Russia Cannot Find Peace While Operating as an Empire

Executive Summary:

• The breakdown of Russian-Ukrainian peace negotiations in Istanbul highlights Moscow’s uncompromising demand to annex four Ukrainian regions. Despite lacking full control, Russia insists on its complete annexation, demonstrating its imperial pursuit of territorial expansion.
• Russia’s disregard for Ukrainian sovereignty and international agreements signals a broader threat to neighboring states. If Ukraine falls, countries such as Moldova, Poland, and the Baltic states could be next, undermining regional stability and international law.
• President Vladimir Putin continues reviving Russia’s imperial identity through authoritarian governance and expansionism. Systemic reform, shifting from a centralized empire to a genuine federation, could transform Russia from imperial pursuits and redirect its focus to addressing internal problems.

The breakdown of the first round of Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul on May 16 and June 2 occurred in large part due to Moscow’s insistence on claims to four Ukrainian regions (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson) (see EDM, May 19 [1], [2], June 3, 4). Moscow has not fully captured these regions, but it demands that they join Russia in their full administrative borders. Additionally, Russia continues to threaten to occupy the Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts (The Moscow Times, May 16; Radio Svoboda, May 24). There is a historical paradox here. Russia is already the largest country on the planet in terms of territory. Instead of developing its own regions, many of which are in economic decline, the Kremlin is pursuing a policy of external expansion (see EDM, April 28, May 13, 14, 15, 22). This is typical for an empire, where territorial expansion is more important than anything else.

In Europe, especially in the east, this problem looms deeply and acutely. If Russian President Vladimir Putin seizes Ukraine, he will inevitably move on to Moldova, Poland, the Baltic States, etc. (see EDM, June 3). This would be a violation of international law in relation to ​​mutual respect and observance of the territorial integrity of various states (United Nations, accessed June 4). Russia appeared to respect this principle when it recognized Ukraine’s borders in the Belovezh Accords of 1991 and when it signed the “Big” Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty of 1997 (Russian Presidential Library; United Nations, accessed June 4).

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 sparked a drive for the “rebirth” of national identity in various republics. Ukraine and the Baltic States then began to restore their statehood, founded in 1918. Russia’s leaders at that time, however, did not restore the Russian Democratic Federative Republic in 1918, proclaimed by the Constituent Assembly in the same year (Russian Presidential Library, accessed June 4). Instead, they moved toward the revival of the pre-revolutionary Russian Empire, with the Kremlin “tsar” at its center.

This historical restoration has led to many tragedies. In 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered troops to shell the Russian Supreme Soviet, which had declared Russia’s sovereignty in 1990 (President of Russia, October 3, 1993). In 1994, he began a colonial Chechen war, entirely in the style of the tsarist Caucasian wars of the 19th century (Novaya Gazeta, December 11, 2024). Notably, Chechnya did not sign the 1992 Federative Treaty and, accordingly, was not de jure part of the Russian Federation (Russian Treaty of Federation, accessed June 4). Chechnya did not vote for the Russian Constitution of 1993 either (Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation, December 12, 1993, web archive accessed June 4). The Kremlin, however, sent troops there with the official explanation “to restore constitutional order” (Novaya Gazeta Europe, January 6).

The system of Russian post-Soviet power itself began to be built on the principle of monarchical “succession.” Ten years later, the idol of democrats of the late 1980s, Boris Yeltsin, declared Putin, a former Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) officer and then-prime minister, his successor (President of Russia, December 31, 1999). Putin has been in power for over 25 years (2000–2008, 2012–present as president and 1999–2000, 2008–2012 as prime minister). This is a stark contrast to the situation in Ukraine. There have been seven presidents in the country in the post-Soviet years, each of whom was not a “successor” but rather an opponent of the previous one (Great Ukrainian Encyclopedia, June 19, 2022).

In general, post-Soviet Ukraine perceives itself as an ordinary European state with no territorial claims to other countries. Russia demonstrated its imperial essence back in 2014, however, when it illegally annexed Crimea and installed puppet regimes in Donbas. In reality, this war has been ongoing for 11 years already (Kuzio, “Crimea: Where Russia’s War Started and Where Ukraine Will Win,” July 8, 2024).

To this day, Putin refuses direct dialogue with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (President of Russia, June 4). The Kremlin claims that Zelenskyy is an “illegitimate” president, as presidential elections were not held in Ukraine in 2024 (TASS, February 5). Ukraine cannot hold elections under martial law (Ukrainian Constitution, accessed June 4). Putin, however, has been in power for 25 years and amended the constitution in 2020 to reset presidential terms, allowing him to potentially remain in power until at least 2036 (Interfax, January 15, 2020).

During the Soviet Union’s perestroika (перестройка) era, President Mikhail Gorbachev convened the leaders of all the then-Union republics for negotiations at the 1991 Novo-Ogaryovo talks in an attempt to work out a new Union Treaty (Gorbachev Foundation, accessed June 5). Today, however, there is no talk of any equal treaty to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. The main goal of the current Kremlin is the restoration of “historical Russia” (President of Russia, July 12, 2021; Posle.media, June 29, 2022). As a reborn empire, Russia appears to simply not recognize the real independence of its neighboring republics.

This is essentially an attempt to restore the pre-Perestroika Soviet Union, only calling it “Russia.” Vladimir Medinsky, whom Putin appointed head of the recent negotiations with Ukraine in Türkiye, is known for having written an imperial school textbook that absolutely denies any political agency of Ukraine (DW, August 9, 2023). This clearly demonstrates the frame of mind Russia’s negotiators had when entering into these talks. Unsurprisingly, neither of the meetings in Istanbul on May 16 and June 2 yielded any effective results (see EDM, May 19, June 3, 4).

As world history shows, such protracted wars seldom end with a return to the pre-war status quo. In addition to the general demand for peace, however, other developed federations, such as the United States and Germany, could demand that Russia comply with its own laws. If it calls itself a “federation” in its constitution, then its regions should receive greater autonomy and self-government. This would force Russia to spend its energy on internal development, rather than imperial expansion. Today’s Russia has effectively been transformed into a unitary empire, where all governors are appointed from Moscow (see EDM, April 9, 2014, November 20, 2017, September 19, 2018, May 9, 2022, April 28, May 22).

Such a transformation of Russia would be vital for the political subjectivity of Europe. It will be increasingly difficult to deal with an empire that openly threatens neighboring countries and promotes anti-European propaganda both within Russia and in the West. As a genuine federation, Russia would be forced to focus on its internal development to keep the current regions together rather than the pursuit of territorial expansion. This could allow Russia to be well-positioned to resume political dialogue and economic cooperation.