Russia Looks to Target Achilles’ Heel of Western Economies on Ocean Floor

Executive Summary:

• Western officials have raised concerns about increased Russian naval and sabotage activity, which could potentially target the global underwater cable network vital for international communication, financial transactions, and trade.
• Russia’s specialized unit, the Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), possesses a significant fleet capable of deep-sea operations, including cable sabotage. Vessels from this fleet have been reported to lurk near critical cables in recent months.
• Moscow may use the threat of sabotaging underwater cables as a way to combat Western sanctions and gain leverage over those countries that provide security assistance to Ukraine.

On September 10, Nils Andreas Stensoenes, head of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, stated that he believes Russia will likely conduct more sabotage operations against European energy infrastructure because the risk level has changed as Russia’s war in Ukraine prolongs and the West continues to aid Ukraine (Evropeyskaya Pravda, September 11). Over the past year, reports have proliferated that the Russian Federation, along with increasing its military presence, is conducting intensive research on the underwater infrastructure of the Atlantic Ocean, potentially creating a threat to the global network of cables through which almost all Internet and financial traffic flows. Simply put, this complex of underwater cables ensures global connectivity. Any significant damage to this network would threaten global trade, military readiness, logistics, and Internet connectivity. According to various estimates, over $10 trillion in financial transactions, commercial payments, and trade operations occur worldwide every day. More than 95 percent of global communications are carried out through a network of approximately 500 cables laid across the world’s oceans (TSN.ua, February 22). The potential threat emanating from Moscow worries Western military and political leadership, who are highly dependent on the resilience of these communication lines.

The protection of underwater cables is a tactical mission for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with strategic implications for the functioning of its members’ national economies and security apparatuses. In recent years, NATO allies have identified several instances of suspicious activity around underwater infrastructure (see EDM, October 4, 2022). In April, Vice-Admiral Didier Maleterre, deputy commander of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command, stated, “Russians have developed a lot of hybrid warfare under the sea to disrupt the European economy, through cables, Internet cables, pipelines” (Unian.net, April 24). Additionally, concerns are growing that Russia may target underwater cables and other critical infrastructure to disrupt life in the West and gain leverage over those countries providing security assistance to Ukraine.

The special military unit at the Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research of the Ministry of Defense (GUGI) is the Kremlin’s primary tool for conducting such sabotage operations. GUGI has a significant fleet of surface oceanographic vessels, submarines, and marine submersibles, including those with nuclear engines. The missions carried out by deep-sea submarines are mostly classified (Topwar.ru, May 15, 2020). GUGI’s main base is located on the Kola Peninsula in Olenya Bay, which is covered with a network of boom barriers and sensors. Sea mines have also been installed in the area. Both GUGI ships and submarines can locate and destroy underwater cables, using deep-sea divers or operating remotely (The Barents Observer, June 15, 2023). Hypothetically, all underwater cables, at depths ranging from several dozen to 6,000 meters (~6,560 yards), are within reach of GUGI’s sabotage units.

Russian leadership places great importance on GUGI, continuing to fund this unit during the costly war against Ukraine. On August 30, 2023, a ceremonial event was held in Kaliningrad for the transfer of the vessel Evgeny Gorigledzhan—a reconnaissance vessel converted from the MB-305 sea tug of project B-92, built in Poland in 1983—for the needs of GUGI. Currently, at the Baltic Shipyard, a vessel for the “Almaz” project 22010 is being constructed. This vessel has been under construction since 2016, and its delivery is planned for the end of 2024. All GUGI vessels are equipped with deep-sea manned and unmanned autonomous underwater vehicles of the Rus and Consul types, which are built for the Russian Navy and can survey and classify sea bed objects  (Flotprom.ru, April 24).     

At sea, the Yantar and other GUGI vessels can disable their automatic identification systems (AIS), a short-range coastal tracking system, making it difficult to monitor their movements (The Barents Observer, June 15, 2023). Intelligence tasks of the vessels are linked to their frequent appearance and prolonged operations in areas where underwater cables pass. In October 2016, for about three days, the Yantar remained stationary at a point near Latakia, Syria, where the Turkish underwater communication cable Turtcyos-2 runs. The cable connects the Turkish province of Hatay with the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Then, the Yantar moved south to the coast of Lebanon, where it “hovered” near Lebanese Tripoli at a point above the Lebanese branch of the India–Middle East–Western Europe (IMEWE) international underwater communication cable (Bmpd.livejournal.com, October 12, 2016). After observing the Yantar, Western media widely discussed its capability to intercept and even cut such cables. In August 2021, the Yantar was spotted off the coast of Ireland, within the country’s exclusive economic zone, along the routes of underwater cables. As a result of this visit, the Irish Navy deployed its standby forces at sea (Antikor.com.ua, August 23, 2021).

In recent years, GUGI has demonstrated a growing interest in the Baltic and North seas. The Evgeny Gorigledzhan oceanographic research vessel is a frequent guest in the region. In October 2023, Jan Swillens, head of the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, stated, “Russia has an extensive program aimed at sabotaging offshore wind farms, gas pipelines, and cables” (Ghall.com.ua, October 22, 2023). Earlier, In 2021, a cable measuring 4 kilometers (2.5 miles) in length and weighing 10 tons disappeared on the floor of the Norwegian Sea at a depth of 2.5 kilometers (1.55 miles). The cable connected coastal monitoring stations with sonar and underwater sensors, which observe Russian submarines and ships leaving the Kola Peninsula. Therefore, it may become a target for sabotage, though the investigation into this case is ongoing (Cczy.livejournal.com, November 16, 2021).

Similar reconnaissance and sabotage operations can also be conducted by Russian deep-sea mini-submarines, which are also based at the GUGI base in Olenya Bay. These mini-subs have the capability of unlimited range delivery aboard two modified strategic nuclear submarines. They also possess the ability to descend to deeply laid sections of cables and disrupt their operation, either by destroying them or by connecting to them for data manipulation. One such vessel is the Losharik (AS-12). In late September 2012, this submarine spent 20 days collecting soil and rock samples at depths of 2,500–3,000 meters (~2,834–3,280 yards) to strengthen Russia’s position in the United Nations regarding the demand to expand its exclusive economic zone in the Arctic. During underwater research in the Motovsky Gulf in 2019, a fire occurred on the apparatus, resulting in the deaths of all 14 officers on board. The Kremlin reported this incident as “information belonging to the category of state secrets,” indicating that it was likely conducting dubious research (New Voice, July 3, 2019).

More recently, in June 2023, Deputy Head of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev openly confirmed the possibility of an underwater threat on his Telegram channel in June 2023. He stated that Russia has “no remaining moral constraints to refrain from destroying the cable connections of our enemies laid on the ocean floor” (T.me/medvedev_telegram, June 14, 2023). As Medvedev is a close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin, this statement drew attention across Europe and North America.

Russia is capable of conducting sabotage operations on underwater cables and has demonstrated its willingness in past years  (see EDM, October 4, 2022). The cost of such operations is very low compared to the expected effect, which is necessary for Russia to influence the West regarding sanctions and support for Ukraine. In recent years, Moscow has been actively exploring areas where underwater sabotage could occur. The war in Ukraine is depleting the reserves and capabilities of the Russian economy. Some forecasts suggest that 2025 could become problematic for the Kremlin in its ability to continue the war at the same level of intensity (Ukrainska Pravda, September 14). Underwater sabotage may indeed become a strategy for potentially alleviating some of the economic strain. The necessity for preventive actions to protect against Russian threats is already evident, and time is not on the West’s side.