Russian Soldiers in Ukraine Use Smartphone Videos for Protest at Home

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 22 Issue:

(Source: TASS)

Executive Summary:

  • Russian soldiers fighting against Ukraine are making and sending home video protests to their local governments about a wide variety of issues, boosting the profile of opposition causes.
  • Video protests from soldiers are increasing because commanders are unwilling to spark more anger in the ranks by confiscating smartphones. The videos are often effective because officials in Russia are less willing to ignore the voices of soldiers than they are of civilians.
  • One indication of Kremlin concern about this development is a new plan for a census of smartphones and related devices, which would make it easier for commanders to restrict soldiers’ smartphone use.

Moscow has long been worried about veterans of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine causing problems when they return to Russia (see EDM, January 19, 2024, May 29). Russian soldiers in Ukraine, however, are already creating problems for their local governments. These soldiers are increasingly using their smartphones while fighting in Ukraine, not just to communicate with friends and families but also to send video protests to officials in their hometowns about a wide variety of issues (Novaya Gazeta, June 7; Kedr, June 10).

Video protests are growing in number because commanders are unwilling to confiscate soldiers’ phones and punish those using them. Even though there is currently a ban on soldiers at the front using smartphones, commanders are not enforcing these rules, lest they spark more anger (Oreanda; Smolnarod, August 24, 2024). Protest videos produced by Russian soldiers in Ukraine are increasingly effective because officials in Russia are less willing to ignore the voices of soldiers than civilians. Civilian activists view military personnel as potential allies because soldiers can speak out more freely and are more likely to be heard by the Kremlin. Unsurprisingly, the Russian government wants to stop soldiers’ infusion of support for opposition groups and plans to conduct a country-wide census of smartphones and related devices (Rossiiskaya gazeta, June 8). The census could make it easier for Russian commanders to restrict soldiers’ smartphone use, but some say that the plan could exacerbate the issue (Svobodnaya Pressa, June 16).

Russians have been using videos to try to influence government policy for as long as phones have been able to record and broadcast clips. Kotlovan, also known as The Foundation Pit, a celebrated Russian film directed by Andrey Gryazev in 2020, exemplifies the trend, consisting almost entirely of video appeals to the government (Art Doc Fest, 2020). Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine using video clips to influence officials in their home towns and regions is a more recent development, one that Aleksandr Leonidovich, a journalist for Novaya Gazeta, and researchers at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics (HSE) have chronicled in detail (Novaya Gazeta, June 7; Kedr, June 10). Leonidovich stresses that video protests by soldiers in Putin’s invasion forces are one of the last venues for Russians to protest without the expectation of punishment. Soldiers often succeed in their causes, given that officials do not want to appear indifferent to the opinions of those fighting “for Russia.”  Opposition groups recognize the sway disgruntled soldiers hold with the government and have begun working closely with them in a united front that poses a distinct threat to the Kremlin.

Soldiers fighting against Ukraine are coming up with videos “on the most varied subjects” (Novaya Gazeta, June 7). Among them are protests to officials about the possible destruction of a social club in Moscow, the elimination of local self-government in Krasnoyarsk krai, power struggles among Cossack groups, and conflicts over land ownership in Dagestan (YouTube/@Kurush2560, September 9, 2024; VK Video/@popechenie, November 18, 2024; RuTube/Natalya Makeeva: poet i zhurnalist, November 27, 2024; VK Video/@metrokievskaya, April 24; VK Video/@tvknew, April 28). These and other videos share a common message, as seen in a video about a local government mishandling trash: “While we are in the zone of the Special Military Operation and shedding our blood, in our small motherland, our wives, children, and parents are being poisoned” (Dzen/IA “Russkii GUP Prodakshn”, August 26, 2023). In some cases, local governments acquiesced to soldiers’ demands or were more willing to compromise after seeing videos from Russian soldiers in Ukraine. The HSE study, which focused on environmental protests, notes that soldier-produced videos represent “a new form of ecological protest” in Russia, one that is likely to spread because it is nominally apolitical and often effective (Kedr, June 10; Window on Eurasia, June 13).

Soldier-produced videos involve some issues that do not present an easy compromise. Some Russian soldiers have used videos to call on officials to take an even harder line on immigration and ethnic minorities, threatening to take violent action against these groups once they return from Ukraine (Odnoklassniki/Za CCCR, November 11, 2023; Odnoklassniki/Putin-today.ru, March 26, 2024; Vkontakte/@horizon_russian, March 10). There are also videos from non-Russian ethnic groups fighting in Putin’s war against Ukraine wherein soldiers protest their ethnic groups’ treatment by Moscow. Muslim soldiers in the Russian army filmed a video to complain about the closure of a prayer room in the settlement of Malakhovka in Moscow oblast, pointing out that many who used the room support the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine. The soldiers urged Russian officials not to forget that Muslims are also fighting in Russia’s war against Ukraine (RuTube/Romano_drom, December 17, 2024).

Two other videos regarding sensitive ethnic issues featured a group of Bashkir soldiers squared off against a group of ethnically Russian soldiers. Armed Bashkir soldiers lamented that while they were fighting in Ukraine for Russia, Russian officials oppressed Bashkirs in the crackdown following environmental protests in Bashkortostan, a Turkic Muslim republic in the Middle Volga (YouTube/Bashkurdistan, January 17, 2024). The video, which was mostly in Bashkir, pointedly warned the Russians in Russian that if they “do not stop going against our people, our fathers, and our mothers, we will leave out positions and come after you. If you want war, you will get it” (YouTube/Bashkurdistan, January 17, 2024). Armed ethnically Russian troops produced a second video in response, condemning the “extremist” Bashkirs. According to Leonidovich, these soldiers demanded that Moscow send Bashkir nationalists to Russian units where they would be “re-educated” and taught “to love their homeland” (Novaya Gazeta, June 7). Ruslan Gabbasov, the head of the Committee of the Bashkir National Movement Abroad, claims that the Bashkir soldiers are not intimidated, demanding with some success that the Russian soldiers involved in the second video apologize (Telegram/@rg_bashkort, April 16). Despite this, the exchange shows cracks in the ethnic cohesion of Russian forces fighting against Ukraine.

As Russia’s war against Ukraine shifts from a focus on ground forces to drones, the Kremlin’s control of civil society is moving toward concern about video activism among soldiers. Moscow sees such videos as a threat and would like to confiscate soldiers’ smartphones. Smartphone confiscation, however, may cause more resistance and hence more problems for Moscow (Svobodnaya Pressa, June 11). Just like the drone-centric war, the “video war” is likely to continue and increasingly affect both the front lines and areas deep inside the Russian Federation.