (Window on Eurasia, September 1). On the other hand, these shifting assessments are the product of major changes in the performance of the two forces on the battlefield, the domestic situations the two countries find themselves in because of the war, and the changing constellation of forces in the international system. As the war heads into 2025, however, a consensus is emerging that some kind of agreement that will end the fighting can and will be reached in the coming months (The Moscow Times, December 6; Gazeta.ru, December 7).

The evolution of the war during 2024 strongly suggests that achieving even a mere ceasefire would be extremely difficult. Likewise, any accord that does emerge will be, at most, a truce rather than a peace. Both countries would use a ceasefire to rebuild and expand their forces. Russia will do so because President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine has always been about a greater conflict with the West (Window on Eurasia, September 1, November 10). Ukraine will do so because Russia will remain an existential threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty unless Moscow is fundamentally transformed, something that may not happen anytime soon (The Moscow Times, December 5). Kyiv will have an interest in pursuing a truce—especially if, given the sad history of Western security guarantees beginning with the Budapest Memorandum more than two decades ago, the West does not offer it membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (see EDM, September 24, 2009, March 10, 2014; Window on Eurasia, November 15, 2022).

Consequently, Moscow and Kyiv will try to present any such agreement as a triumph that will guarantee “peace in our time,” something they and their propagandists can be counted on to do. There is every reason to believe that 2025 will be marked both by political scrambles involving all the relevant international parties and by major security moves by Russia and Ukraine, even if the guns fall silent along the front. A ceasefire will in all likelihood result in many assuming that the conflict is over. This assumption would be fundamentally incorrect, as the duration of the truce would be used by Moscow to test the West’s resolve in Ukraine and elsewhere. Similarly, Kyiv would necessarily spend the time preparing to defend itself against future Russian attacks—something made all the more likely by the dwindling military assistance it is expected to receive.

The most important change in 2024 has been the scaling back of both sides’ definitions of victory. For Putin, the war in Ukraine has always been part of a larger campaign against the West, but it became increasingly apparent over the last 12 months that he is currently more interested in inflicting a massive defeat of the West in Ukraine than full territorial annexation (Window on Eurasia, September 1, November 10). The Kremlin may have even come to recognize that absorbing all of Ukraine would be counterproductive (Window on Eurasia, March 17, 2022). Extracting concessions from the West about what it will and will not do for Ukraine—including promises not to provide Kyiv with arms, admit it to NATO, or continue sanctions against Russia for its aggression in Ukraine—is now more important to the Kremlin leader than simply gaining territory.

In achieving these goals, Putin would show the world and the Russian people that he has the power to compel the West to concede. That will, in turn, impact both the former Soviet republics—which Putin believes should be part of a Russian sphere of influence—and countries further afield. Simultaneously, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy concedes now that Kyiv will not be able to retake all the territories Russia has seized since 2014 by force of arms and will require time to recover from the Russian onslaught (RG.ru, December 9). Consequently, some offer of a security guarantee from the West and the chance to further strengthen Ukraine’s defense establishment with Western help would constitute a victory for Zelenskyy at this point.

If these shifts have changed the underlying negotiating positions of the two sides, developments on the front and the expansion of what constitutes “the battlefield” have also changed what is likely to occur in 2025. The quality and rapidity of such changes, however, are a reminder that those who expect the future to be a continuation of current trends are likely to be disappointed. In 2024, Ukraine promised a major counterattack but did not carry it out. Instead, it radically expanded its drone attacks on facilities in Russia and even invaded Russia’s Kursk oblast (see EDM, August 14, 15). Moscow threw enough forces at the frontlines to block the much-ballyhooed Ukrainian offensive, recover about half of Kursk’s territory occupied by Ukraine, and continue its advance into Ukrainian areas. The Russian offensive proceeds slowly and at great cost in terms of life and treasure, and their forces have shot down many, but far from all, Ukrainian drones targeting Russian territory (The Kyiv Independent, November 11). As each of these events occurred, many commentators in Moscow, Kyiv, and the West shifted their predictions about the future, though these predictions were then compelled to change again as the war progressed.

Behind these changes on the battlefield, larger and potentially more important domestic changes have occurred in the two countries most directly involved. In Russia, Putin continues to enjoy public support for his war. Evidence suggests that said support is more broad than deep, with most Russians prepared to say they back Putin’s actions, but ever fewer willing to sacrifice anything in support of the war (see EDM, September 10). As a result, the Kremlin has worked hard to treat the war as distant as possible from the concerns of ordinary Russians. In 2024, for example, Moscow was unable to conduct a general mobilization because of popular opposition and the risk of a new emigration by the country’s military age population. Instead, the Kremlin has been forced to pardon criminals who agree to serve, offer ever larger bonuses (several times the average yearly wage in most regions) to get men to sign up, and bring in foreigners to fight its battles (see EDM, October 24). The war has come home and is now affecting ordinary Russians’ daily lives. Money that previously went to social programs is being reallocated to military ones, inflation is rising, and many goods are no longer available because of sanctions (see EDM, October 3, 21).

The Ukrainian advance into Kursk oblast and the increasing number of drone attacks deeper into Russia and on Moscow itself has brought the fighting to everyday Russians’ doorsteps. The return of Russian men in coffins, the appearance of ever more former soldiers disfigured by war ds on Russian streets, and the rising number of otherwise-healthy veterans with PTSD and other psychological conditions may affect Russian society the most (Window on Eurasia, November 23; see EDM, January 19, July 16, 24, November 19, 27). The longer the war goes on, the greater the effects of all these factors will be—and the more problems Moscow will have with a population that is increasingly divided about the war. The Kremlin fears these effects’ influence on the war’s popularity will persist, making it harder to ignore how many sacrifices have been made with less to show for them than Russian propagandists suggest (Window on Eurasia, December 3).

Ukraine also faces a series of internal problems, including but not limited to difficulties raising enough troops, war weariness, and damage to property, particularly housing and hospitals. The rising number of deaths due to the war and emigration exacerbated by the conflict are both intensifying the country’s demographic decline and causing difficulties in many sectors of the economy. While these get less attention abroad than the difficulties Russia faces (except in Russian media), they too contribute to issues within Ukrainian society (see EDM July 18, October 18; Window on Eurasia, July 28).

The changing international environment is also having a greater impact on the war than it has previously. Widespread war weariness exists in many Western countries. This has helped power the rise of right-wing populist governments that are more isolationist than their predecessors and willing to defer to regional hegemons such as Russia—especially if they see economic advantages for themselves in doing so (Ukraina.ru, December 8). The election of Donald Trump as US president is part of this trend, as he has pledged to end the war in Ukraine quickly and restart relations with Russia, even if such a move would require putting enormous pressure on Kyiv. For Ukraine, this might mean threats of a major scaling back in or a potential end to US assistance entirely. European countries are trying to devise ways to assist Ukraine if this comes to pass, but given the continent’s problems, it is uncertain whether they have the ability and/or will to do so (The Kyiv Independent, November 18). These changes have sparked hopes in Russia and fears in Ukraine that the West, in general, and the United States, in particular, will seek a settlement in Ukraine to allow for a drawdown of Western efforts.

Even with all these developments, reaching a ceasefire will be difficult. Working to ensure that such an accord will, in turn, lead to peace appears to be harder still. The first step toward a ceasefire, the shift in international conversations from total victory or defeat toward cries for ending the bloodletting and sanctions, has already occurred. That being said, as the most thoughtful Russian commentators have noted, Putin is not currently compelled to seek a ceasefire. He has enough resources to continue his war on Ukraine for a long time. In the words of social and economic analyst Sergei Shelin, Putin certainly does not want a truce with Kyiv “but might agree to one” for several reasons: the war is costing more than expected, his imperialism is increasingly at odds with the nationalism of the Russian people, and the population itself is tired of war (The Moscow Times, December 6). Consequently, Putin has the ability to drag his feet, hoping the West will make more concessions to Moscow and force Ukraine to go along with them. After all, the Kremlin leader knows that he will be able to present almost anything he ultimately gets as a Russian victory (Kasparov.ru, December 2). Putin also is aware that once a ceasefire is in place, the West is likely to redirect its attention elsewhere. This would make it easier for Putin to conduct additional activities across the former Soviet space and, more generally, rebuild his military capabilities.

This is precisely what policymakers in Ukraine fear and why Kyiv will cautiously approach any talks about a ceasefire, even if there is a desire to bring an end to the war. More than that, precisely because the West appears so ready to make concessions to Moscow and is so reluctant to provide credible security guarantees to Kyiv in the form of NATO membership—a deal killer for Moscow—Ukraine is certain to be forced to consider how it can defend itself in the future (see EDM, July 18, August 6, 7, 14 [1], [2]). This would necessitate strengthening its already powerful drone industry, building up its armed forces, and potentially developing nuclear weapons. That final step is far more unlikely, regardless of Russian propaganda around the possibility of Ukraine re-joining the nuclear club (see EDM, July 8, October 8, November 8, 13, 21). Kyiv will have an interest in expanding the portion of its arsenal that is domestically produced   to avoid being subject to a Western veto over how its weapons are used, something that has been a problem up to now (see EDM, June 4).

No shortcut to peace between Russia and Ukraine exists, and a rapid pursuit of a ceasefire by the West in pursuit of peace could backfire, raising the risk of an even larger conflagration in the future (see EDM, October 21). Some Russian commentators are already warning about such a possibility (T.me/dimitriy_savvin, October 31, reposted at Kasparov.ru, November 11; Izvestiya, December 9). Western policymakers’ have feared that offering NATO accession to Ukraine risks Russian escalation. On the contrary, a willingness to make concessions in the pursuit of peace could make a broader war with Russia more likely.