Russia Updates Nuclear Doctrine, Lowering Threshold for Use of Nuclear Weapons (Part 1)

Executive Summary:

• The Kremlin announced updates to Russia’s nuclear doctrine, lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons by expanding the list of conditions that would justify such a measure.
• These updates are intended to serve as a warning to the West and legitimize fears of a potential nuclear response to Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory using Western- or Ukrainian-made long-range weaponry.
• Russia’s nuclear umbrella now extends to Belarus. This may offer more insight into the use of tactical nuclear weapons, including scenarios such as preventive strikes, which have been hinted at by both Russian and Belarusian military officials.

On September 25, Russian President Vladimir Putin chaired a meeting of the Permanent Conference of the Security Council on Nuclear Deterrence, updating the country’s nuclear policy (Kremlin.ru, September 25; see EDM, September 30). The updated Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence expanded the category of states and military alliances against which a nuclear response could be conducted. The timing of these updates coincides with debates in the West over whether to allow Ukraine to use long-range weapons against targets on Russian territory and is likely a tactic to deter this authorization.

The updates to the nuclear doctrine include a list of non-nuclear military threats that the Kremlin seeks to deter:

On the one hand, Russia mirrored the wording of its doctrinal documents from the 2000s. In particular, the 2000 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation declared that the country reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies. More to the point, the document suggested that nuclear weapons could be used in response to a large-scale conventional attack in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation (Kremlin.ru, April 21, 2000).

The first, second, and third updated and supplemented conditions establish a new, lower threshold, which hypothetically allows Russia to use nuclear weapons if Ukraine attacks Russian territory with both North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) weapons and long-range weapons of its own production (Kommersant, September 4). This would also apply to the invasion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) into Russian territory—no doubt a reference to the AFU’s Kursk incursion. The Kremlin presumes that the incursion would not have occurred without the explicit approval of the United States and NATO (see EDM, July 5, 2023, August 15, September 25).

Pavel Podvig, head of the “Russian Nuclear Forces” project at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, believes that the additions and revisions made to permit the use of nuclear weapons in the event of aggression from a non-nuclear state backed by a nuclear power to be strategically significant. He claims that this formulation was specifically crafted to influence the ongoing debates about allowing Ukraine to use long-range weapons against targets on Russian soil (X.com/russianforces, September 25; Meduza, September 27). 

This possibility, however, already exists in current Russian doctrinal provisions. Russia has pledged not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, except in cases where they act in conjunction or alliance with nuclear states. This formulation was adopted in 1995 as a result of the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the Review and Extension of the Treaty (United Nations, 1995).

Russia has expanded its nuclear umbrella to cover Belarus, which will soon be formalized in a security guarantee treaty between the two countries by the end of this year. It will include principles for the use of nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as other methods of protection for both countries within the Union State (Belta, September 2). For this reason, Putin mentioned coordinating these issues with Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. This implies extending Russia’s nuclear-use conditions to Belarus as well. Since Russia has already deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, this provision was inevitable (see EDM, March 13, May 9).

Dmitry Peskov, Russia’s presidential press secretary, said that Putin’s proposals to change the nuclear doctrine could be considered a signal to Western countries. In that sense, the Kremlin is explicitly threatening the West of the consequences of participating in an attack on Russia by various means, including conventional ones. Peskov did not disclose whether the possible abandonment of the moratorium on nuclear tests was discussed as part of the changes in doctrine (RBC, September 26). Shortly before the meeting of the Security Council, however, the head of the Russian Federation’s Central Test Site on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, Rear Admiral Andrei Sinitsyn, said that the test site, its personnel, the laboratory and test base are ready to resume full-scale nuclear weapons testing activities if and when the command arrives (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, September 17).

Reportedly, the Russian Ministry of Defense initiated internal consultations on changing the procedures for the use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) and strategic ground-based nuclear forces. Allegedly, the Russian General Staff was tasked with revising the strategy for the use of nuclear weapons in connection with the risks of escalation due to its war with Ukraine. The scope for TNW use was expanded, and the possibility of a preventive strike by ground-based strategic missile forces, supported by nuclear strikes of submarines and strategic aviation, was outlined (Octagon.media, January 18, 2023).

Putin confirmed that Russia was considering changes in nuclear doctrine in June. He linked the need for these changes with lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and the development of ultra-low-yield explosive nuclear devices by the West. Simultaneously, he hinted that the use of nuclear weapons could increase the speed of achieving Russia’s goals in its war against Ukraine and the confrontation with the West (RBC, June 7). Later, the connection between the revision of the nuclear doctrine and the war with Ukraine was confirmed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his deputy, Sergei Ryabkov, complaining of  the escalatory course of Russia’s Western opponents (TASS, August 27, September 1).

The updated nuclear doctrine lowers the threshold for Russia’s use of nuclear weapons. It remains, however, qualitative and general. There are no tools for its quantitative assessment. This is, on the one hand, due to the Kremlin’s desire to maintain an air of nuclear uncertainty and ambiguity, thus exerting psychological influence on its opponents. On the other hand, the updated provisions do not clarify the role of tactical nuclear weapons and the conditions for their use. The scenarios (counter-retaliatory strike, retaliatory strike, first use) of the use of nuclear weapons stipulated by the old and updated Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence still refer to strategic nuclear forces, leaving questions regarding the possibility for the Russian land, naval, and aerospace forces’ use of non-strategic (tactical and operational-tactical) nuclear weapons. Victor Yesin, a retired colonel-general and the former head of the Main Headquarters of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces (1994–1996) asserted that the Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence represent only the open, unclassified part in the field of nuclear planning (YouTube.com, November 7, 2023).

The forthcoming treaty on security guarantees between Minsk and Moscow may shed light on the role of tactical nuclear weapons and scenarios of their use, including preventive strikes, which has been hinted at by both the Russian and Belarusian militaries (see EDM, March 13, April 30).