Russia Expands Nuclear Energy Influence in Southeast Asia

Executive Summary: 

• Russia is increasingly involved in Southeast Asia’s nuclear energy market, most recently vis-a-vis the signing of a new memorandum on the development of nuclear energy between Rosatom and Vietnam Electricity. 
•  Once established, nuclear energy cooperation creates long-term commitments associated with power plant maintenance, fuel supply, and dispensing. 
• Closer nuclear energy cooperation between Russia and Southeast Asian countries holds implications for Western sanctions policies.

On January 14, a subsidiary of Russia’s nuclear energy company, Rosatom, and Vietnam Electricity signed a memorandum on the development of nuclear energy (Interfax, January 14). At the same time, Rosatom’s director, Valerii Likhachev, announced the resumption of construction of the Ninh Thuận-1 nuclear power plant, suspended in 2016 (Izvestiya, January 15). Additionally, Russia plans to build a new research reactor in Vietnam, with construction scheduled to begin in 2027. This revitalization highlights Russia’s interest in expanding its Southeast Asian footprint to forge long-term relationships in power plant maintenance and fuel supply. Russia’s regional ties and more commitment-based relationships will impose new challenges for Western sanctions policies. 

Russia’s nuclear energy technology is one of its key foreign-oriented sectors, with numerous power plants under construction in countries such as Bangladesh, Türkiye, China, Egypt, India, and Hungary (Rosatom, January 23; see EDM, January 24). For Russia, the nuclear energy industry has been the hallmark of its capacity to outcompete foreign counterparts by offering one-stop-shop projects that include most, if not all, necessary stages of power plant construction, expedited licensing, and lucrative contractual terms. Such contracts are, by design, long-term and often last decades (TASS, August 26, 2024). Rosatom’s successes abroad are reflected in its foreign revenue, which since 2017 has reportedly doubled (Youtube/imemo_ran, November 28, 2023). In October 2024, Likhachev reported that Rosatom expected to receive $18 billion in foreign revenue for the year (Interfax, October 14, 2024).

In addition to market competition and revenue from export projects, Russia’s race to become the leading nuclear energy power is a source of national pride. Russian President Vladimir Putin regularly praises Rosatom’s overseas projects and has called them the “best in the world” in terms of technical sophistication and safety standards (TASS, November 28, 2024). Contracts with developing nations also neatly fit into the Russian government’s rhetorical alignment with the developing world and Putin’s claims of support for clean energy (Kremlin.ru, November 7, 2024). 

Much of Russia’s industry and state-owned corporations remain under Western sanctions. To date, Rosatom has avoided being sanctioned directly. Its subsidiaries, however, have been targeted, including Rusatom Overseas, Rusatom Arctic, Rusatom Additive Technologies, Rosatom Digital Solutions, Rosatom Microelectronics, and Rosatomflot (Interfax, January 10). In January 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department designated senior Rosatom officials, including Likhachev himself (U.S. Treasury Department, January 10). Despite the pressure of sanctions, according to the firm’s reports, it occupies eighty-eight percent of the global nuclear power plant market, with revenue for 2023 amounting to $16.2 billion ($4.4 billion up from 2022) (Rosatom, September 6, 2023). 

Southeast Asia is considered one of the fastest-growing and most attractive markets for Russian energy exports (Tsifrovaya Energetika, 2019). According to a 2024 International Energy Agency report, Southeast Asia contributes twenty-five percent of the projected increase in global energy demand by 2035 and is expected to exceed the European Union’s total energy consumption by 2050 (International Energy Agency, October 22, 2024). On an institutional level, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has consistently reaffirmed its interest in exploring nuclear energy cooperation with Russia. Numerous strategic-level documents, including the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) and the ASEAN-Russia Work Plan on Energy Cooperation for 2022–2025, identify nuclear energy as a focus area (ASEAN, October 28, 2021). 

Rosatom is strengthening its regional presence through various nuclear energy and technology projects. In Indonesia, it actively engages with national agencies and institutions to promote its small modular reactor (SMR) technologies. It also received recognition as the “Best Nuclear Technology Supplier” at a regional electricity provider exhibition, Electricity Connect 2024, where it served as a platinum sponsor (MKI, November 2024). In Myanmar, Rosatom is advancing an SMR project under a 2023 intergovernmental agreement. It is also involved in education, with Russian experts and Myanmar institutions partnering on training programs and science festivals to build local expertise.

Russia’s presence in the Southeast Asian market has been anything but linear. For instance, while Vietnam’s interest in nuclear energy can be traced back to 1963, the first agreement with Russia on constructing a nuclear power plant came only in 2010 and has been on hold since 2016 (BBC Russian Service, November 22, 2016). Despite the delays in construction projects, Rosatom continued to invest resources in Vietnam. According to Likhachev, between 2019 and 2025, it trained approximately 400 Vietnamese workers by employing them in the firm’s projects in other countries (Izvestiya, January 15). The new agreement puts Russia back on track to finish the construction of Ninh Thuận 1, which may lead to additional future projects in the region. 

Vietnam is not the only country in Southeast Asia with a long track record of nuclear energy cooperation with Rosatom. Almost all of the states in the region have nuclear energy ties with Russia, ranging from knowledge transfer and research institutions to power plant construction projects. Much interest in nuclear energy stems from the ASEAN’s goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 (ASEAN, June 8, 2021). 

(For an interactive version of this map, please see Flourish.studio)

The expanded nuclear energy cooperation between Russia and Southeast Asian states has several consequences. First, new long-term commitment-based relations in the region, with Russia playing a key role, will adversely affect Western energy providers. Second, the more countries use Russian nuclear technology, the more complex and consequential the decision to sanction Rosatom or any of its multiple subsidiaries will be. 

Western sanctions effectively stall nuclear energy cooperation initiatives at the development stage. New restrictions, however, may pose safety concerns once countries begin to rely on Russian services to operate and fuel nuclear reactors. Rafael Grossi, the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, noted that sanctioning Rosatom may have “negative consequences from the perspective of nuclear security, as it supplies fuel and provides services in many countries” (TASS, June 14, 2024).  

It is too early to tell whether Russia’s push for a greater market share in Southeast Asia will succeed. The local market remains highly complex due to a wide range of factors, including fragmented public opinion, safety concerns, and geopolitical tensions. Some countries in the region are still weighing their options while seeking alternative suppliers from Western countries. With Rosatom’s intensified dealmaking quest, however, Western companies may require robust government support for their projects to stay competitive.