Russian Intrigues in Middle East Surge

Executive Summary:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin summoned Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad to Moscow for a secret meeting the same day Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the US Congress, demonstrating Putin’s scramble to maintain influence in the Middle East.
• Russia’s renewed interest in the Middle East is due to the growing influence of other regional powers, such as China’s recent mediation between Palestinian factions.
• The Kremlin seeks to portray itself as a champion of the struggle for dismantling the US-dominated world order. Its war against Ukraine, however, proves Moscow’s ongoing propensity for violent disorder in its vision of a multipolar world.

On July 24, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad was summoned to Moscow for a secret meeting in the Kremlin with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the same day that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint session of the US Congress. The visit was announced only the following day when al-Assad was already back in Damascus, which was hardly a coincidence (Kommersant, July 25). Few details about the talks were released, but Putin’s pronouncement that the situation in the Middle East “tends to deteriorate” could be more than just a trivial observation (Kremlin.ru, July 25). Moscow is worried about the decline of its influence in the region and presumes that only a spike in tensions will grant it new opportunities to restore that diminished profile.

Russia’s capacity for supporting and controlling the al-Assad regime is shrinking as Syria mutates into a narco-state specializing in the production and export of the synthetic amphetamine Captagon (fenethylline) (Izvestiya, July 25). The military intervention that used to be the main instrument of Russian power projection is increasingly difficult to sustain as the Black Sea Fleet has been weakened by Ukrainian strikes and blocked by the Turkish closure of the Straits (see EDM, March 11, 26). An implicit illustration of this maritime weakness was the cancellation of the traditional naval parade in Kronstadt (Lenta.ru, July 26; Novye Izvestiya, July 17). Additionally, the nuclear submarine Kazan and frigate Admiral Gorshkov returned to the bases of the Northern Fleet after their long voyage to Cuba in mid-June instead of making a detour to St. Petersburg (MK.ru, July 21).

A preamble to al-Assad’s abrupt visit to Moscow was played in the UN Security Council, where Russia holds the rotating chairmanship (Izvestiya, July 17). Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov initiated a special session on the crisis in the Middle East, primarily to pin blame for escalation on the United States (Kommersant, July 17). His attempt to disparage US President Joe Biden’s plan for a ceasefire in Gaza betrays anxiety about the key role Washington plays in promoting peace talks and consolidating its regional influence (RIAC, July 15). Russia cannot offer any constructive proposition for managing the Palestinian problem. Thus, it is trying instead to position itself as a mediator in the cautious rapprochement between Syria and Türkiye (Nezavisimaya gazeta, July 25).

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan hardly needs such mediation in this relationship. Still, he is upset about Putin’s reluctance to pay his long-promised visit to Ankara, even after the pointed reminder at their brief meeting on the margins of the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Astana (Vedomosti, July 3; Valdai Club, July 18).

Putin, however, appears more inclined to sign a treaty on a comprehensive strategic partnership with Iran negotiated over several years than maintain his relationship with Erdogan (TASS, July 24). The Kremlin holds some concerns about the newly elected and putatively reform-oriented President Masoud Pezeshkian, who might be more interested in softening the confrontation with the United States (The Insider, July 9). If finalized, the Russian-Iranian agreement is certain to arouse many questions in the Persian Gulf region, which Putin tried to preempt in a recent phone conversation with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (RBC.ru, July 17).

The Kremlin leader’s plan to upgrade a partnership with Iran directly counters Netanyahu’s proposal for building an “Abraham Alliance” of regional stakeholders to deter security threats emanating from Iran (Svoboda.org, July 24). Moscow assumes that chances for organizing such an alliance are slim and points out that the reaction was somewhat mixed even in the US Congress (Interfax, July 25). What is seen as far more probable is Israel’s offensive operation into southern Lebanon aimed at destroying Hezbollah’s capabilities for cross-border strikes, particularly after the escalation that compelled Netanyahu to cut his visit to the United States short (Nezavisimaya gazeta, July 25; Gazeta.ru, July 28). Israel’s retaliatory strike on Port Hodeida in Yemen is presumed to be just another demonstration of its capacity for long-distance attacks, as Moscow was irritated by the Houthi drone and missile strikes on ships carrying Russian goods (RBC.ru, July 22).

China’s diplomacy in mediating an agreement between Hamas, Fatah, and a score of other Palestinian factions has prompted a new surge of Russian intrigues in the region (Vedomosti, July 24). Moscow has earlier tried to promote such a deal and was rather surprised that Beijing had scored this success without cultivating ties with Palestinian groupings of various persuasions, including Hamas (RIA-Novosti, June 6). The most likely explanation for this is money, and while Russia keeps opening new credit lines for clients and friendly states, including Iran, China’s coffers are far less limited (Izvestiya, July 26). Russian experts struggle to grasp the scale of corrections in the aims of China’s foreign policy caused by the accumulating and conveniently denied problems in the economy of its pivotal strategic partner (Profile.ru, July 24). Additionally, worries about a probable reduction of demand for Russian hydrocarbons translate into a greater urge to prove Russia’s relevance in such a crucial region (RIAC, July 22).

The problem with Russian activities in the Middle East is that the exaggerated anti-Americanism and the newly strengthened criticism of Israel can appeal to the proverbial “Arab street” but much less so to the pragmatic and self-serving elites. Similar to every dictator, Putin has nothing but disdain for the disgruntled masses and fears their sudden outbursts of anger. However, he seeks to gain respect from the rulers who excel at hiding their true feelings and intentions behind demonstrative deference. They know perfectly well that Russia’s loud discourse is not supported by its capacity for projecting power, diminished by a shortage of supply and resources. This was further illuminated by the destruction of a column of Wagner mercenaries in northern Mali this past weekend (MK.ru, July 28).

Russia seeks to portray itself as a champion of the struggle to dismantle the US-dominated world order, but the alternative is not just vague—it is dangerous. Russia’s brutal aggression against Ukraine proves the propensity for violent disorder inherent to its vision of a multipolar world. Many Middle Eastern rulers prefer to keep a safe distance from the war in Europe, but they know that defeating the aggression—as was done in Kuwait in 1991—is one of the only ways to keep instability in check in their conflict-rich region.