Russia’s Federal Subjects Quietly Cutting Subsidies for Military Recruits

Executive Summary:

• Some Russian federal subjects are reducing the bonuses awarded to new military recruits, though earlier in Moscow’s war against Ukraine, the regions competed among themselves to offer the highest subsidies.  
• These new cutbacks stem from growing financial constraints, also reflected in overall spending cuts, rather than war weariness, let alone any protest of the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine.
• Lower bonuses from federal subjects for military recruits are forcing Moscow to find new ways to fill the army’s ranks, and growing financial pressures on regional governments are prompting regions and republics to demand that Moscow return more of their tax revenue.

The partial mobilization in 2022 and discussions of a general mobilization to fill the ever-depleting ranks of the Russian military sparked widespread anger earlier in the war, leading to the flight of tens of thousands of Russians abroad. Since then, the Kremlin decided to force the federal subjects to ensure their manpower needs were met. Regional governments accordingly competed with one another to offer increasingly larger bonuses and subsidies, allowing most to meet Moscow’s demand for soldiers but forcing them to cut back on financing essential services, such as schools and hospitals (see EDM, October 24, 2024). This decentralized approach to military recruitment led many Russians to blame regional and republic authorities for the treatment of soldiers, rather than focusing their anger on those making decisions in Moscow.

Some of Russia’s federal subjects are beginning to quietly reduce bonuses for those who sign up to fight the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine (Idel Realii, October 8; The Moscow Times; Vazhnie Istorii, October 16). Other regional governments have announced that those who wish to receive bonuses must sign up by a specific date, implying that such bonuses will soon be unavailable. Reducing these subsidies eliminates a major reason that many sign up for the military. These new cutbacks stem from growing financial constraints, reflected in regional governments’ overall spending cuts, rather than war weariness or any protest against the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine (see EDM, July 7, September 23). Federal subjects are reducing spending on a wide variety of issues, including bonuses and subsidies that have been used to encourage behavior in line with Moscow’s interests, including money for select businesses and pregnant students (see EDM, March 13, April 17; Golos Regionov, October 15; Ekho; The Moscow Times, October 17; Versia; Agenstvo, October 18).

Cutbacks in bonuses for those who agree to join the Russian military are not an anti-war protest. They reflect a tectonic shift in the ways Russian officials operate. Moscow must find new ways to recruit the men it needs for combat, either by transferring more funds to the federal subjects to allow them to offer large bonuses, utilizing reservists, or increasing coercion—possibly by declaring a highly unpopular general mobilization—all of which will cause the Kremlin difficulties. The governments and populations of the regions and republics are likely to be increasingly angry about their financial problems, which reflect the Kremlin’s failure to return a large portion of the taxes they pay to Moscow and its imposition of unfunded liabilities that the governments of the federal subjects are supposed to somehow make up for on their own (see EDM, September 9). By refusing to fully fund bonuses for the military and other Moscow-centric issues, regional and republic governments are demonstrating that they have the power to exert pressure on the center, despite their subjugation to Putin (see EDM, July 31; Versia, October 18).

Since the beginning of October, four federal subjects—Tatarstan, Chuvashia, Mari El, and Samara—have cut back bonuses to those who join the military from more than two million rubles ($20,000) to 400,000 rubles ($4,000) (Ideal Realii, October 8, October 13; Telegram/@horizontal_russia, October 15; The Moscow Times, October 16). This reduction follows similar cuts in 2024 and earlier this year in Belgorod oblast and the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District (Kommersant, October 28, 2024; RBC, April 15). No federal subject is discussing eliminating such subsidies altogether, given that in 2024, Putin ordered every oblast, krai, and republic to pay a minimum bonus of 400,000 rubles ($4,000) to those who join the military (Kommersant, July 31, 2024). Recent reductions contradict the efforts of a few federal officials earlier this year to increase these payments, in some cases by asking regional businesses to cover a significant portion of the total (TASS, April 29; Telegram/@govvrn36, October 2; Telegram/@Govorit_NeMoskva, October 6).

Some Russian analysts suggest that the regions feel able to cut bonuses because the overall economic situation in the Russian Federation has deteriorated to the point that smaller figures may still motivate those who are economically desperate (The Moscow Times, October 16). The main reason for these reductions, however, is that the budgets of the federal subjects are running increasing deficits and regional leaders are scrambling to find ways to reduce spending to limit further cutbacks and the acquisition of new debt (The Moscow Times, October 16). Mounting financial challenges suggest that more federal agencies will reduce or eliminate military recruitment bonuses, even if a few can still be persuaded to maintain or even increase large bonuses (see EDM, September 24).

For Moscow, these cuts will necessitate transferring more funds from other sectors to the federal subjects, allowing bonuses to be maintained. The Kremlin could also resort to coercion, including a full or partial mobilization, which would be extremely unpopular and deleteriously impact the Russian economy. For heads of federal subject governments, growing financial challenges mean that they will find themselves caught between Moscow’s military demands and the needs of the residents of their territories, which Moscow’s war spending makes it impossible for them to meet. Some, perhaps most, will capitulate to the center because the Kremlin appoints regional leaders. Others, however, will not, as they observe other regional and republic leaders getting away with reducing bonuses. Federal subjects cutting subsidies for army recruitment will spark new center-periphery tensions as Moscow increases repression, and the regions and republics suffer as a result.