Russia Responds to Kursk Incursion With Nuclear Exercise and Strategic Maneuvers in Belarus (Part 1)

Executive Summary:

• Since Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk oblast on August 12, the Kremlin has continued to delay its response, while Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has threatened further escalation if Ukraine does not halt its advances.
• Rumors indicate that Russia and Belarus may conduct joint exercises in response to the incursion, possibly involving tactical nuclear forces and establishing a layered air defense system.
• The upcoming joint military maneuvers are a standard form of covert concentration of strike and offensive forces for both diverting Ukrainian troops from critical directions and preparing a new attack from Belarusian soil against Ukraine.

Three months have passed since the beginning of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ (AFU) incursion into Russia’s Kursk oblast (see EDM, August 14, 15, October 21). Russian leadership seems to be in no hurry to respond to the Ukrainian military’s daring raid, if the transfer of a large number of formations from the front line to Donbas rather than Kursk is any indication (Rtvi.com, September 12). The Kremlin’s postponement of their declared deadline for liberating Kursk oblast from October 15 to February 1, with the establishment of a buffer zone on Ukrainian territory by February 25, 2025, also attests to this not being a top priority (RBC.ua, October 22). This postponement occurred despite Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov’s statements that such actions by the AFU cannot go unanswered, and it is not a question of “one solution,” back when Ukrainian troops first entered Kursk (RIA Novosti, August 26).

The Kremlin’s complex solution includes several measures to combat Ukrainian advances. The Russian government has arranged a counter-terrorist operation regime and formed a new regional troop grouping of soldiers in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts (RBC.ru, August 10; Kommersant, August 20). Russian forces have increased their already massive missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities, as shown at the end of August (Forbes.ua, August 26; Pravda.com.ua, August 27; Facty.com.ua, August 31; see EDM, October 16). The Russian response on the ground began the routine redeployment of more experienced formations, such as units of the 106th Airborne Division and the 155th Marine Division, to support their current counterattacks and upcoming counteroffensive operations and, most recently, the reinforcement of the Russian Kursk troops grouping with North Korean units totaling up to 12,000 personnel from the Korean People’s Army (Gazeta.ru, September 11; Unian, October 24, see EDM, October 30).

Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has been vocal about the AFU’s incursion, revealed additional retaliatory measures even when the Kremlin remained silent. Lukashenka threatened that if Ukraine does not stop its advance, sit down at the negotiating table, and accept Russia’s conditions, it will simply be destroyed as a result of a retaliatory escalation by Russia. The Belarusian politician made it clear how this escalation will play out, including the reopening of the “northern front” on Belarusian territory against Ukraine and the use of nuclear weapons by Russia. In both cases, however, he noted the undesirability of these steps. Lukashenka believes that neither Minsk nor Moscow is ready to increase the length of the frontline by another 1200 kilometers (745 miles) along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, which the Kursk raid itself has demonstrated. Additionally, the Kremlin’s use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine would leave Belarus and Russia even more isolated on the world stage, without allies and sympathetic partners, according to the Belarusian leader (President of Belarus, August 15).

Rumors suggest that the military departments of Belarus and Russia have already begun practical preparations for these actions despite Lukashenka’s cautious rhetoric. According to anonymous sources associated with the Belarusian military, in response to the Kursk incursion and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) activities near the borders of the so-called Union State, Minsk and Moscow may conduct joint military exercises on Belarusian territory (Belvpo.com, August 28). These would include maneuvers of the Russia-Belarus Regional Troops Grouping (RTG) and the third-stage expansion of the check of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear forces (see EDM, August 15). The exercises may include several preparatory steps, such as the transfer and deployment of the Russian contingent, including carriers of tactical nuclear weapons, Iskander missile systems, MiG-31K, Su-34, and Su-24M aircraft from the Russian side, and Su-25Ms, Iskander systems, and Polonez-M MLRS from the Belarusian side; the establishment of an echeloned air defense system, including S-400 Triumf, Tor, and Pantsir systems to protect the grouping of troops, strike systems with tactical nuclear weapons, as well as airfields; and the arrival of a Russian ground contingent in two to three battalions.

As a result, the total number of Russian troops located in Belarus is expected to initially be five to six thousand soldiers, with more coming later. Such a number of Russian military personnel is required since one missile group with tactical nuclear weapons must have at least two echelons of protection, a layered air defense system, and units of material and logistical support (Belvpo.com, August 20).

Rumors suggest a scenario reminiscent of February 2022, with another large-scale redeployment of Russian Aerospace Forces to Belarusian airfields. The airfields and depots for the placement of nuclear weapons prepared in Belarus allegedly make it possible to deploy the MiG-31K with a Kinzhal hypersonic air-launched ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead (Belvpo.com, August 28). Other anonymous sources affiliated with the Belarusian military claim that for the prompt delivery of troops and equipment, Russia will use proven railway routes, including  Smolensk-Orsha-Minsk, the main and most direct route connecting the central regions of Russia with Minsk; Bryansk-Gomel-Minsk, an important route for the transfer of troops to the southern regions of Belarus, directly adjacent to the Ukrainian border; Kursk-Gomel-Minsk, a route for the rapid delivery of forces from the southern regions of Russia; and Voronezh-Gomel-Minsk is a strategic route for transferring troops from Russia’s southern regions (T.me/belvestnik, September 4).

The independent Community of Belarusian Rail Workers has been tracking the covert preparations of the two countries’ railways for the deployment of Russian troops to Belarus via Belarusian railways since mid-May (T.me/belzhd_live, May 15). This indicates that the Kremlin had started to plan to reopen the “northern front” against Ukraine at least three months before the beginning of the Kursk incursion. Alexander Valfovich, the state secretary of Belarus’s Security Council, confirmed that Russia and Belarus are planning to conduct strategic maneuvers of the RTG on Belarusian territory next year (Oborona.ru, September 9).

Military insiders expect that the transfer of additional Russian troops to Belarus will begin at the end of 2024 and continue until the beginning of 2025 (T.me/belvestnik, September 10). Neither Russia nor Belarus is hiding that the RTG will be deployed in the southern operational direction, on the border with Ukraine, allegedly to prevent an incursion in the area of the Belarusian city of Mozyr (Belvpo.com, September 12). Russia will start concentrating its military forces by the end of this year under the guise of preparations for joint strategic maneuvers. In the context of the ongoing conflict with Ukraine, such exercises could aim to divert Ukrainian forces from critical directions (Donbas, Kursk, etc.) and prepare for a new invasion from Belarusian territory.