Russia Seeks to Reassert Influence in South Caucasus

Executive summary:

• Russia’s strategic interest in the Republic of Georgia has been reenergized as Tbilisi drifts away from the European path and abstains from joining Western sanctions against Russia.
• A fundamental factor in Moscow’s current view of Georgia is the former’s lack of effective leverage over Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, especially following the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the conflict zone.
• Any ceasefire or truce on the Ukrainian front, especially with potential Russian-Georgian normalization, could indefinitely protract the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace treaty.

The relationship between Georgian Dream, the Republic of Georgia’s ruling party, and Russia has come under intense scrutiny since the introduction of the bill “On Transparency of Foreign Influence,” the alleged violations and rigging in the recent parliamentary elections, and Tbilisi’s unilateral declaration to halt its accession process to the European Union (EU). The opposition has depicted the bill as “Russian law,” and the decision to halt EU accession negotiations as a deliberate act to derail Georgia’s European path and to bring it back into the Russian orbit (see EDM, June 21, December 6, 10, 2024). In contrast, Russian leaders and public figures have praised Georgian Dream’s controversial policies and laws (Civil.ge, April 18, 2024; Sakartvelosambebi.ge, November 24, 2024; TASS, December 29, 2024).

The renewed Russian interest in Georgia can be further understood in the context of the current state of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. Azerbaijan’s defeat of Armenia in the 2020 war in Karabakh ultimately led to a drastic weakening of Russian leverage over the region (see EDM, September 22, 2021, February 9, November 6, 2023). Although Moscow brokered the armistice between Azerbaijan and Armenia, it was not long before it became clear that Russian influence may be dwindling (Kremlin.ru, November 10, 2020). Frequent clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces and accusations against the Russian peacekeepers epitomized that (Armenpress.am, September 20, 2023). The 2023 Azerbaijani fighting offensive that removed remaining Armenian forces from Karabakh under the responsibility zone of the Russian peacekeeping contingent eventually resulted in the early withdrawal of the Russian peacekeepers (see EDM, April 22, 2024; Moscow Times, June 12, 2024). Several developments have occurred since then in a clear manifestation of Moscow’s declining role. An EU monitoring mission has been deployed in the Armenian territory along the conditional border with Azerbaijan (Consilium.europa.eu January 30; see EDM, March 11, 2024, January 16; Azatutyun.am March 20, 2024). The Armenian government has endorsed a bill to start the process of “accession to the European Union,” and the parliament is expected to adopt the bill soon (Armenpress, January 23; Azatutyun, January 24; see EDM, January 28). Additionally, Yerevan and Washington have signed a Strategic Partnership Charter (Armenianweekly.com, January 15).

Azerbaijan continues to reinforce what it has long termed as “independent foreign policy” and, therefore, closely aligns with the Non-Alignment Movement and actively engages with the Organization of Turkic States as a leading member state (see EDM, October 30, 2019, March 6, 2024; Azertag.az, October 20, 2023; Foreign Affairs Ministry of Azerbaijan October 25, 2023; Azernews.az November 6, 2024). Baku has made it clear that Azerbaijan is part of the Turkic family (President.az, February 14, September 23, 2024). As such, Baku pursues a foreign policy that seeks to avoid embroilment in the geopolitical and ideological confrontations between the West and Russia while emphasizing the importance of a new Turkic center of power.

Baku and Yerevan have made slow, troubled, yet significant progress toward the resolution of the conflict. They have achieved the delimitation and demarcation of a portion of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border without Russian involvement, and this process is still ongoing (Armenianweekly.com, October 23, 2024; Jam-news.net, January 17; Report.az January 22). Under such circumstances, the Kremlin seeks an increased significance in the deployment of the Russian forces along the proposed Armenian-Azerbaijani transport connection, otherwise known as the Zangezur Corridor (Al-monitor, December 4, 2023; Jam-news.net, Vereiq.am, Mehrnews.com, September 9, 2024; TASS,  Trtrussian.com, September 11, 2024; see EDM, September 12, 2024; Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, 2024). This would allow Moscow to create a mechanism to ensure its continued leverage. Yerevan’s categorical refusal of such deployment, however, has rendered that perspective ineffective (Ekhokavkaza.com November 23, 2023; Gfsis.org, 2024).

In this context, Moscow’s interest in increasing influence in Georgia goes far beyond Georgia itself. Rather, it is more about influencing the whole of the South Caucasus. By virtue of its geostrategic location, Georgia appears, for the Kremlin, a “to be or not to be” question for broader Russian presence in the South Caucasus. Moscow’s desire to draw Tbilisi closer to its orbit is evident, but Russia lacks effective leverage (TASS, January 18, 2023; Rtvi.com, July 31, 2024; Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry, October 16, 2024). Moscow’s challenge is to operationalize Georgia’s strategic location as the key factor due to Russia’s 2008 invasion of the country and the subsequent official recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Breaking with the West, the main security guarantor for the country over the past couple of decades, would almost inevitably cause Tbilisi to become dependent on Moscow. If Russia manages to win Georgia back, there would be serious ramifications for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgia is a door for Armenia and Azerbaijan to engage with strategic international partners and access European markets (Georgian Public Broadcaster, January 26, 2024; JAM News, April 4, 2024; see EDM, June 21, 2024; Azernews, January 30, 2025). It is neither in Baku nor Yerevan’s interest to see this Georgian door restricted in any way or controlled by Moscow.

Restoration of Soviet-era railway connections extending from Russia to Georgia, Armenia, Iran, and Türkiye has long been on Moscow’s regional geopolitical agenda (Mgimo.ru November 2, 2012; Civil.ge, February 27, 2017; see EDM January 25, 2018; JAM News, January 14, 2021). Amid objections from the Georgian political opposition and civil society, however, the Georgian government has reluctantly refrained from conceding. Georgia’s Parliamentary Speaker, Shalva Papuashvili, has publicly rejected the proposal (Sovanews.tv, May 14, 2023; Rossaprimavera.ru, June 29, 2023). The possible restoration would blow the feasibility of the Zangezur Corridor, hence neutralizing the Armenian-Azerbaijani incentive for peace. Furthermore, such a scenario would entail increased Russian influence over strategic energy and transit infrastructure from the Azerbaijani shores of the Caspian to Türkiye and the Black Sea via Georgia (Russiancouncil.ru, March 3, 2023; Ekhokavkaza.com, November 23, 2023). Incidentally, the recent downing of an Azerbaijani passenger airplane by the Russian air defense has raised concerns for Baku (The Moscow Times, December 27, 2024; see EDM, January 15; Turan.az, February 5).

Against this backdrop, the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace treaty and normalization still remain out of reach due to incompatible stances of the two states (Eurasianet.org October 28, 2023; Report.az, January 29). They should be wary, however, that the negotiation options available to them today may become unavailable in the foreseeable future, especially in case of a breakthrough, be it a truce, ceasefire, or other arrangement, between Ukraine and Russia. In such a case, Russia and influential international actors may be able to refocus on Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. That scenario does not necessarily promise positive outcomes for either Armenia or Azerbaijan. Armenia’s experience attests to the fact that over-reliance on Russia, or any other great power, is not a sustainable strategy. Similarly, Azerbaijan’s case demonstrates that the involvement of great powers is not inherently favorable either.

Ultimately, little leeway remains for Baku and Yerevan to utilize this brief opportunity effectively. Both states should reflect on whether they have a plan B in case of positive developments in negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, especially if it is combined with normalized Georgian-Russian relations.