Russia Prioritizes Icebreakers in Scramble for Arctic (Part One)

Executive Summary:

• Russia announced the new Project 22220 Chukotka nuclear icebreaker in early November, which is part of a new generation of icebreakers crucial for transforming the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic into a globally competitive transportation artery.
• Moscow sees the Arctic as a key geopolitical battleground, prioritizing natural resource access and security. Its advanced icebreakers enable year-round navigation, positioning Russia to challenge traditional trade routes like the Suez Canal.
• Russia’s recent icebreaker innovation reflects significant technological progress, bolstering its Arctic infrastructure and defense readiness. The integration of advanced weaponry and multifunctional designs in military icebreakers enables Russia to assert control and respond flexibly to Arctic challenges.

On November 6, Russia celebrated the launch of the fifth Project 22220 Chukotka nuclear icebreaker. Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the ceremony virtually, claiming that the launch of the new icebreaker signifies the superiority of Russian science and technology, providing an example of how the Russian economy should be developing. He added that the “materialization of [Russia’s] plans related to the Arctic territories and increase of trade along the Northern Sea Route [NSR] depends on the state and development of Russia’s icebreakers fleet” (Spb.vedomosti.ru, November 6). The new icebreaker’s launch demonstrates Russia’s determination to preserve and strengthen its position as the leading Arctic power. In Russia’s view, icebreakers should serve a dual purpose, securing Russia’s geoeconomic and geopolitical (with a visible tilt toward security) objectives.

The use of icebreakers in achieving geoeconomic objectives is primarily related to transforming the NSR into the world’s key transportation and trade artery to challenge existing transportation routes, such as the Suez Canal (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 12). While the NSR has some competitive advantages against the Suez Canal—the voyage is much shorter, safer, and cheaper—the main problem route is the adverse climate conditions, with the eastern part of the route being inaccessible for conventional cargo ships much of the year. Russian sources claim that Project 22220 icebreakers are designed to replace icebreakers of the previous generation and enable year-round transportation via the most challenging parts of the NSR. Specifically, Russian sources mention the following competitive advantages offered by an icebreaker of the new class (Vpk.name, November 8):

• Project 22220’s icebreakers are powered by two nuclear reactors (RITM-200), which allows them to reach a speed of 22 knots and effectively deal with up to three-meter (approximately ten-foot) layers of ice. Moreover, the new icebreakers are four meters wider (approximately 34 feet) than the previous generation, allowing them to create lanes for larger vessels such as the most recent liquified natural gas (LNG) carriers and oil tankers.
• Their design and construction allow these icebreakers to travel through low water levels. This enables them to operate in deep-sea areas, estuaries of Arctic rivers, and shallow coastal areas. They can operate in both the Arctic Ocean and Siberian rivers, a function that used to require the employment of other types of smaller icebreakers.
• The economic sustainability of these icebreakers, secured by the new type of nuclear reactor (RITM-200), enables them to operate on the same nuclear fuel for seven years. In contrast, icebreakers of the previous generation required a fuel change every four years.

By 2030, the Joint Stock Company United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC)—established in 2007 as a critical builder in Russia’s shipbuilding industry—will have constructed seven nuclear icebreakers for Russia’s state nuclear corporation, Rosatom. This will reportedly enable year-round transportation along the entire NSR, transforming the passage into a world-class transportation artery and a direct competitor of the Suez Canal.

Russia’s geopolitical interpretation of Arctic affairs is a key motivator for this project. Despite Russia’s official rhetoric—which is reconciliatory, frequently quite deceptive, and aimed at foreign audiences—analysis of specific issues and journals shows how the Russian intellectual community views the Arctic region primarily through the lens of geopolitical competition. An article published in specialized military journal Arsenal Otechestva discusses the struggle for Arctic resources and Russia’s place in the Arctic generally, consisting of five “circles” of countries and international organizations (Arsenal-otechestva.ru, May 4, 2023). These include:

• The so-called “Arctic countries,” including Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark, and Norway, which have direct access to the Arctic and have advantages in competing for Arctic resources;
• Near-Arctic states, including Iceland, Sweden, and Finland;
• International organizations consisting of Western countries (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, and Nordic organizations) that have recently become stakeholders in Arctic affairs;
• The United Nations and specialized subcommittees, including the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the United Nations Environment Programme, the International Maritime Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), that are not directly involved in Arctic affairs but perform the role of an arbiter in the region;
• Non-Arctic states represented by (unspecified) East Asian states and some European countries.

According to Russia’s logic, developments in the Arctic will be primarily shaped by rivalry between individuals and groups of stakeholders, meaning that the leading indicator of success is premised on the military capabilities of participants. One of the key tools that might have a decisive effect on the unfolding struggle for the Arctic and its resources will become icebreakers, especially those that can perform dual functions—transport and re-supply infrastructure—and perform certain types of military operations if needed. Russia can rely on several such icebreakers, including the Project 21180 Ilya Mutomets icebreaker (introduced in 2017), which became the first military icebreaker built for the Russian Navy in almost four decades, and the Project 21180M Evpatiy Kolovrat icebreaker, which entered service in July 2024.

In the next couple of years, two Project 23550 Arktika and one Yermak icebreakers will enter service—the latter being specifically commissioned by the Russian State Security Service (FSB) coast guard. These icebreakers will be equipped with the following types of weaponry and munitions:

• AK-176 76-millimeter naval guns; 
• 9K38 Igla man-portable infrared homing surface-to-air missile systems;
• Various types of heavy machine guns; and 
• Platforms for Kalibr and Uran missiles.

Russian sources also claim that Russia would use civilian icebreakers formally under the jurisdiction of the Rosatomflot to perform (para)military tasks and functions if necessary (Topwar.ru, August 4). The premier icebreaker of Russia’s military flotilla, however, is the Project 23550 Ivan Papanin, which went on sea trials in June 2024. This multifunctional vessel combines the functions of an icebreaker, tow, firefighting vessel, and warship. Due to its unique design and construction, it can operate both in the Arctic—it is capable of penetrating ice up to 1.7 meters (approximately 5.5 feet) in width—and in tropical climates. According to Russian experts, the icebreaker is equipped with Kalibr missiles with a 2,500-kilometer (1,600-mile) reach, and due to its design, it could host various types of military equipment. Russia plans to produce three analogs to Ivan Papanin vessels in the near future (Octagon.media, July 26).

Currently, Russia has a clear and undisputed competitive edge in its arsenal of icebreakers in the Arctic. This supremacy, however, might be somewhat diminished due to certain decisions taken by the Western coalition of powers, which will be discussed in part two.